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Abstract 
 
What explains the Development Bank of Latin America’s (CAF, in Spanish) continuity and 
expansion since the 1990s? This thesis explores how an initially small Andean development 
bank crafted a successful strategy to survive in a troubled region and eventually thrive as an 
important lending source. This thesis argues that CAF’s expansion can be attributed to four main 
factors: 1) leadership, 2) institutional design, 3) member governments’ preferences and 4) 
Brazil’s push for regional cooperation beyond trade.  
 
Theoretically, this thesis draws upon two sets of interrelated academic debates to explain 
CAF’s growth: 1) International Political Economy (IPE) and International Organization (IO) 
theories discussing the main motivations for the design, culture, and behaviour of international 
institutions, and 2) IPE and International Relations (IR) literature on national interests, regional 
cooperation and development governance in South America.  
 
This thesis makes an empirical contribution to existing literature by providing the first 
detailed analysis of the history of CAF, while seeking to explain the reasons behind its expansion 
within a region in which defaults on external debt obligations have not been uncommon. 
Theoretically, this thesis invites scholars to reengage with the study of leadership in IOs. The 
study of CAF highlights the importance of successful agency under strong leadership in the 
survival and growth of RFIs. This thesis accounts for how and when CAF has employed its 
granted discretion and taken advantage of its institutional features to expand its mission and act 
in ways that were not originally outlined by its principals. It also examines how CAF has 
successfully balanced in its own terms the distinct demands of two types of stakeholders 
(member countries and credit rating agencies), while partaking in regional discussions and 
agendas related to infrastructure development. Moreover, this thesis shows that the rise of certain 
states as regional leaders can also influence an IO’s strategy in trying to understand and engage 
more often with a state that is leading the agenda on regional cooperation.  
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Chapter 1. A unique sub-regional bank that found a way to stand out in Latin 
America 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This study demonstrates how in a large world of powerful multilateral agencies, a small sub-
regional development bank under strong leadership can successfully use its agency—taking 
advantage of its institutional design, member preferences and the regional environment— to craft 
a strategy in order to survive in a troubled region and eventually thrive as an important lending 
source. When it comes to multilateral lending in South America, most academic debates in 
International Political Economy (IPE), International Relations (IR) and regional studies have 
historically focused on the roles played by the World Bank (WB) and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB). Nevertheless, in the last decade, countries in the region have been 
turning increasingly to a variety of sources beyond these multilateral agencies, including extra-
regional and sub-regional arrangements for long-term development financing. In the midst of this 
challenging and changing lending environment, there is an institution— the Andean 
Development Corporation (CAF, in Spanish)—that has shown an incredible capacity throughout 
its existence to accommodate its vision, rules and procedures to distinct economic and political 
conditions within its member countries. 
CAF, recently renamed the Development Bank of Latin America, was originally a small 
regional trade bank established in 1968 by five Andean countries. At present, the number of 
shareholders has grown to eighteen countries, including most Latin American countries. This 
thesis provides the first detailed analysis of the history of CAF, while seeking to explain the 
reasons behind its survival and growth within a region in which defaults on external debt 
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obligations have not been uncommon. Compared to other regional agreements with limited 
participation and agendas, CAF continues to attract its members’ interest and high demand for 
loans and related services. What explains then CAF’s continuity and expansion since the 1990s? 
CAF’s success and proactive leadership can be captured first in terms of its current 
lending figures. While the institution accounted for less than 5% of multilateral financing in the 
region in the 1980s, today it provides around 30% of the total multilateral lending in Latin 
America and, most notably, has taken over the top spot in recent years in terms of approved 
financing for infrastructure development (Garcia, 2014; Moody’s, 2013). CAF’s annual 
commitments to Latin America are now on a par with that of the IADB and the WB. From 2007 
to 2011, CAF’s approvals in the region accounted for US$ 44,3 million, while the World Bank 
approved US$ 32,6 million, and the IADB, US$ 58, 9 million (see Appendix A). Moreover, CAF 
is still the main source of multilateral financing for the five founding member countries (Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) (Moody’s, 2013). After seven years of growth 
averaging 12% annually, CAF’s loan portfolio totaled $16.4 billion by the end of 2012 
(Moody’s, 2013). By comparison, another RFI in South America, the Plata Basin Financial 
Development Fund—Fonplata, in Spanish—has had a much more limited lending impact that 
CAF, with a loan portfolio of US$ 664 million by the end of 2013 (see Appendix B). 
But beyond loan figures, CAF makes an interesting case of study for IO and global 
governance scholars due to its unique features and developments and how these have shaped its 
survival and performance under a clear institutional mandate. CAF’s is essentially a Latin 
American-owned institution, which at first glance could be perceived as a limiting factor for 
growth, considering that the existence of donor countries is a defining aspect of most regional 
financial institutions (RFIs) worldwide. The unique shareholder-borrower feature has been, 
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however, an important determining factor of its institutional success and has enhanced its 
management’s ability to promote the entity within international credit markets. CAF has received 
strong support from its member countries through remarkable debt service, ongoing increases in 
capital and non-interference with CAF’s management. CAF has also ultimately survived a 
diversity of regional economic and political integration strategies and agendas in the last four 
decades, while ensuring that it continues to have a role to play in development financing in Latin 
America (despite the existence of well-established RFIs and the emergence of regional and 
bilateral financing alternatives).   
 
1.2 Framework for explaining CAF’s expansion and contributions to knowledge 
Research on CAF, despite its unique owner-recipient structure and increasing importance in the 
region, is still limited. With the exception of Humphrey (2012, 2014) and Humphrey and 
Michaelowa (2010, 2013)—whose research provides detailed discussions on CAF’s institutional 
design and operational characteristics—most available literature on CAF consists of brief 
discussions in some United Nations’ publications focusing on Latin America’s regional 
institutions. At the empirical level, this dissertation is the first detailed analysis of CAF that 
accounts for the factors that have contributed to its survival and growth and attempts to provide a 
comprehensive story of the institution since its creation. Through archival and secondary 
research, this work reveals that prevalent regional dynamics were important in consolidating a 
unique constitutive agreement in the 1970s that would in later decades allow the institution’s 
management to carve a niche for the institution—infrastructure lending—while entering the 
international financial markets to expand its portfolio and impact in the region. This thesis also 
reveals that CAF is an institution that has had to reinvent itself throughout the years to 
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accommodate members’ changing preferences dependent on specific economic, regional, 
political and development contexts. But through these reinventions, CAF has not been a mere 
tool for members to achieve their national development agendas but instead, the entity—through 
a clear mandate defined by its Executive President, Enrique Garcia—has become a well-
respected technical advisor, financier and active participant in regional discussions, independent 
of the political inclinations of member nations. 
At the analytical level, this study shows how the principal-agent (P-A) literature can 
serve as the foundation to better account for RFI’s (agents) and country members’ (principals) 
actions and for how and when smaller banks like CAF employ their granted discretion and 
actually take advantage of their institutional features to expand their mission and act in ways that 
were not originally outlined by the principals. Recently, the work of Humphrey (2012, 2014) and 
Humphrey and Michaelowa (2010, 2013) has engaged with the examination of shareholding 
arrangements within three RFIs (CAF, the IADB and the WB) and the role of agency within 
these institutions. For example, CAF has a unique owner-recipient structure in which 
shareholders and borrowing countries are two sides of the same coin. As such, CAF can be 
considered a borrower-dominated regional bank. These shareholding arrangements are very 
distinct from other institutions. Industrialized non-borrowing countries largely continue to 
determine lending policies at the WB while at the IADB, there is a stronger but still secondary 
influence of member states that are also borrowers (Humphrey, 2012). These are valuable 
contributions to the literature and this study expands these authors’ analysis of CAF’s 
institutional design. At the same time, it presents a wider lens than their institutional 
examination. Besides CAF’s unique shareholder agreements, other features embedded in its 
constitutional agreement (such as a non-resident board and its preferred creditor status) have 
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been crucial for the institution to balance both members and global markets’ demands, while 
carrying out CAF’s revamped mandate outlined in the 1990s by its current Executive President.  
This study also takes into account other factors that have not been discussed in depth in 
the available literature and that are vital for better understanding how CAF (and possibly other 
RFIs) operate in order to remain self-sustaining institutions. First, this work reintroduces the 
study of leadership as a crucial variable for better understanding how international institutions 
(IOs) use their autonomy. In the last two decades, most studies have treated regional IOs (the 
agent) as a unitary actor, even when P-A theory has been complemented with constructivist 
insights when discussing bureaucratic cultures. This study suggests that in order to understand 
how RFIs actually outline their agenda and approve budgets, we may need to look at the role of 
the executive president, especially when the individual has become a well-recognized personality 
in the region and has successfully navigated the policies and priorities of both left- and right-of-
center governments.  
This work also argues that to better understand RFIs’ actions, we also require an 
examination of how member states (principals) manifest and act on their national and regional 
interests and how institutions foresee and/or act on those governments’ plans. This is particularly 
relevant for a smaller bank like CAF that has survived in a tumultuous region where visions and 
recipes for achieving economic growth and regional integration tend to ebb and flow over time. 
Members’ preferences—some of them constant throughout CAF’s existence and others more 
recent due to ideational motives and economic factors—have facilitated Garcia’s role and 
contributed to the institution’s work in the region. Moreover, this dissertation shows that the rise 
of certain states as regional leaders can also influence an IO’s strategy in trying to understand 
and engage more often with a state that is leading the regional agenda. 
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Therefore, this study contributes to significantly expanding the existing literature on 
CAF, while demonstrating that a detailed study of various theoretical elements is necessary when 
accounting for CAF’s continuity and expansion. This work ultimately argues that CAF’s 
expansion has been possible primarily due to four factors: 1) leadership, 2) institutional design, 
3) member governments’ preferences and 4) Brazil’s push for regional cooperation beyond trade 
(see Figure 1). In order to answer the main research question of this study, the next chapters 
explore how the four explanatory factors have manifested in CAF’s mandate and operations. 
Theoretically, this study draws upon two sets of interrelated academic debates to explain CAF’s 
growth: 1) contrasting IPE and IO theories discussing the main motivations for the design, 
culture, and behaviour of international institutions (including insights on RFIs), and; 2) IPE and 
IR literature on national interests, regional cooperation and development governance in South 
America. The significance of leadership draws on insights from P-A theories and IO leadership 
literature to show how individuals can play autonomous roles. The role of institutional design 
draws on the IO literature on that subject. The role of member governments’ preferences draws 
on development, regional integration (and new forms of regionalism evolving in South America) 
and ideational literatures to show how principals have participated and supported CAF’s mission 
throughout the years. Finally, the role of Brazil and its push for a more comprehensive regional 
agenda draws on realist insights (including a discussion on regional hegemony) and literature on 
regional initiatives beyond trade.  
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Figure 1. Framework for explaining CAF’s growth since the 1990s 
 
 
This is a study that engages then with the role of leadership in IOs and as such, it 
explores the motives that prompted Enrique Garcia—CAF’s Executive President since 1991—to 
define and pursue an institutional agenda and ideology that had three key interrelated goals: 
promoting infrastructure financing, accessing the international markets to expand its lending 
scope and impact in the region, and expanding institutional membership within Latin America. 
Garcia was successful in cultivating an internal culture and bureaucracy that supported his core 
goals for the institution. Meanwhile, Garcia used his charisma, diplomatic abilities and expertise 
working in RFIs to build coalitions and alliances to ensure adequate support from both credit 
rating agencies (CRAs) and member governments. Garcia’s work was crucial in outlining and 
executing a mix of strategies to balance the needs of both groups. In regard to CRAs, CAF has 
delivered a careful expansion of membership and risk diversification, sustained increases of 
1. Leadership 
2. Institutional 
Design 
3. Member 
Governments’ 
Preferences 
4. Brazil’s Push 
For Regional 
Cooperation 
o Outlined CAF’s ideology by identifying clear goals and 
methods to reach them 
o Built a successful bureaucracy that supported the core goals 
o Built coalitions and alliances to ensure adequate support 
within members and credit rating agencies 
o Constitutive agreement established under an international 
treaty giving CAF unique characteristics such as: 
• Non-resident board 
• Membership 
• Preferred creditor status  
o Changed ideological context 
o Ongoing sense of ownership and responsibility 
o Renewed focus on infrastructure financing 
o Expanded regional cooperation agenda, promoting integration 
beyond trade matters (including the establishment of IIRSA) 
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paid-in capital and excellent repayment records. For members, CAF has ensured speedy loan 
approval, low conditionality and loan availability during both economic booms and downturns.  
CAF’s institutional design has provided the necessary foundations for its leadership to 
carry out Garcia’s vision for the institution. CAF was established through a very solid and formal 
constitutive agreement that envisioned the preferences for integration of the founding members 
in the late 1960s. The agreement was key in setting the stage for its later institutional growth, 
since it has given CAF structural foundations to respond and adjust to a variety of geopolitical 
and economic conditions within and beyond the region. The agreement has also facilitated 
management’s operations in the region. For example, the fact that it has a non-resident board, as 
opposed to a permanent one, has permitted management to increase its autonomy in the everyday 
functioning of the institution. The agreement also gave the institution its preferred creditor status, 
which ensures that debt owed to the entity is excluded from debt restructurings carried out by 
official debtors. The special status has contributed to CAF’s excellent record of loan repayment. 
Further, its unique shareholder-borrower member composition has been a crucial feature in 
supporting CAF’s expansion; member governments have developed a sense of ownership and 
responsibility in the survival of the institution.  
When CAF’s mission statement was updated in the mid-1990s to emphasize physical 
interconnection and cross-border development, these areas attracted various non-Andean 
countries that initially joined the entity in the 1990s as associate shareholders. A changed 
ideological context in various member countries combined with an improved fiscal situation after 
the late-1990s regional crises favoured a renewed emphasis on infrastructure. Consequently, 
greater attention could be paid to the role that institutions like CAF can play in member 
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governments’ long-term financing agendas. This factor was relevant for countries in the 
Southern Cone, which were allowed to join the institution as full members in the mid-2005. 
Moreover, CAF’s management has shown an incredible ability to navigate the regional 
landscape, which has been shaped to a great extent by Brazilian interests in the last fifteen years. 
Brazilian foreign policy in this period created a renewed enthusiasm for regional cooperation, 
drawing attention away from trade and focusing instead on the mutual benefits of physical 
integration and framing a South American identity. CAF has been able to capture Brazilian 
priorities, while ensuring its participation in regional infrastructure discussions and schemes such 
as the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA).  
 
1.3.  Overview of the institution and its shareholders 
CAF’s main objective, as outlined in its constitutive agreement, is to promote sustainable 
development and regional integration through credit operations, grants and technical support. 
CAF offers financial structuring services to the public and private sector. Besides its capital, 
CAF raises funds for operations primarily in the international financial markets. CAF’s day-to-
day management is divided into two broad functions: client relationship management and 
financial management. This study explores—in order to answer the research question above— 
CAF’s ability to balance both functions, while ensuring that the institution remains a relevant 
lending agent in the region. This ability has enabled CAF to act as a catalyst of funds for its 
members and also as an advisor for countries when trying to fulfill their development agendas’ 
priorities—especially when it comes to infrastructure.  
CAF has three different classes of shares (A, B, and C), with full-member shareholder 
countries having A and B shares, while associate member countries only holding C shares. The 
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different types of shares come with different entitlements for electing directors to its Board. The 
five original Andean members, in addition to Argentina, Brazil, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay 
are both A and B shareholders. The new full members are each allowed to appoint one director to 
the Board of Directors, while the founding members are allowed to appoint two directors each. 
Commercial banks from member countries also are able to hold series B shares. The other 
member countries hold series C shares which entitle them to elect two principal directors 
collectively (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Types of shares 
Types of shares Description 
Series A shares  
(Available for full 
members) 
• Subscription of Series "A" Ordinary Capital shares is 
available to the governments of each member 
country or to public-sector institutions, semipublic or 
private entities with social or public objectives, as the 
respective government may designate. Currently, the 
ownership of these shares corresponds to Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, either directly or through 
an institution designated by the government.  
Series B 
(Available for full 
members) 
• Subscription of Series "B" shares is available to the 
governments or to public, semipublic or private 
entities of the Member Countries. 
• Series "B" shares may be subscribed by private 
entities from the Member Countries, provided that the 
percentage of their equity interest by country does not 
exceed 49% of the total shareholders for that series. 
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Series C 
(Available for 
associate 
members) 
• The subscription of Series "C" Ordinary Capital shares 
is available to legal entities or natural persons outside 
of the sub-region. Series "C" Ordinary Capital shares 
may be converted into Series "B" Ordinary Capital shares 
once the conditions for the member country’s adhesion to 
the Articles of Agreement, approved by the Shareholders' 
Assembly, have been met by the respective Member 
Country. 
Sources: Data from CAF (2014) and Standard & Poor’s (2013), compiled by author. 
 
In 2005, an amendment to the constitutive agreement was approved so that Latin 
American countries other than the five founding members could become Series A and B 
shareholders. A new phase of growth began then by allowing the admission of new Latin 
American and Caribbean countries as full members of CAF (see Table 2). Non-Latin American 
countries—Spain and Portugal—are not eligible to purchase A or B shares. As of 2013, only 
Spain was represented on the Board of Directors with 4.5% voting power. 
 
Table 2. Full and associate country members  
Full members 
Year of 
Incorporation to 
CAF 
Year Country 
Became Full 
Member 
Peru 
Founding members 1970 
Venezuela 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Bolivia 
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Brazil 1995 2007 
Panama 1997 2008 
Paraguay 1997 2008 
Argentina  2001 2007 
Uruguay  2001 2007 
Associate members    
Mexico 1990  
Chile 1992  
Trinidad and Tobago  1994  
Jamaica 1999  
Spain 2002  
Costa Rica 2002  
Dominican Republic  2004  
Portugal 2009  
Source: CAF - Annual reports   
 
CAF is an institution that has been very active within infrastructure financing, a critical 
component of its story. The biggest share of CAF’s loan portfolio goes towards funding 
infrastructure projects (transportation, telecommunications, electricity, gas and water) (Moody’s, 
2013). At the end of 2012, infrastructure accounted for 70% of the total portfolio, followed by 
social development (19%) and financial intermediation (10%) (Moody’s, 2013). CAF 
headquarters are in Caracas, Venezuela, and it maintains offices in each of the other original full-
member shareholder countries. In addition, it has offices in Argentina, Brazil, Panama, Paraguay, 
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Spain, and Uruguay. The offices in Uruguay and Panama serve as regional hubs for credit 
analysis in the region. The Madrid office serves as a bridge between Europe and Latin America. 
CAF’s governance is based on its constitutive agreement, which dictates that the shareholders’ 
annual regular meeting is the ultimate forum for management and shareholders’ decisions. At 
this meeting, CAF’s Board of Directors reviews various documents and functions including the 
institution’s financial statements, credit policies, annual expense budget, and membership of the 
Board of Directors, among others (Standard & Poor’s, 2013; CAF, 2014a).  
The Board also appoints the Executive President, CAF’s Chief Executive Officer. 
Enrique Garcia took the office in December 1991 and began his fifth five-year term in 2012. 
CAF’s Board of Directors, as previously mentioned, is a non-resident board, meeting only three 
or four times a year. According to CAF’s constitutive agreement: “the Board shall meet 
whenever it agrees to do so, when called by its Chairman, upon the request from at least twenty 
five per cent (25%) of Directors, or upon the request from the Executive President” (CAF, 
2012a, p.21) Consequently, the Board delegates various responsibilities, including credit 
approvals within specified limits, to an executive committee of the Board. Garcia chairs this 
committee, which comprises one director from each of the Series A countries and one director 
representing the collective Series C members. (Standard & Poors, 2013; CAF, 2014.)  
Since the mid-2000s, a substantial political shift to the left has taken place in some 
countries—including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In some 
cases, these governments have criticized the major international financial institutions, while 
trying to restructure their relations with them and searching for alternative financing of their 
own. Throughout these changes, CAF has remained as a relevant and timely financing alternative 
for members, despite the fact that some members have increasingly had more options when it 
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comes to financing their national agendas. The landscape of developing lending is now a maze of 
RFIs, national development banks from Brazil and China and emerging geopolitical institutions 
such as the Bank of South (BOS). The lending provided by the Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES) in South America continues to attract academic and media attention, while reaffirming 
Brazil’s weight in the region as a financing actor.  Fonplata, a small development bank in the 
Southern Cone, has had a much slower expansion than CAF, suggesting that CAF’s rise was 
intentional with a clear mandate by its leadership and not a structural development in the region. 
Fonplata has just begun to follow CAF’s footsteps by creating the position of executive president 
in 2013 and by obtaining the first capital increase—which was pursued by the new president— 
since its creation (Fonplata, 2013).  
Appendix B provides an overview of existing institutions and arrangements for financing 
long-term development projects in South America, including recent financial and non-financial 
highlights. Providing this brief overview is important for this study since it shows how RFIs like 
CAF now coexist with other funding sources, which are often more linked to individual 
countries’ foreign relations. Some recent academic analyses have focused on the renewed 
impetus behind more ambitious and more radical projects such as the Regional Clearance Unity 
System (Sucre, in Spanish) and the Bank of the South (BOS) (see Rosero & Erten 2010; Trucco 
2012). Although these projects will continue to coexist with other financial arrangements in 
South America and to introduce themselves as non-market and non-hegemonic alternatives, their 
impact so far has been limited. The BOS continues to confront serious implementation 
problems—for instance, the Brazilian Congress has not ratified the institution to this day. 
Understanding the continuity and political economy elements of CAF may also help to highlight 
the reasons behind the limited success of more alternative projects.   
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1.4. Methodology  
This study applies a process tracing research method based on qualitative analysis. Primary 
documents, websites, and secondary sources from academia and press releases were consulted to 
inform the analysis of the main internal and external factors impacting CAF’s survival and 
growth. This study compiled and analyzed documents in English, Spanish and Portuguese. When 
non-English documents are cited, translations are the author’s except where otherwise noted. 
Archival documents were important for explaining CAF’s first two decades of existence and they 
were obtained by visiting the Library of Congress in Washington D.C. during the summer of 
2012. The Documentation Center of the IADB Institute for the Integration of Latin America and 
the Caribbean (INTAL) was also an important source since it compiles many documents on 
integration and regional cooperation. Various internal documents were provided by CAF’s 
Centro de Información y Documentación and by the Vice-Presidency of Country Programs 
during fieldwork in Caracas in the Fall of 2012. An exhaustive keyword search and ongoing 
Google alerts were also employed to further explore available documents in the public domain 
related to the geopolitical context in South America, especially since the creation of IIRSA, and 
further information regarding CAF’s institutional dynamics and regional environment.  
To strengthen this analysis, I conducted thirty-nine interviews with the approval of 
Wilfrid Laurier University’s Office of Research Service granted in September 2012. Twenty-five 
respondents were former or current CAF staff—including lengthy interviews with its president 
and vice-president— and fourteen respondents were infrastructure consultants, public officials 
and academics. In-person interviews were conducted in Caracas, Washington, D.C. and Quito. 
Most interviews were in person; only four interviews were conducted via phone. Given the 
limited availability of primary and secondary documents surrounding the day-to-day activities of 
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CAF, especially in regard to its organizational culture, these interviews were crucial to outline 
and better understand the work environment within the institution and to explore how 
relationships are forged with members’ public officials. The interviews were conducted in 
Spanish with a semi-structured format in order to establish commonalities between interviews, 
while granting interviewees the opportunity to further elaborate and identify new processes, 
events and actors that account for CAF’s growth and survival. Where permission was obtained, 
the names and positions of the interviewees are disclosed. Where permission was not obtained, 
the names and/or positions of interviewees are kept confidential at interviewees’ own request. 
When interviewees are cited in this dissertation, the Spanish-English translations were conducted 
by the author.  
George and Bennett (2005) acknowledge the range of different forms of process tracing. 
These authors argue that it ranges from detailed narratives with more explicit use of theory, 
where “at least parts of the narrative are accompanied with explicit causal hypotheses highly 
specific to the case without, however, employing theoretical variables for this purpose or 
attempting to extrapolate the case’s explanation into a generalization.’ (George & Bennett, 2005, 
p. 210-211), to varieties of process tracing where “the investigator constructs a general 
explanation rather than a detailed tracing of a causal process” (Ibid, p. 211).  
Consequently, process tracing can be closely related to historical explanation, which is 
not simply a detailed description of a sequence of events; rather, it draws on theories to explain 
each important step that contributes to causing the outcome (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). This 
dissertation uses the interpretive case study method, employing the theoretical discussion 
developed Chapter 2 to provide an explanation of the particular case of CAF, which according to 
Vennesson (2008) can lead as well to an evaluation and refinement of theories. While the goal 
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may be theory testing, the diverse theoretical approaches presented in Chapter 2 will guide the 
empirical analysis. The study of CAF as a case study within RFI and IO literature provides an 
opportunity to contribute to broader scholarly debates: RFIs are situated at the junction of 
international political economy, systemic developments in globalization and development 
debates. The empirical analysis is presented in the form of historical explanations, supported by 
theoretical foundations, in order to explain CAF’s survival and growth in Latin America. 
Relying on interviews from a ‘small-n’ sample size renders inference precarious due to 
the bias of the respondents (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994). Through fieldwork, this dissertation 
attempts then to construct a historical narrative linked to IO and IPE theories from which one can 
better understand two aspects of the case study: a) how CAF survived and grew through 
tumultuous economic times in the region and b) how CAF’s staff perceive their own work, 
Garcia’s character and responsibilities, and the role of the institution in regional and national 
lending. This approach is justified in this case given this study’s interest in shedding light on 
how an understudied development bank has thrived within a region in which defaults on external 
debt have not been uncommon and other regional initiatives established throughout the years 
(e.g. Fonplata) have had a limited impact. In addition, proponents of qualitative research have 
shown how “small n” studies that select on the dependent variable are more likely to generate 
novel interpretations of historical processes (George & Bennett, 2005). 
 
1.5. Brief outline of the dissertation 
CAF’s expansion has been possible due to both internal and external factors. The examination of 
these factors sheds lights on how the combination of leadership, institutional design, member 
governments’ preferences and CAF’s ability to navigate the regional landscape and engage with 
 18 
the regional leader have contributed to the growth of an Andean, South American and 
increasingly Latin American organization.  
Chapter 2 provides an overview of CAF’s mission and organizational characteristics, 
while engaging with existing literature on the institution. It outlines scholarly explanations 
accounting for IOs’ independence by employing principal-agent (P-A) theory and 
complementing it with insights from constructivist explanations.  A framework—which was 
briefly discussed in this introduction—is then outlined and further developed in order to answer 
the main research question, while addressing the limitations of available literature. The 
framework takes into account four explanatory factors that have prevailed in CAF’s operations 
as they relate to its institutional ability to consolidate its relationship with its members and 
international capital markets, and ultimately provide infrastructure financing. Therefore, this 
chapter reviews existing IPE, IO and regionalist literature that might be relevant to account for 
CAF’s growth. A proactive leadership and a unique institutional design, combined with 
distinctive member preferences and Brazil’s desire for increased regional cooperation have 
provided the necessary space for Garcia’s vision to flourish. 
Chapter 3 discusses the context that prompted CAF’s creation, the establishment of key 
features in its constitutive agreement and operation and the most relevant changes that the entity 
underwent in order to survive and become a relevant lender for the Andean countries by the 
1990s. In addition, it examines CAF’s relationships with its member countries and fundamental 
institutional policies introduced and promoted by Enrique Garcia, CAF’s Executive President 
since 1991. This chapter suggests that CAF survived the 1980s, but that it was not until the 
arrival of Enrique Garcia that the entity redefined its goals and somewhat isolated itself from the 
dilemmas and disagreements with the prevalent Andean integration goals and schemes. Garcia 
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intended to make CAF a key source of long-term financing for the region. This strategy consisted 
of developing capital and human resources to have an impact in three areas: gaining access to 
capital markets, developing a niche in financing physical infrastructure and expanding its 
membership while strengthening relationships with distinct stakeholders in Latin America. 
Chapter 4 showcases how CAF has been able to survive and grow its lending portfolio by 
nurturing and balancing two key relationships: the one the institution has with its shareholders 
and the one it has developed with the CRAs since the 1990s. CAF has continuously tried to find 
a balance between strengthening its financial position, making its operations more complex, 
keeping up good relationships with its principals and increasing resources to provide loans in key 
sectors such as infrastructure. CAF has employed a mix of balanced strategies to respond to 
members’ and CRAs’ needs such as: ongoing and sustained increases in its paid-in capital (to 
later raise more funds globally) and a cautious expansion of membership within the region (to 
also reduce concentration of its loans in any one country). At the same time, in order to preserve 
its South American (and nowadays increasingly Latin American) essence, the institution has had 
to forgo its capability and/or willingness to improve financial indicators such as callable capital. 
Moreover, members’ trust has been fundamental in this process: they are committed to 
maintain and further strengthen CAF’s institutional credibility and have opted to keep their 
obligations to CAF in full despite numerous crises by respecting its preferred creditor status.  In 
addition, CAF’s institutional design, leadership and self-promotion as an institution with 
technical knowledge and expertise on infrastructure lending —as opposed to an entity that results 
from the mere combination of various nations in the region—have been key elements in this 
narrative. Additional factors that have contributed to ensure that country members continue to 
participate and invest in CAF are also examined in this chapter including: the speed of loan 
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approval, the ways CAF has tried to stay away from conditionalities linked to loan approvals and 
the entity’s development of specialized knowledge according to national government’s priorities. 
CAF has played a recognized catalytic role in the region, financing projects in good and bad 
times. This role has attracted the attention of new institutions like the New Development Bank 
(NDB),1 whose officials have recently studied CAF’s design as a potential operational model. 
Features that may be worth studying for newer development banks include CAF’s relationship 
with its members, its lean organizational structure, its catalytic role and current hiring practices. 
Chapter 5 analyzes how infrastructure, as a key component for development, has been 
understood and promoted by CAF. The institution’s focus on promoting infrastructure projects 
for regional physical integration constitutes a strategic component of its corporate mission, while 
making CAF more attractive and relevant for member countries. Promoting infrastructure 
financing has been one of the key goals in Garcia’s strategy and has carried more weight in terms 
of impact than getting involved in other areas of regional cooperation such as trade and finance. 
In South America, infrastructure reentered the agenda of regional cooperation in the 2000s. 
CAF’s work in this area since Garcia’s arrival provided the basis to respond and update a 
mandate that now increasingly needed to take into account regional developments. In recent 
years, CAF’s senior management have focused on highlighting the role of MDBs in promoting 
regional cooperation in infrastructure, following CAF’s mandate to enhance its portfolio in this 
area. They also had to ensure that despite emerging alternatives for financing and cooperation in 
the region, CAF would find a way either to participate in these alternatives or to frame itself as 
an entity that could co-exist with newer institutions. Further, CAF’s work on infrastructure has 
been facilitated due to the combination of several issues including Brazil’s involvement and 
                                                        
1 The NDB formerly referred to as the BRICS Development Bank, is a multilateral development bank operated by the BRICS states (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa). 
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leadership in promoting cooperation on infrastructure; an improved fiscal scenario within 
countries in South America, especially before the 2008 global crisis and member governments 
embracing ideational motives in regard to how infrastructure could be the right channel to 
prompt regional integration. This chapter also examines CAF’s parallel agenda to infrastructure, 
which consists of its activities for supporting the creation of knowledge in this area. 
Chapter 6 continues to further explore infrastructure matters but under a regional scheme, 
the IIRSA initiative. IIRSA is a platform where multilateral agencies and South American 
nations, following Brazil’s leadership, have come together to define high priority infrastructure 
projects with regional scope. This chapter focuses on the IIRSA initiative as the platform by 
which member governments’ (principals’) actions can be observed within a changing regional 
environment, in which Brazil led initial cooperation efforts while other members consolidated 
their own views on infrastructure. This chapter also provides an examination of what has IIRSA 
meant for participants and critics. Through the examination of IIRSA, Chapter 6 demonstrates 
CAF’s ability to navigate and respond to its principals’ (both converging and diverging) interests 
in regard to their national and regional agendas for development. Further, it also shows how 
IIRSA got away from CAF in the later years, since the initiative encountered key challenges in 
mainly two areas: the lack of strong environmental safeguards, and some countries’ desire to 
limit RFI participation within the regional entities such as the Union of South American Nations 
(Unasur). Ultimately, CAF has, however, benefited from participating in IIRSA. First, the 
initiative has served to strengthen its relationship with several countries and has enhanced its 
understanding of members’ national priorities in regard to infrastructure. Second, it has kept the 
institution informed of ongoing geopolitical discussions in the region, while giving it a forum to 
broadcast its programs, lending opportunities and how the institution can support its members.  
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Chapter 7 provides a conclusion to the thesis by summarizing its main arguments and the 
theoretical framework and narrative employed to answer the main research questions. The 
chapter also revisits the contributions of the dissertation to existing literature and highlights 
potential future research agendas to build on these contributions. In particular, it suggests that it 
is time for IPE and IR to revisit the role of leadership in regional and international organizations 
and also to expand in innovative ways the study of principal-agent (P-A) dynamics in explaining 
IO performance. 
  
 23 
Chapter 2: Explaining CAF’s continuity, growth and its role in regional long-
term lending dynamics 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores theoretical underpinnings in order to provide an explanation that can 
account for CAF’s continuity and growth in Latin America. It begins by examining how the 
existing literature has explained the ways IOs exist independently of states and can be 
autonomous actors, drafting their own strategies for survival and growth. Theoretically, two 
approaches have been widely used to explain how IOs function as autonomous actors: principal-
agent (P-A) theory and constructivism. The first approach focuses on contracting arrangements 
between states (principals) and IOs (agents), while in the second approach, IOs are depicted as 
bureaucracies that partake in the construction of the context in which states operate, thereby 
shaping their preferences.   
P-A theory emphasizes how IOs are created to overcome problems emerging from the 
management of diverse preferences among states but acquire a life on their own because they 
develop their own interests and— in the language of P-A theory—have discretion; a 
circumscribed range of activity for deciding exactly how they should carry out their mandate and 
pursue their interests. These interests are also often defended by strategic action. As such, IO 
autonomy is at least partially the result of rational, strategic calculations undertaken by agents. 
For constructivists employing sociological theories, states also create IOs to overcome collective 
action problems, but in doing so, they create cultural entities. These entities, through their 
internal cultures and organizational practices, develop their own sense of what their raison d’être 
is and how their collective action goals can be attained. 
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The frameworks described above provide an important basis for understanding how CAF 
has been able to survive and grow in the region, especially since Garcia became its executive 
president in the 1990s. This dissertation seeks to build on the work of existing scholarship; 
despite differences in emphasis and conceptualizations between P-A and sociological 
organization theories, both approaches treat IOs as important actors in taking their behavior and 
actions seriously. This dissertation builds on the same premises, looking for those instances in 
which both theoretical approaches may complement each other to strengthen explanations of 
how internal and external influences and social and material factors impact an IO’s behavior. In 
CAF’s story, member governments are the principals and the institution is the agent. 
Moreover, despite the important contributions of existing literature, there are key 
empirical and theoretical limitations that this thesis seeks to address. This chapter expands on the 
analytical framework presented in Chapter 1 to address these limitations. The framework 
identified four fundamental factors in accounting for CAF’s survival and growth: 1) leadership, 
2) institutional design, 3) member governments’ preferences and 4) Brazil’s push for regional 
cooperation. Through a P-A analytical lens, this chapter discusses these four factors—from a 
principal, agent or principal-agent viewpoint depending on the factor—and buttresses their 
insights with existing IPE, IR and regionalist literature in order to highlight how a 
comprehensive study of CAF requires an expansion of our current understanding of principal-
agent dynamics. This is needed in order to account for how and when these four factors have 
contributed to the strengthening of the institution. CAF has benefited from a proactive leadership 
and a unique institutional design, while member preferences and Brazil’s desire for increased 
regional cooperation have provided the necessary space for Garcia’s vision to flourish. 
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2.2. Previous literature on CAF 
Research on CAF, despite its unique owner-recipient structure and increasing importance in the 
region, is still limited. The institution has been discussed briefly in some United Nations’ 
publications that focus on regional cooperation. For instance, in a chapter of an Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) edited volume, Culpeper (2006) 
argues that factors explaining the comparative success of CAF likely include judicious 
management and the sectorial composition of the borrowing portfolio, with its heavy emphasis 
on public sector infrastructure. Moreover, Ocampo and Titelman (2009) suggest that CAF has 
succeeded in providing services to member countries in a timely way, with countercyclical 
effects, and on a large scale relative to other forms of multilateral financing. Further, Prada 
(2012) remarks that the balance of forces between competition and collaboration among RFIs in 
Latin America and other sources of development finance have formed a system that is 
decentralized and client-oriented. For Prada (2012), CAF has a comparative advantage in 
structuring financing for large infrastructure projects by catalyzing funds from multiple private 
investors and investment funds due to its closeness to global capital markets.  
While advocating for the enhancement of the role of regional development banks within 
the multilateral landscape, some scholars have stressed CAF as an example of a solid regional 
bank and a “successful experience ” (Griffith-Jones, Griffith-Jones & Hertova, 2008, p.6). These 
scholars suggest that there is a need for new or expanded regional development banks to fill gaps 
in the international financial architecture, since RFIs have specific and localized roles that are 
not always covered adequately by global institutions. Similarly, Desai and Vreeland (2011) also 
suggest that regional governance mechanisms are often better placed to coordinate economic 
actions given the greater stakes that nations may have. Without going into details of how CAF 
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has been able to increase its operations throughout the years, Griffith-Jones et al. (2008) discuss 
briefly some institutional features: 
[CAF] is unique in being almost exclusively owned by developing countries. A 
noteworthy feature is also the exponential growth of its loans since 2000 and the great 
average speed at which their loans are approved, with an average period of around 3–4 
months. These, and other positive features of the CAF provide very good lessons for 
potential new development banks (p.vii). 
 
Moreover, in an OECD Working Paper, Santiso and Whitehead (2006) explore how some 
Latin American IOs are locally grounded and illustrate the interaction between technocratic and 
political rationality in the region. They argue that CAF is a cognitive institution, “which has also 
developed over the past decades an important locally-grounded capacity” (Santiso & Whitehead, 
2006, p.25). These scholars emphasize the high level of education of the approximately 300 staff 
members and suggest that CAF can substantially contribute to the debates, agenda setting and 
spread of policy-making opinions between and within the countries on issues as different as 
fiscal sustainability, pension reforms and growth strategies in Latin America.  
Santiso and Whitehead (2006), Griffith-Jones et al. (2008), Ocampo and Titelman (2009), 
and Prada (2012) briefly discuss some elements that have contributed to CAF’s survival and 
growth, such as the strong sense of ownership that states attach to these institutions and the 
catalytic role that CAF has played throughout the years. Culpeper (2006) especially draws 
attention to CAF staff management’s abilities, while Griffith-Jones et al. (2008) suggests that the 
speed of loan approval remains an attractive feature. As such, all of these authors’ contributions 
are brief but valuable and their arguments regarding CAF’s success will be further explored in 
 27 
this study. However, there are important limitations in the available literature. These authors’ 
contributions are for the most empirical and need to be linked to theoretical underpinnings in 
order to provide a more complete explanation of how CAF has acted in order to survive in a 
tumultuous region. These authors provide an account of CAF’s story by providing figures such 
as loan approvals through the years and the increase of staff numbers. Nevertheless, these 
authors’ examinations do not situate key institutional developments and advancements within the 
broader context of the ongoing regional landscape and theoretical perspectives on IO, IPE and 
regional dynamics. This study addresses this gap by providing a more complete theoretical and 
empirical account of the institution.  
 Only recently, scholars at the University of Zurich have dedicated considerable effort to 
conduct a comparative analysis of the three largest RFIs operating in Latin America: the WB, 
IADB and CAF (Humphrey, 2012; Humphrey & Michaelowa, 2013; Humphrey, 2014). These 
scholars have examined how the categorization of RFIs according to the balance of power among 
shareholders helps explain why countries might prefer one or another RFI. Humphrey and 
Michaelowa (2013), using statistical analysis and qualitative research, show that the balance of 
power amongst shareholders in RFIs shapes the terms of the loans (such as the financial costs, 
bureaucratic procedures and safeguard requirements). Another important contribution of these 
authors is the way they highlight how RFIs like CAF are affected by the evolving demand for 
their loans—therefore emphasizing the financial character of multilateral banks, which 
constitutes a key element for understanding their institutional scope and actions.  
Humphrey (2012, 2014) and Humphrey and Michaelowa (2014) successfully demonstrate 
how CAF’s institutional characteristics have shaped the character of the institution and 
contributed to expand its staff’s agency, while giving member countries a sense of responsibility 
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to preserve the entity since it has helped them with financing during tumultuous times. For 
example, Humphrey (2012) shows how in CAF, the shareholding dominance of borrowing 
countries—which results in the alignment of principals’ goals for the bank with the agent having 
considerably less incentive to pursue interests that do not coincide with the principals’ goals—
has resulted in a more streamlined administration (p.167). CAF’s management is then less 
bureaucratic than other RFIs and given much greater room to manouvre by the shareholders.  
Humphrey (2012) and Humphrey and Michaelowa (2013) also demonstrate how RFIs are 
to a large degree self-financing and do not rely to a great extent on fiscal contributions from 
shareholders. At the same time, this has meant that institutions like CAF also must follow closely 
the developments in global capital markets and the criteria used by credit rating agencies (CRAs) 
when shaping their operational and financial policies (Humphrey, 2012). This study expands 
these authors’ analysis of CAF’s institutional design, but at the same time presents a different 
lens to their institutional examination. This work examines how CAF’s institutional design has 
provided solid foundations to balance both members and CRAs’ requirements and needs and 
how this design has contributed in carrying out Garcia’s vision of making infrastructure CAF’s 
primary “niche.” This study also takes into account other factors that have not been discussed in 
depth in the available literature and that are vital for better understanding how CAF operates. 
These factors are CAF’s leadership and the impact of both Brazilian foreign policy and CAF 
member governments’ preferences in regional cooperation both at the ideational and material 
level.  
 
2.3 Understanding IO’s survival and growth through principal-agent theory 
The ontological position of this dissertation is that IOs exist independently of states. Institutions 
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like CAF have dynamics on their own that make them matter within international institutions, 
regional dynamics and long-term financing for development. P-A theory provides several 
theoretical underpinnings to understand how and when IOs act autonomously. P-A theory does 
so by establishing how and under what conditions states (principals) exercise control over IOs 
(agents). Through P-A theory, scholars have identified very similar mechanisms as explanations 
for autonomous behaviour of IOs as have been found to be at play in domestic politics. These 
mechanisms can be summarized as: preference heterogeneity among principals, uncertainty 
about the effectiveness of a policy, the costs of information emerging from controlling agents, 
and the interests of the agent  (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, & Tierney, 2006; Koremenos, Lipson, & 
Snidal, 2001). These factors help to explain why states grant discretion to IOs. For Hawkins et al. 
(2006), discretion specifies “the principal’s goals but not the specific actions the agent must take 
to accomplish those objectives.” (p.8).  For example, with regard to preference heterogeneity 
amongst principals and uncertainty about the effectiveness of a policy, states may benefit from 
delegating decision-making power to an IO when their preferences over policy goals are shared 
but they disagree on relevant details and outcomes involving cooperation (Hawkins et al., 2006). 
Moreover, P-A theory suggests that controlling the agents is a resource intensive activity and can 
be expected to be conducted imperfectly; states will rarely use tools to impose intensive control 
on agents, because tight control has considerable costs and can reduce the gains from granting 
agents discretion (Hawkins et al, 2006). 
P-A literature suggests various ways agents use the autonomy granted: some stick to the 
mandate (work-to-rule), others use discretion given by design (gap-filling) or ‘exploit’ autonomy 
(exploitation); and still others build buffer zones in case principals might react negatively in the 
near future (buffering) (Elsig, 2011). Therefore, depending on how the P-A issues are managed, 
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some IOs become tightly controlled by their principals, while others have considerable space for 
discretion, and may act in ways that run counter to the preferences of the states that created them. 
Consequently, principals can and often do incur agency losses defined as “costs when agents 
engage in undesired independent action or when they [principals] expend resources to contract 
with or monitor and control those agents” (Hawkins et al 2006, p.7). Independent action by 
agents occurs through agency slack, the difficulty of monitoring and control by multiple 
principals, and the space created by incomplete contracts (Hawkins et al. 2006; Nielson and 
Tierney, 2003; Vaubel, 2006). Agency slack manifests in the form of shirking and slippage. 
Agency shirking refers to a conflict situation between the interests of the principals and those of 
the agents (McCubbins & Kiewiet, 1991). For instance, the agent’s interests might not be aligned 
with those of the principals if an agreement matters for the agent more than its specific content. 
In contrast, agency slippage takes place when the structure of delegation in itself stimulates the 
agent to adopt a different position from the principals (McCubbins & Kiewiet, 1991). 
Moreover, IOs have three different ways in which they can influence the relationship 
with their principals. First, they can actively engage in the negotiation of delegation (and 
subsequently in the interpretation and reinterpretations) of agreements. Early in a delegation 
relationship, agents are likely to mirror principals’ interpretation of the rules (Hawkins & Jacoby, 
2006). However, once substantial delegation occurs, “agents are less likely to demonstrate their 
deference for the benefit of less important principals that have not yet joined. As a result, 
longstanding agents are more likely—depending on the agent preferences—to openly reinterpret 
their mandate and other rules in way that are at odds with principal preferences “ (Hawkins & 
Jacoby, 2006, p.206-207). Second, IOs can attempt to increase their autonomy by protecting their 
core tasks from interference by their principals (Hawkins & Jacoby, 2006). Because control 
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mechanisms of principals are imperfect, IOs can adopt strategies which make it difficult for 
states to control what they are actually doing. Third, IOs can facilitate the access of non-
principals to decision-making processes, which Hawking and Jacoby (2006: 209) refer to as 
agents increasing their permeability: “increasing permeability is likely to influence agent 
preferences as non-principals use incentive and persuasion to push agents in their preferred 
direction.” When the preferences of both the IO and other non-principals align, it becomes harder 
for principal to monitor the work of IOs.  
Taken together, the mechanisms identified by P-A theory provide several explanations to 
account for why IOs can be understood as being autonomous actors. The principal-agent 
characterization helps in investigating decision-making processes taking place within IOs by 
providing what we would like to call the baseline: IOs and member states are caught up in a 
structural relationship of mutual dependency (Reinalda & Verbeek, 2004). As such, P-A theory 
provides a plausible, yet not complete explanation for why, how and when IOs use their 
autonomy. The next section describes how constructivism can complement P-A explanations. 
 
2.3.1 Complementing P-A theory with constructivist insights  
Constructivist accounts of preferences help to explain an international organization’s preferred 
policy and thus its behaviour during the decision-making process. Constructivists generally 
recognize in P-A theory a powerful tool for understanding the distinction between state actors 
and IOs, and for finding insights into why IOs are structured as they are; nevertheless, they then 
move beyond the rationalist approach to examining actions and interests, by incorporating 
insights into bureaucratic behavior, socialization, and organizational culture, among other 
factors. This type of theorizing on IOs draws heavily on organizational studies, a subfield of 
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sociology. Constructivists assume that actors are engaged in a constant process of learning and 
interacting and focus on explaining distinct process and structure variables that influence IO 
behavior beyond delegation and rationalization (Oestreich et. al, 2012). Organizational culture 
shapes what IOs do by influencing the understandings of those engaged in the organization about 
what the aim of the IO should be and how this mission should be achieved. Organizational 
culture includes a wide range of formal and informal practices within organizations that shape 
the identities of those involved in these organizations. An organization’s mandate or mission 
might be its initial raison d’être, but organizations are able to evolve and develop an identity that 
can be fundamentally different from its functional origins  (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Nielson 
et al., 2006; Park & Vetterlein, 2010). 
Moreover, the seminal work of Barnett and Finnemore (2004) suggests that together, the 
autonomy, authority, and power of IOs explain why IOs, despite their lack of material resources 
and their dependency on states as their creators, matter in world politics. Autonomy explains 
why IOs are more than structures through which others act in world politics. The mutually 
reinforcing sources of the authority of IOs explain why states and other actors in world politics 
tend to accept what they do and say. The power resources of IOs explain through which 
mechanisms IOs affect change in the behaviour of other actors (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). 
The power resources of IOs are ‘soft’ because in general IOs lack the material resources to 
coerce. What has been identified as the power of IOs might be best understood as ‘constitutive’ 
forms of power (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). IOs shape the way in which other actors perceive 
problems and through which they define their interests, form their preferences and choose their 
courses of action (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). 
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2.4 Limits of existing theoretical explanations 
Available empirical research has shown that IOs possess organizational agency and that both P-
A and sociological approaches have ways to empirically confirm theoretical assumptions. IOs 
and member states are caught up in a structural relationship of mutual dependency. IOs such as 
CAF act every day in a thousand different ways, whilst states give them specific direction on a 
few big goals or strategies. But by necessity, states defer to them on exactly how those goals will 
be reached or those strategies carried out (Oestreich, 2012). Both ideational and material 
interests play a role within multilateral agencies.  In regard to international financial institutions, 
scholars’ attention has focused on a few “usual suspects” when analyzing IO behaviour, 
including the IMF (Abdelal, 2007; Chwieroth, 2009; Gould, 2003; Lombardi & Woods, 2008; 
Park & Vetterlein, 2010) and the World Bank (Nielson & Tierney, 2003; Nielson, Tierney & 
Weaver, 2006, Park & Vetterlein, 2010, Park & Weaver, 2012; Weaver, 2010). In addition, there 
is an emerging body of research focused on better understanding the IADB and the Asian 
Development Bank (Bull & Bøas, 2003; Babb, 2009 and Kilby, 2011).  
The studies mentioned above contribute to our understanding of how IOs develop and use 
their autonomy and some of their findings will be employed for helping answer the research 
question of this dissertation. However, as Haftel and Thompson (2006) remark, larger 
institutions are by no means representative of the universe of international financiers; in 
particular, they have unusually large staffs and substantial resources at their disposal. This 
promotes a limited picture of the sense of the degree and nature of independent behavior and 
potential overall strategies for survival at the disposal of other financial institutions. Despite the 
important contributions of existing literature then, there are important limitations that this thesis 
seeks to address and that can contribute to a more complete picture on IO behaviour, particularly 
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regarding financial institutions. Some recent analyses (Humphrey, 2012, 2014; Oestreich et al 
2012; Schroeder, 2014; Weller & Xi Chong; 2010) have begun to analyze IO behaviour by 
enhancing P-A explanations through providing more comprehensive analyses of the P-A 
relationship. This work builds on this emerging literature, while providing some novel insights.  
First, although the autonomy of IOs has been widely recognized within P-A literature, 
scholars have commonly treated the “agent” exercising discretion as a unitary actor, even when 
the focus has been complemented by examining organizational cultures. However, as Weller and 
Xi Chong (2010) suggests, we need to bring the people and the processes back into the analysis 
of IOs; “the agent is never a single actor but consists of people acting both as principals and 
agents at various levels, indifferent circumstances, and with their own distinct cultures” (p.202). 
Weller and Xi Chong (2010) seek to understand the operations of the World Bank by examining 
one particular group of players – the country directors. This dissertation argues that scholars also 
need to pay closer attention to the role of leadership in IOs and that P-A explanations can benefit 
from a better understanding of executive presidents’ role in exercising IO autonomy. In turn, the 
fields of IPE and IO could provide a more complete picture of the processes by which 
international financial institutions actually draft and execute their agenda and budgets, while 
balancing relationships with diverse stakeholders. As Oestreich (2012) claims, “the ‘black box’ 
must be opened up and down to the individual level” (p.14) to explain the contributions of some 
of those in key positions. The following chapters in this work will show that certain internal and 
external conditions permit entrepreneurial agents to influence IO change. 
Second, in regard to principal-agent dynamics in IFIs and RFIs, there is room to further 
unpack the impact of institutional design on IO performance. At their creation, IOs are equipped 
with certain features; some of them may be subject to change over time, while others may frame 
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IO actions for years to come. In regard to RFIs, as previously mentioned, Humphrey (2012; 
2014) has recently focused on the issue of shareholding arrangements and how it impacts IOs’ 
autonomy and agency. Moreover, Humphrey (2012) demonstrates how the self-financing model 
embedded within RFIs, is a source of considerable source of strength and autonomy: 
MDBs—unlike many other international organizations such as the United Nations—do 
not depend on budgetary handouts. As country shareholders do not have the “power of 
the purse” in an absolute sense, MDBs have more room to maneuver on their own terms, 
opening the door perhaps wider to principal-agent dynamics and more constructivist- 
oriented bureaucratic self-motivation than in other organizations controlled more directly 
through annual budget allocations like, for example, the United Nations (p.212). 
Consequently, in order to have a more complete analysis of an IO’s continuity, empirical 
analyses need to take into account institutional dynamics to attract funds in the global capital 
markets and how institutions engage with credit rating agencies (CRAs) in order to outline and 
act upon their financial strategies and balancing of budget. This dissertation takes into account 
these important scholarly contributions, while also highlighting other aspects of institutional 
design that matter such as an IO’s constitutional agreement and its preferred creditor status.  
Third, part of understanding IO behaviour, especially of smaller institutions like CAF 
which have survived various regional and economic crises, lies in explaining how principals 
manifest and act on their national and regional interests and how an IO responds to those actions. 
This work examines how members’ preferences—some of them which have been constant 
throughout CAF’s existence and others which have changed due to ideational motives and 
economic factors—can shape the P-A relationship. Moreover, the rise of certain states as 
regional leaders can also influence an IO’s strategy and require a more frequent engagement with 
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that state regarding the regional agenda. This dissertation examines the actions that CAF, 
through its executive leadership, has needed to take in order to ensure members’ support through 
changing national and regional preferences. The following paragraphs develop the theoretical 
arguments needed to account for CAF’s survival and growth and outline four main explanations. 
 
2.4.1 The role of executive leadership 
Despite existing literature that engages with the effects of leadership on IOs, leadership has been 
so far one of the less studied features when analyzing the continuity of MDB. The empirics of IO 
studies frequently credit IOs’ executive heads with important changes, but these studies seldom 
consider these individuals separate from the rest of the bureaucracy and thus make few 
theoretical claims about them (Schroeder, 2014). As Gardini (2010) suggests, too often IR as a 
discipline has privileged systemic constraints and structures, downplaying the role of individuals 
and their actual ability to impact systemic interactions. The study of leadership has largely faded 
away from explanations of how IOs have gotten autonomy from principals, but there is a role for 
leadership in P-A explanations.  
In a pivotal study examining the growth in scope and authority of international 
organization, Cox (1969) identifies executive leadership as perhaps “the most critical single 
determinant” (p. 206). Cox, Jacobson and Curzon (1973) extend this line of enquiry as it relates 
to decision-making within IOs. Other authors have reiterated Cox’s point, but the connection 
between executive heads’ characteristics and their efforts to advocate a higher level of authority 
within their respective IOs has not been considered in depth by most available RFI literature. 
There are however some recent exceptions (Kille & Scully, 2003; Weller & Xi Chong, 2010; 
Weaver, 2010; Park & Weaver, 2012; and Schroeder, 2014) that show how P-A models can 
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delve further down the delegation chain to examine the P-A dynamics within IOs and assert to 
what extent executive heads may realize their preferences. For instance, Park and Weaver (2012) 
examine the opportunities and constraints on the autonomy and agency of two World Bank 
executive heads vis-à-vis both the external environment of the IO and the internal bureaucracy, 
during distinct time periods. Park and Weaver’s (2012) study portrays how at times effective 
leadership could overcome the problems imposed by issue salience: the work of the World Bank 
certainly seems important to states, but good leadership can still carve a niche for an institution.  
Further, Schroeder (2014), by studying World Bank President Robert McNamara and 
United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, shows how these executive heads use 
their leadership by not just channeling state and bureaucratic demands but by actually making 
political choices that contributed to organizational adaptation. To make this argument, Schroeder 
(2014) draws on sociological institutionalist and constructivist scholarship on IO and leadership 
to develop an analytical framework where IO adaptation is linked to the executive heads’ 
performance of two tasks commonly associated with executive leadership: defining a strategic 
plan and mobilizing support to implement that plan. Similarly, Kille and Scully (2003) suggest 
that a central issue for IO leaders is whether they pursue an expanded role for their organization; 
the level of effort put forth to shape a more important and independent organization is the key 
behavioral variable that these authors specify in their study of leadership within the United 
Nations and European Union. 
Various legal factors and personality characteristics can impact how executive heads 
influence the mandate and actions of their organizations. Cox (1969) ultimately suggests that an 
executive head must have great political skill, while maintaining a personal confidential 
intelligence network reaching into domestic politics of key countries. Cox’s views on leadership 
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have been greatly impacted by Haas’(1964) perspective on executive leadership and these 
insights remain useful for understanding the impact of Garcia in interpreting CAF’s mission and 
subsequent actions. Schroeder (2014) provides similar arguments for highlighting the importance 
of a leader’s strategic plan and execution to explain IO adaptation. Haas (1964) distinguishes 
three critical variables in the executive head’s strategy for maximizing opportunities for task 
expansion. First, the executive head must define an ideology that gives clear goals to the 
organization and prescribes a method for attaining these goals. Second, they must build a 
bureaucracy committed to this ideology and having a sense of its own independent international 
role. Third, they must make coalitions and alliances to ensure support from a sufficient 
proportion of the constituents (Haas, 1964). 
Haas’s approach provides key foundations to account for what took place at CAF after 
Garcia came to power. First, Garcia identified an ideology that outlined clear goals and methods 
to reach them. This thesis explains how Garcia refocused CAF’s actions around the goals of 
increasing credit, infrastructure funding and membership. He also centered infrastructure 
financing as an important niche and opportunity, while ensuring the development of technical 
expertise about it. Second, CAF’s leadership built a successful bureaucracy and internal culture 
that supported the core goals. Although Garcia took a central role in promoting the institution 
within and beyond the region, he increasingly ensured that staff that shared his vision committed 
themselves to advance the goals he outlined for the entity. CAF’s staff, guided by Garcia, began 
conceiving infrastructure as a window of opportunity for the institution, an area through which 
CAF could transcend and become more attractive to more countries beyond the Andean nations. 
CAF’s culture was framed in a way that its staff worked together towards the regional and 
international recognition of the institution. CAF’s staff has developed a similar “logic of 
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appropriateness” (March & Olsen, 1998) as their professional identities have become the lenses 
through which they view CAF’s mission. Ultimately, Garcia has acted as a norm entrepreneur by 
couching change goals in ways that did not appear “counter-hegemonic,” but instead he has 
shown and convinced staff that the change would be culturally compatible. Changing CAF thus 
became at least in part a matter of reengineering the organizational culture.  
Third, CAF leadership built coalitions and alliances to ensure adequate support; this 
involved managing relations with both CRAs and member governments. CAF’s management 
realized that, according to the strategy devised by Garcia, it needed the agencies’ ratings if it 
wanted to expand its portfolio and presence in the region. Ultimately, to explain CAF’s growth it 
is vital to understand, as Barnett and Coleman (2005) discuss, how the drive to secure external 
resources can strongly shape the strategies and activities taken by an IO as well as individuals 
within it. Garcia’s efforts to secure funding are also related to the financial character of the 
institution; CAF needed to expand its horizons and conduct roadshows within and beyond South 
America in order to raise funds in the international markets in order to expand its loan portfolio. 
Thus, it needed to increase its level of “international personality.” As such, CAF’s management 
felt that it needed to comply and accept many of CRAs’ criteria if it wanted to survive and grow; 
Garcia was key in promoting an approach that aimed at progressively incrementing the amount 
of money raised in the global markets, while keeping shareholders identified with the institution. 
This required the ability to balance and nurture simultaneously the entity’s relationships with 
both the CRAs (by strengthening financial indicators, diversifying risk and showing consistent 
profitability) and its members (by ensuring speedy loan approval, low conditionality and non-
prescriptive agendas).  
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2.4.2. Institutional design 
At their foundation, IOs are set up and equipped with certain features which are subject to 
change over time since an organization is not a stable entity but, as P-A and sociological theories 
suggest, it depends on how agents use the discretion granted by the principals. For example, in 
regard to the IMF, Park & Vetterlein (2010) identify four main features that help determine how 
an IO acts and interacts: 1) its original mandate; 2) an organizational structure with a set of rules, 
regulations and operational procedures, specific units and departments; 3) informal regulations 
emerging in the daily interaction of staff and 4) the organization’s autonomy from its principals.  
In the case of CAF, its institutional design has provided solid foundations for its leadership to 
carry out Garcia’s vision for the institution, including an enhancing mandate in terms of mission 
and membership. CAF was established through a very solid and formal constitutive agreement 
that envisioned the preferences for integration of the founding members in the late 1960s. The 
agreement was approved one year before the Cartagena Agreement, which in practice made CAF 
parallel to, and independent of, the system of Andean institutions established under this 
agreement—although expected to cooperate closely. 
 P-A theorists suggest that a key dimension of institutional design relates to flexibility, as 
it conveys the way institutional rules and procedures accommodate new circumstances. 
Koremonos, Lipson and Snidal (2001) distinguish between two kinds of institutional flexibility: 
adaptive and transformative. When it comes to adaptability and flexibility, a fundamental factor 
in CAF’s growth has been its constitutive agreement. CAF’s agreement has been flexible enough 
that it has accommodated arrangements while changing the institution in ways that are 
profound—what Koremonos et.al. (2001) refer to as transformative flexibility. This agreement 
was established under an international treaty giving CAF unique characteristics such as: a non-
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resident board, defined membership and preferred creditor status. The agreement was key in 
setting the stage for its later institutional growth, since it has given CAF structural foundations to 
respond and adjust to a variety of geopolitical and economic conditions within and beyond the 
region.  Chapter 3 demonstrates how CAF’s constitutive agreement set the foundations for 
allowing CAF to balance in its own terms the distinct demands of two types of stakeholders 
(principals and credit rating agencies) since the mid-1990s, while partaking in regional 
discussions and actions related to infrastructure development. Moreover, the agreement has been 
fundamental in ensuring CAF’s survival and can be considered robust since it stands as an 
international treaty that grants CAF several privileges and immunities including exemption from 
debt moratoria and restrictions on asset transfers. These characteristics have been crucial when 
raising awareness within the finance community, since they serve to emphasize how CAF has 
avoided loan default, while highlighting the institution’s stability within and beyond the region. 
Humphrey (2012, 2014) and Humphrey and Michaelowa (2014) successfully demonstrate 
how some of CAF’s institutional characteristics—in particular, its shareholders’ dominance 
structure and the self-financing character of the entity—have shaped the operational 
characteristics and strategic actions of the institution. These characteristics have contributed to 
expand its staff’s agency, while giving member countries a sense of responsibility to preserve the 
entity since it has helped them with financing during tumultuous times. While acknowledging the 
important contributions of these authors to the study of institutional design, this thesis also 
presents a different lens by exploring the ways CAF’s institutional design has contributed to two 
key aspects of its institutional growth. First, the institutional design was pivotal in Garcia’s 
strategy of consolidating infrastructure as an area of focus for the entity and second, it was also 
important for successfully balancing both members’ needs and CRA’s requirements.  
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Moreover, through P-A theories, this work shows how CAF’s growth can be explained 
by how the agents have use the discretion granted to the institution through the act of delegation. 
CAF officials have acted at times outside a delegated range of discretion in a way that has not 
necessarily been foreseen by states, but is importantly innovative. CAF—by using its 
institutional autonomy and relying on its organizational characteristics—has been able to expand 
beyond its original mandate and outline and interpret distinctive priorities from those of at least 
some of its country members.  
A key element in CAF’s story is the fact that it has a non-resident board, as opposed to a 
permanent one. This element has permitted management to increase its autonomy in the 
everyday functioning of the institution, including crucial decisions regarding loan and technical 
assistance approvals. CAF’s autonomy and subsequent growth also conform to P-A theory that 
suggests that IOs in which a ministerial council (or other body of representatives) is the most 
important decision-making body are more independent than IOs in which heads of state are the 
key decision makers. CAF’s status is that of a preferred lender with high-level political 
representation on its board of directors; usually finance ministers or central bank governors. But 
rather than a full-time sitting board, as with the IADB and World Bank, CAF’s Board meets only 
three or four times per year as outlined in the introductory chapter. Moreover, the vast majority 
of policy and lending decisions are taken by an Executive Committee presided over by Enrique 
Garcia, CAF’s Executive President (CAF, 2012a). CAF’s organizational features, as Humphrey 
and Michaelowa (2013) emphasize in their study, are then much more streamlined than either the 
IADB or World Bank, and this allows much more autonomy to CAF’s administration vis-à-vis 
its shareholders. 
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 In addition, CAF has proven to states through past successes—including steady increases 
of its investment grade, alliances with other institutions, and responsiveness in regards to loan 
approvals— that it can carry out tasks that are important for the region, such as the promotion 
and financing of large infrastructure projects. CAF has a unique shareholders’ composition that 
impacts its internal structure and as such, CAF’s autonomy, while shaping its culture and 
strategic management decisions. The institution has always been governed by the countries to 
which it lends and so the interests of the principals and the agent are aligned. The unique owner-
recipient structure, as scholars like Humphrey (2012, 2014) and Prada (2012) remark, has given 
members a strong sense of ownership, while increased trust has been the result of speedy 
approval of loans and lesser conditionality. These key points will be further discussed in this 
study, in particular in Chapter 4 in which CAF’s relationships with CRAs and members are 
explored—including the tensions and the fine line CAF has to walk between those two types of 
stakeholders. 
Therefore, CAF, as scholars such as Hawkins et al. (2006) suggest, has demonstrated that 
it could seek to increase the degree of autonomy that it possessed by convincing states to 
delegate more authority to the institution. CAF, especially since the mid-1990s, has been granted 
considerable discretion by its shareholders because of its specialized knowledge in infrastructure, 
its proven catalytic role as a financier and its ability to engage with distinct stakeholders 
involved in the financing of long-term development. Hawkins & Jacoby (2006) indicate 
instances when IOs may be more likely to openly reinterpret their mandate and other rules in 
ways that are at odds with principal preferences. They distinguish between interpretive strategies 
that precede delegation and reinterpretive strategies that follow it, sometimes many years later. 
Reinterpretations occur as circumstances or agent preferences change. CAF, in reinterpreting its 
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mandate and making infrastructure financing a priority, also framed important links between 
infrastructure and regional integration that were facilitated, once again, by its constitutional 
agreement. Besides, since the mid-1990s, CAF’s commitment to regional integration, an 
objective outlined in its constitutive agreement, has been interpreted by the institution as a way 
to promote related regional events and specific intergovernmental initiatives (e.g. IIRSA). 
According to Oestrich (2012), states exert more control over issues they consider most 
important politically. Issue salience is then a central concept in understanding institutions’ 
actions. In regard to CAF, the key issue that has clearly driven its institutional mission since the 
mid-1990s has been the perception that infrastructure and development in the region are 
intimately connected. But cooperation on infrastructure, as opposed to cooperation on trade 
issues for example, is not dominated by international regimes that establish stringent norms (e.g. 
WTO). As such, even if member states consider infrastructure as a salient issue, they may be 
more willing to let an institution like CAF take initiative or contribute with other agencies in 
pursuing particular agendas in this area due to their own lack of resources and expertise.  
 
2.4.3 Member government preferences 
Dabene (2012) argues that regionalism in Latin America has shown a remarkable endurance that 
pinpoints one of the mysteries any inquiry about regional cooperation should try to unveil: 
consistency despite instability, resilience despite crisis. To understand the way CAF interprets its 
day-to-day functioning while defining its role as regional financing agent, it is crucial to 
recognize prevalent regional dynamics throughout CAF’s existence, how principals have 
responded to them and how this consequently impacts CAF. This work suggests that member 
governments, in their quest and engagement with regional initiatives, have directly and indirectly 
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framed their support towards CAF’s mission and actions since its creation.  
Although Enrique Garcia has been a fundamental driver of change in the entity, CAF’s 
members as principals have endorsed the institution through their actions and their regional 
preferences. Some of the principals’ preferences have remained constant throughout the years. 
For example, member governments paid CAF’s loans in a timely way and have continued 
borrowing from the entity (despite increased financing options in the last decade), while 
developing a sense of ownership and responsibility in the survival of the institution. As 
Humphrey (2012) demonstrates, member governments feel “a proprietary interest, or even a 
certain obligation” that drives them to borrow from the entity; there are also considerations that 
go beyond rates of interest (p.176-177). First, due to the membership on the board which is 
composed by high level authorities—central bank directors and finance ministers—principals 
feel they are owners of the institution (especially when compared to the WB or the IADB). 
Second, CAF members know by now that the entity is one of the few sources that may lend them 
funds during bad economic times (Humphrey, 2012; Prada, 2012). 
Further, since the early 2000s, there has been a redesign of national interests amongst 
some of CAF’s members that has resulted in increased ideological and material support of the 
institution. Members have showed an increased interest in national and regional infrastructure 
financing (discussed in Chapters 5 and 6) due to an improved fiscal situation in their economies, 
as well as a changing ideological context that has marked a shift away from the neoliberal 
growth strategies of the 1990s. As Best (1991) demonstrates, after the failure, or stagnation, of 
the first wave of economic associations, the multiple crises of the early 1980s seemed only to 
strengthen a “disintegration” of regional integration. Yet, by the turn of the decade, there was a 
surge of neoclassical integrationist activity in Latin America, even as new circumstances only 
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heightened old questions not only as to the objectives and instruments of integration, but also as 
to the membership of regional groupings. In the early 1990s, “the debates in the political 
economy of development were dominated by indebtedness, the challenges of growth and welfare 
in times of austerity and the absence of any apparent margin for policy choice” (Grugel & 
Riggirozzi, 2012, p.1).  
The end of communism, the debt crisis of the 1980s combined with new economic crises 
in Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador, and the internationalization of finance during the 
1980s and 1990s contributed then to the rise of linking development with free markets and 
retrenchment of the state in international circles. This vision of development was largely adopted 
through Latin America and carried out through the “Washington Consensus,” which set out to 
transform economic practices across the region through the implementation of policies linked to 
the privatization of public assets and cuts in public expenditure. In regard to MDBs, the World 
Bank and the IADB implemented structural adjustment policies tied to lending in line with the 
Consensus. Meanwhile, their renewed institutional agenda by the mid-1990s gave emphasis to 
poverty reduction and social inclusion. As a result, the focus on infrastructure projects in these 
IFIs decreased in relative terms, under the exaggerated assumption that the private sector would 
fill that gap. CAF had then a unique opportunity and under Garcia’s leadership, it began 
engaging more actively in a sector that was previously the dedicated area of focus of other 
institutions (see Chapter 3).   
Meanwhile, during the 1990s, CAF members embarked on extensive structural 
adjustment programs intended to promote deregulation and privatization. This step coincided 
with the phase of “open regionalism,” a regional rapprochement that, in line with the Washington 
Consensus, focused on trade liberalization (including tariff reduction and the elimination of 
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subsidies) and deeper integration of the Latin American countries into the world economy. The 
U.S. administration was at the time actively engaged in the changing regional landscape. Public 
and private actors in the region felt particularly challenged by the multitude of pressures 
including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—which set a precedent for the 
Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA)— and the intense competition for foreign investment flows 
(Tussie, 2009; Gomez-Mera, 2015). Open regionalism emerged as one such response to these 
pressures and as a building block to economic globalization; regional cooperation aimed at the 
promotion of exports and market competitiveness, while enhancing the potential for countries to 
attract foreign direct investment. 
There is some evidence to suggest that prevalent economic and trade policies 
implemented in the 1990s reduced state corruption, controlled inflation, and benefitted 
consumers through cheaper imports, more competitive pricing structures and improved access to 
new technologies (Gwynne & Kay, 2000). But as Grugel and Riggorizzi remark (2012), these 
policies also increased unemployment and poverty to levels that sometimes exceeded those of 
the so-called ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s in the region. As such, a slow down in growth following 
currency difficulties, rising indebtedness (especially pronounced in Argentina) and a growing 
awareness of a failing model changed attitudes in the region towards pro-market reforms and 
elite politics (Riggirozzi, 2012). Ultimately, the contested nature of the neoliberal project led it 
down a winding road and the idea of creating a single economic market in the Americas—which 
depended on the successful consolidation of U.S. hegemony through its multinational and 
structural adjustment-led policies—was abandoned and the U.S. turned to a number of bilateral 
trade deals.  Regional economic cooperation in the 2000s was affected then by a combination of 
factors including the collapse of the FTAA, the deadlock in multilateral trade negotiations and 
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the growing discontent with neoliberal reforms throughout Latin America (Gomez-Mera, 2015). 
Beginning with the election of Hugo Chávez in 1999, a wave of left, or left of center, 
governments took office in South America—within CAF original shareholders, for example in 
Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia. These governments pressed from within for the end of liberal 
economic policies and the assertion of economic and political autonomy vis-à-vis the U.S. 
(Legler, 2013). The year 2005 concluded with the collapse of the US-supported FTAA at the 
Summit of the Americas, which is generally taken as the symbolic end of the U.S.-led brand of 
hemispheric and open regionalism. That year also marks the harbinger of new South American 
governments’ regional projects later materialized in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of 
Our America (Alba, in Spanish) and the Union of South American Nations (Unasur, in Spanish). 
These projects were at least partially conceived as a way to strengthen countries’ external 
sovereignty vis-à-vis the U.S., while focusing on reaffirming closing intraregional relations. 
Therefore, various authors consider that South America began experiencing the rise of 
“post-hegemonic” or “post-liberal” regionalism characterized by hybrid practices as a result of a 
partial displacement of dominant forms of U.S.-led neoliberal governance in the 
acknowledgement of other political forms of economic management of regional issues 
(Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012; Sanahuja, 2012). Despite the various academic denominations at 
play of new forms of regionalism in South America, a common thread runs through these 
analyses: these initiatives are portrayed as moving from an exclusive focus on free trade and 
economics to cooperation in a wide range of areas, from macroeconomic and industrial 
cooperation— especially in infrastructure—to energy, monetary, social and development 
cooperation. In terms of actors, presidents and presidential diplomacy are taken as the most 
relevant drivers of regional cooperation in the region (Malamud, 2014; Merke, 2010). Further, in 
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contrast to open regionalism’s liberalization impulses, regional initiatives since the 2000s have 
been accompanied by the reaffirmation of national sovereignty (Serbin, 2011; Malamud & 
Gardini, 2012). This reassertion has to do with “redefining state-market relations in favour of the 
state as sovereign with restored state authority after neo-liberalism, and with it, strengthening the 
ability to return to new developmentalist policies and strategies” (Legler, 2013, p.334). Efforts to 
promote regionalism in South America have also at times been interpreted as a defensive attempt 
by states to balance U.S. power and influence in the region (Tussie, 2009; Merke, 2010). 
However, it is vital to recognize that “post-hegemonic” or “post-liberal” initiatives like 
those advanced in Unasur and Alba, have been made possible—especially before the latest 
global crisis— by several factors, including Chinese economic growth and the rising global 
demand for primary commodities, which include the main exports of Latin American economies. 
Although not necessarily spectacular by East Asian standards, since the early 2000s until the 
global crisis, Latin America experienced the most remarkable period of economic growth since 
the long post-WW II boom that ended in the mid-1970s. This growth took place after almost a 
quarter of a century of unsatisfactory performance (Ocampo, 2009). Between 2000 and 2008 the 
volume of regional exports rose by a remarkable 42.4 per cent (ECLAC, 2009), allowing 
countries in Latin America to accumulate sufficient resources for advancing a variety of 
socioeconomic projects, including infrastructure initiatives. And although the global crisis 
affected remittances and trade volumes in Latin America, commodity prices suffered less and by 
2011 they had rebounded strongly (Chinese demand was crucial for this outcome), in such a way 
that the major problem for commodity exporters was volatility rather than depressed prices 
(Ocampo, 2011). 
This economic boom—grounded in the sale of commodities, windfall profits and higher 
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fiscal revenues— was key in allowing the elected governments in the mid-2000s in South 
America to reopen the infrastructure agenda. South American countries increased both 
consumption and income tax collection. Rosales (2013) further suggests that  “South America’s 
‘revolutionary’ left turn can be best explained by its assertion of state property over natural 
resource extraction” (p.1443). In the case of Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, the governance of 
hydrocarbon extraction and the control of subsoil rents, combined with the expansion of state 
action in the economy, has been crucial to promote national and regional socio-political projects 
(Rosales, 2013). This reliance on primary commodities also suggests the likelihood of the current 
and near-future approach to development within various countries in South America, a situation 
made possible due to the demand for primary commodities from East Asia. It also points to a full 
acceptance of the global economy on the part of these governments— and the political and 
economic risks associated with development based on commodity dependence (Grugel & 
Riggirozzi, 2012). 
Meanwhile, theoretical advancements outside South America can be helpful in explaining 
how CAF members have shown broad enthusiasm for regional cooperation in infrastructure and 
how this has ensured the survival and growth of the institution. For instance, Yoshimatsu (2008) 
advances a “pragmatic functional approach” in order to explain how non-political functional 
areas in East Asia are selected for cooperation, because these areas easily produce practical 
outcomes. According to Yoshimatsu (2008), the key ideas of pragmatic functionalism have 
similarities with those of the neofunctionalist theory. Both approaches share the common view 
that commitments in technical areas generate the process that leads to closer inter-governmental 
cooperation in high politics. Yet, neofunctionalism posits that the cooperative process should be 
sponsored by formal organisms, while in pragmatic functionalism, states find little interest in 
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developing formal organisms that would exert binding power on them, but rather enhance mutual 
benefits through cooperation that does not affect state sovereignty (Yoshimatsu, 2008). 
Yoshimatsu’s insights are useful in the context of South America’s financial cooperation. 
Initiatives like IIRSA, in which CAF has extensively participated throughout the years, showcase 
how, when it comes to South American integration, there exists the drive to preserve policy 
space within states. This situation creates resistance throughout South America to sharing 
economic sovereignty in areas where doing so would be required to further integrationist 
objectives (da MottaVeiga & Rios, 2007; Cason, 2011).  
Consequently, CAF, as an agent, has benefited from these regional dynamics since 
member countries that are interested in infrastructure matters may be more willing to let the 
entity drive the agenda on this topic due to limited (economic and expertise-related) resources.  
This is also related to the fact that physical integration is not dominated by an international 
regime—which is the case of trade at the WTO—and as such members may perceive it as a more 
practical and feasible area to promote cooperation.  A related consequence of prevalent regional 
dynamics has been the increasing participation of state agencies beyond economic and finance 
ministries. States’ agencies dedicated to the advance of infrastructure, energy and investment 
have been more actively involved in regional discussions in the last decade and interact with 
RFIs’ staff more often than in formal and informal settings than in previous decades. Moreover, 
as this study will demonstrate, cooperation on infrastructure matters has been possible since 
states are not bound to deliver on improved regional interconnections. The distinctiveness about 
cooperation on infrastructure is that CAF member states can take advantage of the rhetoric about 
cooperation at the regional level, while advancing projects that are mainly national.  
Finally, in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the factors that have been 
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crucial in ensuring CAF’s continuity and growth, we also have to take into account a crucial (but 
often ignored) feature of international politics: the gap between what states declare and what 
states actually do to solve a problem. Krasner (1999) offers an explanation for this pattern by 
adapting the concept of organized hypocrisy—initially developed to explain the behaviour of 
organizations—to make it a useful tool for the analysis of international politics. Organized 
hypocrisy is about the gap between what actors say and what they do. This is especially 
important when trying to understand for example how regional commitments and actions such as 
the creation of the Bank of South took place around the same time that CAF was able to secure a 
commitment from member states to increase capital. Consequently, this study will show that 
cooperation between CAF and related states’ actions tends to occur “under the radar” compared 
to the emergence of alternative financing arrangements like the Bank of the South, which has 
been widely covered both in academic literature and press releases. While some countries in 
South America proclaim their support for alternative finance arrangements and their commitment 
to decrease their use of multilateral agencies as financing sources, they have not sidelined CAF 
and instead their support has been constant and even more prominent in the last decade. 
 
2.4.4. Brazilian renewed interests in regional cooperation including IIRSA 
Throughout the years, CAF has focused more and more on becoming an active agent in regional 
venues. In particular, since the 1990s, CAF has been able to leverage regional leadership and 
engage with related discussions on infrastructure financing. Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis 
discuss how Brazilian regional leadership has played a key role in formulating ideas and policy 
proposals that have made certain state preferences converge towards regional cooperation and 
allowed CAF to further its institutional agenda. Starting with the Cardoso administration in 
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1995—and followed with great enthusiasm by Lula in 2003, but with less eagerness by Dilma 
since 2011— Brazil has actively promoted cooperation beyond trade in regional fora, especially 
regarding infrastructure matters, which was materialized through the establishment of IIRSA. 
This is because this area serves as a focal point for Brazil in the coordination of regional rules 
and regulations, while opening doors for its own national agenda on this issue.  
CAF’s management promptly recognized the regional changes at the beginning of the 
2000s and began to decisively pay more attention to Brazilian leadership and to the country’s 
infrastructure agenda. CAF also needed to gradually speak to Brazil not only as a CAF full 
member, but also as a regional leader. In the last fifteen years, Brazil has acted as a regional 
leader, employing its foreign policy representatives and development banks to promote regional 
cooperation discourses and actions that embody its national interests and preferences. CAF has 
benefited from Brazilian foreign policy, since the country has put infrastructure as a key topic in 
the regional agenda and has to an extent reframed South America as the new geopolitical 
reference of regionalism (instead of Latin America).  
According to Sorj and Fausto (2011), for Brazil, “the concept of ‘South America’ has less 
to do with notions of collective governance or a presumption of a common regional identity, than 
with an instrumental calculation based on considerations of autonomy and power” (p.3). The 
development of this notion of “South America” coincided with the years when CAF was trying 
to expand from an Andean into a South American entity. In addition, Brazil’s regional foreign 
policy preferences have managed to appear pragmatic and moderate to some of CAF members 
much of the time, assisted by the implicit comparison with the more ideologically polarized 
alternative regional organization schemes promoted by the U.S. and Venezuela. According to 
Armijo (2013), “Brazil’s national economic ideology is procapitalist, yet unapologetic about the 
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need for state planning, public ownership, and promotion of priority economic sectors. Within 
South America, Brazil attempts to bridge left and right” (p.100). 
One of the greatest points of consensus among realist IPE scholars is that cooperation 
among states is difficult except when there is a preponderant power or hegemon (Mattli, 1999; 
Grimes, 2009). The hegemon acts to promote regional cooperation because it serves as a focal 
point in the coordination of rules, regulations and policies. Although Brazil has not acted 
necessarily as a hegemon when it comes to physical integration—the Brazilian government has 
for the most part not paid the cost of infrastructure financing—Brazilian political leadership has 
become a facilitator and catalyst in promoting the need to integrate the region and enhance the 
construction of highways and dams. Facilitators get other countries to follow by influencing and 
shaping their preferences through persuasive policy ideas (Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990). 
Burges (2009) proposes a sophisticated interpretation of the “low cost” type of regional 
leadership that Brazil exerted during the Cardoso’s administration and the first Lula’s term, 
which he calls “consensual hegemony,” building on neo-Gramscian political economy.  Imposed 
on policy makers by Brazil’s lack of the means to realize its regional leadership ambitions, 
consensual hegemony works through the “teacher-student” dialectic originally advanced by 
Antonio Gramsci. Brazilian officials sought to lead South America in the early 2000s despite its 
lack of hard power resources and an unwillingness to overtly claim leadership (Burges, 2008). 
Brazil’s own national development goals have been fundamental in the consolidation (and later 
advancement) of IIRSA (Burges, 2009; Carvahlo, 2010). For the Cardoso administration, which 
championed IIRSA, South American regionalism had to be built through the physical integration 
of transport and energy infrastructure. During the Lula years, the U.S. largely ignored South 
America in practical terms even if there did appear to be clear engagement through hemispheric 
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multilateralism and military cooperation (Burges, 2009). As such, consensual hegemony offered 
a temporarily attractive scheme for collaboratively preserving regional autonomy. Brazil’s 
leadership in the consolidation of IIRSA and its commitment to Unasur, have become the most 
well known examples of the country’s new stance towards South America.  
Although IIRSA was presented as a response to revive the regional movement in South 
America, it represented to a great extent a pragmatic alternative to expanding the Avança Brasil 
program (a large national infrastructure program, since replaced by the Programa de Aceleração 
do Crescimento—Growth Acceleration Program— in 2007 and the Brasil Maior program in 
2011). Yet, Brazil stepped quite cautiously in promoting IIRSA, taking into account that the 
region has traditionally associated foreign policy leadership with coercion and domination 
(Burges, 2009). CAF followed this cautious approach in terms of infrastructure development and 
was invited to join IIRSA’s technical committee, which opened several doors to financing 
opportunities within and beyond the initiative. An important aspect of CAF’s management 
strategy has been then to ensure that the institution navigates successfully the regional landscape, 
not only as a ‘tool’ for members to materialize their agendas, but also in ways that have allowed 
CAF to strengthen its position as an infrastructure financier and technical advisor to member 
governments. Meanwhile, Brazil’s renewed interest and ability to promote the expansion of 
roads and dams within and outside its borders and to promote development within municipalities 
were important elements in the country’s decision to join CAF as a full member in 2005.   
For Brazil, endorsing international development finance through its national bank, 
BNDES, has also become a vehicle for enhancing its foreign policy stature: even if the scale of 
regional lending from BNDES is not as large as either the bank’s promoters or critics have 
claimed, the bank has helped to establish Brazil as a stronger international actor in the 2000s 
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(Hochstetler, 2014). Moreover, the participation of Brazil’s largest firms in the construction 
sector—such as Odebrecht and Camargo Correa—was an additional factor for the Brazilian state 
to gain participation within and beyond IIRSA through for instance, enhanced private-public 
contracts with South American governments. The Brazilian state has diffused its participation 
and contribution in regional entities that are dedicated to infrastructure financing, which go 
beyond BNDES’ regional projects. At present, Brazil is the second largest contributor to the 
IADB (10.75 per cent of voting power) as well as to CAF, where it holds 6.2 per cent of shares 
(Houtari & Hanemaan, 2014). 
Nevertheless, in spite of its regional prominence, Brazil has been unable to translate its 
structural and instrumental resources into effective leadership and regional hegemony (Malamud, 
2011; Merke, 2015). For example, its potential followers in the region have not aligned with 
Brazil’s foreign policy goals, such as its pursuit of a permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council, of the WTO Directorship-General, or of the IADB presidency, and some have 
even challenged its regional influence (Malamud, 2011). In terms of regional cooperation, 
although the consensual hegemony approach allowed Brazil to establish an ideational project and 
a leading position in South America (and further benefited the RFIs involved in infrastructure 
matters), it failed to provide concrete “regional goods” and, therefore, eventually weakened 
Brazil’s regional position. 
As Merke (2015) suggests, Brazil has been reluctant to become the regional paymaster 
providing collective publics goods such as credit, aid or security. Spektor (2010) suggests that 
Brazilian regional leadership is atypical and dependent on governing elites:  
Brazilian foreign policy and Brazilian power in international relations from the 
perspective of the region remains ‘a study in ambivalence’... Even after several years of 
 57 
sustained economic growth and an expanding foreign-policy agenda, Brazil is not your 
typical regional power…It has sought to anchor and embed its power in a new network of 
regional institutions, and it has become the major institution builder in the region, but the 
institutional architecture that results is thin and weak (to a significant extent because 
Brazil pushes in that direction). Its governing elites are wedded to traditional 
understandings of national autonomy and do not consider pooling regional sovereignties 
into supranational bodies. They are equally reluctant to pay the costs of regional 
prominence, preferring to deal with smaller neighbours on an individual, ad hoc basis 
(p.192). 
 
Ultimately, institutions like CAF have been brought to join Brazilian regional efforts and 
continue to require to response to changing regional dynamics. The Brazilian government’s 
interest in infrastructure has directly and indirectly facilitated CAF’s participation and role in 
regional venues, while allowing the institution to gain more visibility as an entity that promotes 
cooperation, technical assistance and lending opportunities. At the same, it has allowed CAF to 
interact with member countries individually and as a group. Various CAF members continue to 
redefine participation in regional venues as a strategy to support the ideal of a “developmental 
state” and this continues to reinforce the role of institutions like CAF that are eager to help 
countries deliver on their national priorities.  
 
2.5. Conclusion: Contributions to IPE, IR and regionalist literature 
The post-2008 global crisis has highlighted once again the role of RFIs, since these entities can 
play several countercyclical, technical and political roles due to their specialization vis-à-vis the 
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economic and socio-political realities of the regions in which they operate. The study of CAF 
contributes not only to ongoing academic interest in further understanding the roles of RFIs in 
the global political economy, but also in outlining factors that have been vital for the survival of 
a RFI. Explaining these factors also provides an opportunity for scholars to reexamine 
empirically and theoretically how a development bank trying to protect its role as regional lender 
needs to balance the demands of both its members and the international financial markets. This 
dissertation invites scholars to employ P-A theoretical underpinnings in order to address 
empirical and theoretical limitations in existing literature regarding CAF, and more broadly vis-
à-vis the role of RFIs. This work argues that a P-A analytical framework can account for when 
and under what conditions CAF has been able to use its discretion and gain principals’ trust in 
order to carve its own institutional agenda without political interference, which ultimately 
ensured its growth and success.  
In regard to empirical contributions, this chapter has discussed how literature on CAF 
remains limited. Some available studies on the entity have been presented as chapter discussions 
in United Nations’ publications focusing on regional cooperation. Although these publications 
have accounted for CAF’s main events and economic figures, they have not really engaged with 
theoretical explanations that may account for CAF’s success. During the 2008 global crisis, some 
articles were published on the localized role of RFIs during economic downturns and some brief 
articles emerged discussing CAF’s institutional features and how they have helped the entity in 
responding promptly to member governments’ financing priorities. Only recently, CAF has been 
studied in a comparative theoretical and empirical RFI examination (between CAF, the IADB 
and the World Bank) focusing on the balance of power amongst shareholders in RFIs, the 
financial character of RFIs and the role of agency in these institutions. This dissertation seeks to 
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build on these recent efforts to study CAF in a more detailed way by providing a comprehensive 
study of CAF’s historical evolution since the 1990s as well as a broader framework to account 
for CAF’s behaviour and actions. This study also shifts the focus of study of regional 
cooperation from trade to physical integration, showing how CAF became actively involved in 
infrastructure matters through internal institutional developments and external regional 
dynamics.  
This dissertation reveals that a comprehensive study of CAF, and possibly of other 
financial institutions acting in tumultuous regions, requires the adoption of a more integrative 
theoretical approach. This dissertation works towards this aim by addressing the limitations of 
existing literature and showing—through the development of the framework in Chapter 1—that 
both principals and agents possess a variety of strategies and mechanisms that have not been 
successfully incorporated into existing approaches, but that can substantially influence an IO’s 
survival and growth. This work also addresses how the principal-agent relationship for 
institutions like CAF is also impacted by the regional context and both constant and changing 
principals’ preferences. 
The study of CAF also means a renewed academic focus on institutional leadership 
literature and institutional design. There are good reasons why IO and IPE theories need to take 
seriously the influence of executive leadership on the evolution of RFIs. Theories that make 
room for the role of leadership fill the gap between empirical claims crediting an IO executive 
president with key developments and the tendency in academic literature to avoid separating 
analytically the role of the executive leader from the rest of the bureaucracy. Ultimately, an 
agent’s leadership has the potential to build or destroy an institution and this has been 
particularly experienced in regional entities and fora in Latin America. Only recently, Fonplata, 
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another RFI in South America briefly described in Chapter 1, inaugurated the executive position 
of president, in its efforts to promote institutional growth and solidify long-term goals and 
institutional accountability. Leadership has been key in CAF’s story. Garcia outlined CAF’s 
ideology by identifying specific goals and ways to reach them, established a successful 
bureaucracy that supported those goals, built coalitions with both members and the credit rating 
agencies and through it all continued to demonstrate that cultivating charisma in relations with 
different stakeholders can bring harmony and growth to a RFI. 
This work also emphasizes the importance for IOs to understand regional dynamics in 
order to identify when ongoing mechanisms for cooperation (or lack thereof) become an 
opportunity or an obstacle for institutional growth. Moreover, this study suggests that RFIs may 
not be able to ignore prevalent practices in global credit markets if they want to strengthen their 
economic position. Capital is now sought through structuring debt on capital markets. As such, 
the traditional intermediary role of a bank to decide creditworthiness has been weakened, which 
results in the disintermediation of finance (Sinclair, 2005). CAF has engaged since the mid-
1990s with these dynamics and become, in a way, a bridge between its member states and capital 
markets. Without this engagement, CAF would have probably remained a RFI with very limited 
impact in its region and with less commitment from its members to preserve the institution. 
Further, the theoretical framework developed in this chapter to explain CAF’s evolution 
makes a contribution to broader literature seeking to explain the ongoing mechanisms involved 
in recent regional financial cooperation, while framing principals’ actions and their effects on the 
survival and growth of a regional institution. The study of CAF provides an entry point for 
theoretical academic discussions that engage in the examination of regional development 
governance from an angle that has been so far understudied: the distinctiveness of cooperation on 
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infrastructure matters. Infrastructure services are now seen as fundamental to various 
governments’ development agendas in a context where economic incentives in the region are 
largely based on sustained demand and rising commodity prices in world markets.  
Consequently, it is necessary to pay attention to the emerging tensions—and how they are 
managed by the pertinent government authorities (principals) and institutions (agents)— 
regarding the ways cooperation is perceived in these cases by South American governments. On 
one hand, cooperation on finance is perceived as a way to foster integration by enabling retention 
and distribution of the benefits of trade within the region. But on the other hand, cooperation 
may be advancing on mere grounds of facilitating the promotion of national agendas. As such, 
cooperation on infrastructure matters is not necessarily a tale of regional hegemony; Brazil is not 
paying most of the costs of regional physical integration but instead—though its actions and 
continuous calls and foreign policies promoting cooperation—is affecting the structural 
environment and acting as a facilitator.  
This work also suggests that principals have not been passive observers of CAF’s agenda. 
Their support and their own national development agendas have facilitated the work of the 
institution throughout the years. Moreover, the need and desire at the national government level 
for better infrastructure has always been present within South American states. What has 
changed since the early 2000s is the actual capability of those countries to request financing due 
to a better economic position, combined with a renewed interest in fostering the regional agenda. 
In regard to regionalist considerations, cooperation on infrastructure, as this work will show 
throughout its chapters, now embodies the notion of states using the regional arena to deliver on 
national projects, while drawing upon diverse sources of multilateral and bilateral financing. 
RFIs like CAF need then to constantly think about and refine their financial structure, their 
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methods to secure resources, and ways they can solidify their relationships with their members. 
Finally, in the current regional, political and economic context, it is important to 
understand whether the kind of opportunities and dilemmas that CAF faces when dealing with 
country members and credit rating agencies may be relevant for other international and regional 
financial institutions and also for other types of long-term financing arrangements. The study of 
CAF and its involvement in IIRSA remain fundamental for understanding both the changes and 
continuities in financial cooperation within and beyond regional mechanisms and agendas. The 
combination of CAF’s leadership, its management’s ability to manoeuvre the institution within 
the regional space, and the entity’s institutional features which have served to strengthen its 
catalytic and adaptable role in financing infrastructure have all contributed to its continuity and 
expansion. This cooperation has persevered despite the economic crises and financial difficulties 
within its shareholder countries, which have experienced several devaluations and radical shifts 
in economic policies throughout the years. 
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Chapter 3: CAF’s first two decades and the arrival of Enrique Garcia  
 
3.1 Introduction 
CAF is a multilateral development bank that, after two decades of surviving the ebb and flow of 
Latin American integration and economic conditions, had to reengineer its strategy to solidify its 
position as a reliable financial institution with an increasing scope and capability for financing 
large projects for long-term development. CAF’s story intertwines the opportunities and 
challenges of regional integration, the benefits of institutional leadership, a unique organizational 
structure and the support of member governments. More than forty years after its creation, it is 
possible to reconstruct the process that led CAF to become a key lender within Andean countries 
and an increasingly important institution within Latin America. 
 This chapter examines the context that prompted CAF’s creation, the institutional design 
that was envisioned by its creators, and the most relevant changes that the institution underwent 
in order to survive and become a relevant lender for the Andean countries by the 1990s. It also 
outlines CAF’s successive relations with shareholders and key formal and informal policies 
introduced by Enrique Garcia, CAF’s president since 1991. Under Garcia’s leadership, CAF has 
evolved from being a sub-regional lending institution into an increasingly important regional 
one. This chapter predominantly highlights how a particular institutional design conceived within 
a period in which countries were seeking comprehensive regional integration solutions gave 
Garcia the foundation to exercise his leadership when he assumed the CAF’s presidency.  
 This chapter first introduces CAF’s creation, which took place during an era when 
regional arrangements and promises were flourishing and reflected country members’ 
preferences. CAF was created through a very solid and formal constitutive agreement, the kind 
of agreement that we see less and less in Latin America— a region in which sharing sovereignty 
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and binding commitments are not popular amongst recent regional initiatives. CAF’s constitutive 
agreement was conceived and approved at a time when designated lawyers (as opposed to heads 
of state or the private sector, which is more common at the present time) played a prominent role 
in setting up the rules of the game. The composition of shareholders and the decision to have a 
non-resident board have been some of the key institutional features in CAF’s original operational 
structure that have helped the entity differentiate its mandate and operating model from other 
existing international financial institutions. In addition, as is the case with other RFIs, CAF holds 
preferred creditor status within member governments. This status has contributed to its history of 
very strong loan performance—despite fluctuating economic conditions within member 
countries—because it ensures that debt owed to the institution is excluded from debt 
restructurings carried out by official debtors.  
 Further, this chapter outlines CAF’s operations within its first two decades, in which the 
institution as an agent early in a delegation relationship was more likely to mirror shareholders’ 
interpretation of its mandate according to their national and regional preferences. CAF also 
confronted a difficult regional environment during its first two decades. Despite initial vitality, 
the Andean integration goals quickly began to encounter serious difficulties and became 
completely deadlocked in the 1970s for a number of reasons including: changing government 
preference (especially in the case of Chile which ultimately withdrew from CAF as a result of its 
drastic restructuration of economic policies), regional and external economic and political crises, 
inefficient mechanisms of negotiation, and institutional flaws. CAF’s lending scope and goals 
were limited by this environment and by the fact that the promotion of industrial programs—a 
key aspect of its mandate at the time— did not succeed. The 1980s were also a difficult decade 
for CAF not only because of the debt crisis that deeply affected Latin America, but also because 
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Andean countries themselves were dissatisfied and frustrated with the integration scheme they 
had outlined. From this low point, CAF began reorienting its strategic goals and actions. It began 
using its discretion to gradually sideline the political interests of country members, while 
building an operational model that focused more on serving the sectors that the staff thought 
most contributed to countries’ economic development such as agriculture, physical integration, 
and other areas previously not emphasized by CAF.  
 CAF survived the 1980s, but it was not until the arrival of Enrique Garcia that the entity 
redefined its goals and isolated itself to a great extent from the dilemmas and disagreements that 
member countries experienced with the prevailing Andean integration goals and schemes. 
Garcia’s familiarity with the region from a RFI perspective helped him to set up an 
unprecedented strategy when he arrived at CAF. Garcia wanted to make the entity a relevant 
source of long-term financing for the region. This strategy consisted of developing the required 
resources to have an impact in three main areas: gaining access to capital markets, developing a 
niche in financing physical infrastructure and expanding CAF’s membership while strengthening 
the relationships with all country members.  In order to do so, Garcia had to bring CAF’s senior 
management on board with his strategy. In later years (discussed later in Chapter 4), Garcia also 
had to focus extensively on cultivating coalitions and alliances within member states and credit 
rating agencies. He had to ensure support from both groups to successfully deliver on CAF’s 
portfolio and financial performance. 
 
3.2 Context for CAF creation 
The creation of CAF reflected the ongoing regional integration efforts of the 1960s and early 
1970s. During this period, regional integration constituted a fundamental element in the broader 
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development strategy in Latin America. This strategy focused on deepening intraregional trade 
and adopting the import substitution industrialization (ISI) model. Various reasons converged to 
propel regional integration at the beginning of the decade including the fact that both U.S. and 
Latin American leaders wanted to strengthen regional integration. 
First, several prominent statesmen in South America considered regional integration a 
noble political quest, including Arturo Frondizi (Argentina), Juscelino Kubitschek (Brazil), 
Romulo Betancourt (Venezuela) and Alberto Lleras Camargo (Colombia). Second, American 
resistance to integration in the region softened: while the U.S. administration refused a Chilean 
project to create a development bank in 1954, or paid little attention to a Brazilian proposal of a 
Pan-American Operation in 1958, they finally agreed in April 1959 to create the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB). The Cuban revolution triggered this policy change, epitomized by 
Kennedy’s 1961 Alliance for Progress, which strongly supported regional integration (Dabene, 
2012). During these years, integration organizations flourished in the region including the 
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), the Intergovernmental Coordinating 
Committee of Countries of the Plata Basin (CIC), the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and 
the Latin American Association of Financial Institutions (ALIDE). 
The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was created in February 1960, 
with the signature of the Montevideo treaty. LAFTA responded to the developmentalism and 
economic nationalism propounded by the Economic Commission for Latin America of the 
United Nations (ECLA), in a context where difficulties in the external sectors of Latin American 
economies prevailed while the U.S. was perceived not to be responding (Best, 1991). However, 
LAFTA never achieved its fundamental objective to eliminate intraregional tariffs. The issue of 
distribution of gains was central for less developed countries—in particular for Ecuador and 
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Bolivia.2 Preferential treatment for those countries was the objective of a declaration initially 
signed in Bogota in 1966 by the presidents of Colombia, Chile and Venezuela. The Cartagena 
agreement (adopted on May 26, 1969) ultimately included a clause stating that Bolivia and 
Ecuador would receive preferential treatment, within, for example, industrial integration 
programs. This preferential treatment was a means for helping these nations narrow the 
economic gap that separated them from their more advanced neighbours by taking advantage 
(through exclusive benefits) of the sub-regional market. 
Moreover, the idea that the integration process in the Andean region should have its own 
financing organism was primarily promoted by the presidents Carlos Lleras Restrepo (of 
Colombia) and Eduardo Frei Montalva (of Chile). A Mixed Commission of special presidential 
representatives, called by the Bogota Declaration, was formed in 1967 and included specialists 
(mainly lawyers) from Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. During the 
several meetings that it held between 1967 and 1969, the Mixed Commission prepared two 
important documents: CAF’s constitutive agreement and the Andean sub-regional integration 
agreement. The constitutive agreement was concluded first and signed in early 1968, at the fifth 
session of the Mixed Commission, by the five countries which had participated in the 1966 
Bogota conference plus Bolivia which joined the Andean movement after the conference ended 
(Fontaine, 1977). CAF’s treaty was signed then one year before the Cartagena Agreement 
formally created the Andean Pact, founded by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru with 
the objective of creating a Customs Union and a Common Market. The fact that CAF was 
created before the establishment of formal regional commitments gave it room to maneuver 
through its separate constitutive agreement from its very early days. 
                                                        
2 For further discussions on the motives behind LAFTA failure, see Best (1991) and Bulmer-Thomas (2003).   
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During the Mixed Commission’s sixth session held in Cartagena, Colombia, in August 
1968, a final draft was presented regarding the Andean Sub-regional Integration Agreement. The 
delegated specialists took only four months to produce this agreement (referred to as the 
Cartagena Agreement, the founding document of the Andean Pact). This rapidity was in part the 
result of their method: they wrote it behind closed doors, allowing the private sector to take a 
look only after the project had been submitted to the Mixed Commission (Fontaine, 1977). 
Another factor that affected this and subsequent phases of the integration process was the 
monopoly by the executive power (the presidency, planning department, and specialized 
ministries) of all political and legal initiatives in relation to the Andean Group. Where national 
parliaments existed, they were effectively bypassed, whatever the general degree of participation 
in the political process (Puyana, 1982). The fact was that, as far as the Andean Group was 
concerned, all governments excluded political and trade union groups from the debate and 
appeared to seek the participation of the private sector more to establish an alibi for their own 
conduct than as a principle in itself (Puyana, 1982). 
The final round of negotiations of the Andean Pact proved more difficult: for the first 
time a basic pattern of conflicting national interests emerged. The two countries with the most 
advanced industries, Colombia and Chile, pressed for the quick acceptance of the treaty as 
drafted by the technicians. The least developed Bolivia and Ecuador, agreed since the proposed 
accord included generous provisions for them (referred to as preferential treatment). But Peru 
and Venezuela—the countries in the middle of the development spectrum—argued against too 
rapid a rate of trade liberalization on the grounds that this rapidity would strangle infant 
industries (Fontaine, 1977). Therefore, almost a year of additional negotiations and concessions 
was necessary before the treaty was accepted. Venezuela remained outside the Pact for another 
 69 
four years while the other five signed the accord in May 1969.  
The Andean Pact set out a model for integrated economic development in which 
industrial planning—and not the freeing of trade— was to be the central mechanism for the 
advance of import substitution. The predominant concern of the Andean Pact was to influence 
the course of industrial development in the sub-region: what was to be manufactured, where and 
with how much competition (Puyana 1982). The Andean Group’s goals were very ambitious, 
targeting a customs union and aiming at harmonizing economic and social policies. The 
integrated industrial programs and the foreign investment codes were centerpieces of their import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) inspired project (Parkinson, 1973). The Andean Group was 
also granted a supranational institutional arrangement, with a Commission making majority 
decisions, and a Secretary (Junta) composed of three members representing the regional interests 
(Dabene, 2012).   
CAF was envisioned by its creators to be a MDB that would undertake a different type of 
development activity than the existing World Bank or the IADB. The specific role intended for 
CAF was to promote economic integration among the six South American original shareholders: 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. The orientation of CAF’s financial 
services was also intended to be distinct from the World Bank and IADB, focusing on industrial 
development (and to a lesser extent agribusiness and trade support), which was an area that 
neither of these two MDBs really addressed (Fresard, 1968). Financial support could be supplied 
in a broader range of ways than other IFIs, including to “emit bonds or debentures, act as a 
guarantor of any type, provide collateral for obligations, and grant guarantees in share issues” 
(CAF, 1974, Art. 4).  
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 Despite initial vitality, however, the integration scheme quickly began to encounter 
serious difficulties and became completely deadlocked in the 1970s for a number of reasons 
involving the way regional integration was conceived in the first place, with inefficient 
mechanisms of negotiation, weak attention paid to the distribution of gains, and institutional 
flaws (Dabene, 2012). Other factors that affected the integration process can be traced to 
domestic issues, with some countries experiencing profound changes, such as Chile, which 
underwent a coup d’état in 1973 and subsequent rapid market liberalization (Dabene, 2012). In 
the international arena, the difficulties encountered by the Bretton Woods monetary system in 
1971 and the oil crisis of the 1970s deeply impacted Latin American countries’ macroeconomic 
priorities. Moreover, military coups and ensuing juntas soon froze the Andean Pact, while 
Chile’s military regime left the Pact in 1976. 
 
3.3 Design, legal framework and operational structure  
From its beginnings, there have been a number of characteristics that have helped CAF set itself 
apart from other multilateral financial institutions active in the region. These features are 
embedded in its legal structure, which has contributed to the institution’s steady operation 
throughout the years. As Serbin (2011) suggests, when it comes to consensus and policy 
coordination, most multilateral organisms and agreements in Latin America have had a very 
limited predisposition towards establishing and developing a structured multilateral framework 
based on a clearly defined set of rules and values. In the last two decades, informal and non-
binding guidelines have become the rule when it comes to fostering integration in Latin America. 
But CAF differs from most organizations because it has a very structured constitutive agreement. 
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Most notably, when CAF was created, lawyers (instead of countries’ presidents) played a key 
role in setting up the rules of the game.  
 For example, Fresard (1968), a Chilean lawyer who participated in framing CAF’s 
constitutive agreement, remarked that initially there were prominent discussions suggesting that 
CAF was to be created under Venezuelan law since Caracas had been designated as the 
headquarters. Yet, CAF would be recognized as a separate legal entity, independent of the local 
legal system. Member countries were expected to follow the process and to recognize it as a 
separate entity under their national laws. Nevertheless, there was harsh criticism—starting with 
the Venezuelan delegation—regarding the appropriateness of national legislation in providing all 
the immunities, privileges and delegated functions that CAF required for its daily operations 
(Vendrell, 1976). With the intention of speeding up the establishment and actual working of the 
institution, the participating lawyers decided to create CAF under an international treaty. Shortly 
after its creation, Fresard (1968) highlighted that “the entity is agile regarding its direction and 
operation and it was conceived in the most simple way, prioritizing the speed of its operations’ 
[approval]” (p.29, author’s translation3). In later years, the speed of approval would become a 
differentiating factor amongst RFIs, especially for governments eager to fulfill their 
infrastructure agendas.  
 As an international treaty organization, CAF is a legal entity under public international 
law. Having its own legal personality, CAF can enter into contracts, acquire and dispose of 
property and take legal action. The constitutive agreement has been ratified by the legislatures in 
each of the full member shareholder countries. Historically, some of the governments of CAF’s 
member countries have taken actions such as nationalizations and exchange controls that have 
                                                        
3 All translations of Spanish documents were done by the author of this dissertation, unless otherwise indicated. 
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affected ordinary commercial lenders. In light of the immunities and privileges discussed below, 
conferred by the institution’s preferred creditor status, CAF has not been adversely affected by 
these actions and has indeed built a stable financial structure throughout the years. To date, CAF 
(2013a) has been granted the following immunities and privileges in each full member 
shareholder country: 
1. Immunity from expropriation, search, requisition, confiscation, seizure, sequestration, 
attachment, retention or any other form of forceful seizure by reason of executive or 
administrative action by any of the full member shareholder countries and immunity from 
enforcement of judicial proceedings by any party prior to final judgment; 
2. Free convertibility and transferability of CAF’s assets;  
3. Exemption from all taxes and tariffs on income, properties or assets, and from any 
liability involving payment, withholding or collection of any taxes; and  
4. Exemption from any restrictions, regulations, controls or moratoria with respect to the 
entity’s property or assets. 
 
The operational structure of CAF mirrored the examples of the World Bank and IADB in 
some key areas. It followed the model of a corporation, owned by shareholder governments that 
contributed the initial capital and were the final negotiators of its policies. CAF was designed to 
use its capital and other public or private resources it might raise to make loans, which would be 
paid back with sufficient interest to ensure the sustainability of the entity (Humphrey, 2012). 
CAF also enjoyed preferred creditor status in relation to private lenders. According to Sagasti 
and Prada (2006), this status combined with MDBs’ low gearing ratios in comparison with those 
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of private financial institutions, helps MDBs to raise funds on favorable terms in international 
capital markets for their regular windows, while enjoying a high standing in the eyes of CRAs.  
Within this broad model, however, CAF differed from the World Bank and IADB in a 
number of crucial aspects. Perhaps the most significant unique feature relates to the entity’s 
composition: when CAF was established, shareholders were all developing countries expecting 
to borrow from the CAF, with no non-borrowing developed countries involved. Countries would 
also have equitable control over the CAF, while still taking into account differences in wealth 
among the six members, through the creation of different types of shares (Humphrey, 2012). The 
initial US$ 25 million in capital was divided into six Series A shares worth US$ 1 million, with 
all member countries purchasing one share each. The remaining US$ 19 million would be in 
Series B shares, of which Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela purchased 22%, while Bolivia 
and Ecuador purchased 6% (Humphrey, 2012). 
 The design of CAF’s Board is also very different from major RFIs. Under CAF's 
constitutive agreement, the major decision-making forum is the shareholders’ annual regular 
meeting. At this meeting, the shareholders review CAF’s financial statements, allocate net 
income, elect the board of directors, determine members’ compensation, and appoint external 
auditors, among other matters (Standard&Poors, 2013). The Board of Directors, which is a non-
resident board, establishes CAF's credit and economic policies, approves its budget, approves 
loans in excess of a specified amount, and appoints the executive president. The Board of 
Directors usually meets four times a year and delegates certain responsibilities, including credit 
approvals within specified limits, to an executive committee of the board. The Executive 
President chairs this committee, which comprises one director from each of the Series A 
countries and one director representing the collective Series C members. Chapter 4 further 
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explains how these arrangements, in particular the fact that Garcia chairs the loan approval 
committee, result in a decision making process that is faster than that at the WB and the IADB, 
which have permanent sitting boards and heavy oversight by donor nations.  
 Moreover, before Garcia joined the institution in 1991, CAF had already gone through 
four previous administrations led by Ecuadorian or Bolivian nationals. Nationals from these 
nations were selected to reflect the institution’s commitment to include less developed nations 
prominently within the institutions of the Andean Pact. CAF’s previous presidents include: 
Adolfo Linares (1970-1976), Julio Sanjines (1976-1981), Jose Corsino (1981-1986) and Galo 
Montaño (1986 - 1991). Their administrations are briefly described in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. CAF’s administrations (1970-1991)  
CAF’s 
administration 
Highlights during presidency 
Adolfo Linares 
Arraya  
 
(1970 - 1976) 
 
Engineer, Bolivian 
 In addition to financing the initial operations of CAF, the 
Linares administration also took the first steps to raise 
funds in Latin America and from multilateral agencies. 
Especially noteworthy was the creation of the Andean 
Trade Financing System  (Safico), to promote Andean 
intra-regional trade.  
 During this period, CAF increased its authorized capital 
from US$ 100 million to US$ 400 million.   
Julio Sajinés 
Goytia 
 
(1976 – 1981) 
 
Engineer, Bolivian 
 During his administration, CAF had to face many 
difficult situations: Chile's decision to withdraw from 
the Andean Pact in 1976 and from CAF in 1977, and 
the stagnation of industrial programming and trade 
liberalization, as had been agreed in the Andean 
integration framework. However, CAF continued the 
process of institutional and administrative 
consolidation.  
 In 1978, as part of the activities for attracting new 
resources, CAF obtained the first syndicated loan in the 
international banking system, led by Bank of America. 
 In addition to continuing to strengthen its usual 
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operations, CAF ventured into priority sectors for the 
development of its shareholder countries, such as oil 
and agricultural related businesses. 
José Corsino 
Cárdenas  
 
(1981 - 1986) 
 
Economist, 
Ecuadorian 
 During his administration, Latin America was plunged 
into a crisis caused by foreign debt, the falling prices of 
their export products, and the slowdown of growth in 
world trade. This situation affected operational 
development. 
 Meanwhile, CAF was able to adopt new policies 
enabling the expansion of its activities and the 
consolidation of the institution as the financial arm of 
the Andean integration process. During this period, the 
authorized capital increased from US$ 400 million to 
US$ 1 billion. In this stage, CAF adopted the strategic 
guideline of participating in co-financing projects with 
other RFIs.  
Galo Montaño 
Perez 
 
(1986 - 1991) 
 
Engineer, 
Ecuadorian 
 At the beginning of this administration, the economic 
and political crisis in the region was far from over. 
However, CAF had the strong support of shareholders, 
while they were decisively promoting the 
regional integration plans. In fact, the decision was 
made to double the authorized capital of CAF to US$ 
2.05 billion (Galapagos Summit, 1989) and it was 
agreed to invite other Latin American countries to 
participate as associate members (Minute of 
Caracas, 1991). 
 In addition, CAF began incorporating the private sector 
through the subscription B shares by various 
commercial banks in the Andean region. 
 During this period, the increased activity resulted in a 
portfolio that expanded from US$ 192 million to US$ 
853 million.  
 As for fundraising, CAF received new medium 
and long-term credit lines, mainly from the IADB and 
official agencies of industrialized countries. In this 
period, CAF also received its first syndicated loan from 
several European banks and placed its first private 
bond issue in Japan. 
Source: Data from CAF (2014b), compiled by the author. 
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3.4. CAF’s first decade 
When CAF opened its doors in 1970, it had to confront the issue that all multilateral banks face: 
how to raise funds to actually be able to finance relevant projects. The six founding countries had 
committed US$ 25 million in capital, but this would only be paid in over the course of several 
years (Humphrey, 2012). Therefore, the entity needed to quickly find other sources of capital. 
CAF’s founding members and early administrators expected that this capital would mainly be 
raised outside the region. Fresard (1968) who served as the Chilean negotiator suggested that 
CAF would strive to access sources outside the region that supported socioeconomic 
development. These sources could be soft loans from bilateral aid agencies of developed 
countries or other, larger IFIs. In addition, CAF’s management—considering that the entity 
could somewhat emulate the financial operations of the IADB and World Bank—intended to 
issue debt on private capital markets in Europe and North America, as envisioned in its 
constitutive agreement (Humphrey, 2012). Initial impressions were indeed positive: U.S. AID 
provided a US$15 million soft loan in 1971, and Canada soon followed suit with another US$5 
million (Humphrey, 2012, p.64). 
 Additional contributions were expected from the WB and, especially, from the IADB. In 
1971, CAF’s Annual Report states that an initial participation of the IADB was expected with a 
loan on the order of US$ 12 million, which would not preclude further loans (CAF AR, 1971). 
That same year, CAF sent out a financial mission to Europe, Japan and North America to 
investigate the prospects of obtaining credit lines, bond issues, bank loans and technical 
assistance. Moreover, one of the mission’s goals was to get some insights on the conditions 
under which the CAF could in the near future access the international capital markets to secure 
external funding (CAF AR, 1971). In terms of projects, with the exception of those in Bolivia 
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and Ecuador (countries considered to be relatively less developed economically), CAF financed 
projects that were essentially integrationist (CAF, 2010a). In 1972, CAF granted the first loan to 
finance a physical integration project between two of its shareholder countries (CAF AR, 2010). 
But despite initial contributions from outside the region, CAF did not receive substantial 
contributions during its first decade, which was both disappointing and worrisome for CAF’s 
management. Efforts to raise money within European and Arab countries were not very 
successful. Moreover, there was eventually only a single U.S.-AID loan despite hopes for further 
loans (Humphrey, 2012). 
 The World Bank did not offer any financial assistance either despite initial conversations 
in the 1970s in regards to opportunities for technical and financial cooperation (CAF AR, 1974). 
CAF also developed a tense relationship with the IADB in its search for funds. After an initial 
IADB loan of US$ 750,000 for technical assistance purposes, the IADB did not offer more 
monetary assistance. Various formal loan applications and “lengthy negotiations” with the IADB 
are discussed throughout annual reports until 1978, after which the topic is no longer mentioned 
(Humphrey, 2012). Humphrey (2012: 65) argues that “with U.S. enthusiasm for development aid 
dwindling, and the lack of any shareholding influence by the U.S. or European nations, 
developed country governments apparently saw little incentive to supply resources to the CAF.” 
Meanwhile, in 1974, CAF held its first shareholders’ extraordinary assembly in which members 
expressed their solidarity and willingness to strengthen CAF in operational and financial terms, 
by raising its authorized capital to US$ 400 million (CAF AR, 2005). Similarly, at CAF’s 
plenary meeting of November 1975, its Board of Directors urged an expansion of another $600 
in authorized capital (Fontaine, 1977, p.26). 
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 But despite members’ support in terms of authorized capital, what CAF really needed 
was a breakthrough in the private markets. Yet neither U.S. nor European markets showed any 
inclination to invest in CAF bonds. Following a 1974 mission to New York investment banks, 
CAF concluded that it could raise up to US$ 25 million in a private placement (CAF AR, 1974), 
but that did not happen. Private financial participation was also limited. Bank of America 
provided a series of loans, but these were at a high interest rate and directly tied in with a US Ex-
Im Bank loan for specific American export purchases (Humphrey, 2012, p.65). Despite the oil 
boom that some Andean countries were experiencing, it was not until 1977 that the institution 
finally got a loan of US$ 50 million from a syndicate of European, Japanese and U.S. banks 
(Humphrey, 2012, p.66).  
 Credit lines and loans tied to exports were the only significant financing offered by 
countries outside the Andean region: US$ 6 million each from Brazil and Mexico in 1973, US$ 
10 million from Japan’s Ex-Im Bank in 1974, various project purchases funded jointly by the US 
Ex-Im Bank and Bank of America, and US$ 10 million by the Spanish Export Bank in 1977 
(Humphrey, 2012, p.66). CAF sought to avoid credit lines tied to exports, as they limited both 
the financial flexibility of the CAF and the procurement options facing borrowing projects 
(Humphrey, 2012; CAF AR, 1973). Therefore, even though CAF had defined its mandate, it was 
having a hard time due to its limited funds to take on large regional integration projects. CAF’s 
staff also found that private lenders were not easily convinced about its prospects and mission in 
a region in which oil was creating economic differences amongst countries and increasing 
contrasts in their development paths. CAF depended much more heavily then than it had 
originally planned on the prospect of raising funds within its member nations.  
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 Despite the urgent need for funds, CAF’s staff was keen on restricting full membership to 
its original founders since the entity was still trying to differentiate itself from other RFIs. For 
example, in November 1973, CAF’s first president Adolfo Linares visited Argentina and 
suggested that he felt Argentina could not join CAF because “Argentina’s level of development 
and its economic characteristics are too superior to those of other member countries...It would be 
practical and desirable for Argentina to have closer relationship with the group, but not as full 
member.” (Linares quoted in U.S. Embassy Cable, 1973). Venezuela’s changing policies 
regarding the use of its oil revenues also presented problems at the time when CAF was trying to 
obtain external funds: Enrique Vial, a former vice-president at CAF, suggested that Germany 
was about to sign a 15 million mark concessionary loan, but decided to back off due to 
Venezuelan oil-related policies (U.S. Embassy Cable, 1974).  
 In 1974, CAF contracted a group of financial experts (one expert per country member) to 
assess the effectiveness of CAF and make respective recommendations. These efforts resulted in 
the creation of a mechanism— the Andean Trade Financing System (Safico, in Spanish)—for 
promoting and financing trade in shareholder countries, and to increase sub-regional integration 
through export growth and diversification (CAF, 2010a). But according to a cable from the U.S. 
Embassy in Caracas, Adolfo Linares, CAF’s president, felt frustrated with the difficulties 
encountered in promoting cooperation within the Andean Group: 
Linares complained bitterly that government decisions involving CAF are affected too 
much by national politics rather than purely economic development considerations. He 
was particularly upset concerning negotiations for a US$ 60 million loan from 
Venezuelan Investment Fund, which has been undergoing change in management. (U.S. 
Embassy Cable, 1975).  
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 At the same time, by the mid-1970s, the regional and external environment had changed 
and several events had an impact on the development agendas and policies of Andean countries. 
Detente and the crisis in U.S. international economic leadership, an increasing interest in 
relations with Europe and other regions, the new climate of “Third-Worldist” activism and 
demands for a new international economic order, all prompted a belief in more far-reaching 
diversification of external relationships and new forms of collective action in pursuit of distinct 
paths towards development. At the institutional level, an important result for Latin America of 
this new regional environment was the creation in 1975 of the Latin American Economic System 
(SELA), which included Cuba and excluded the United States. At the sub-regional level, in 1976, 
Andean countries signed an agreement to harmonize their financial, monetary, and exchange 
policies. This led to the establishment, in 1978, of the Andean Reserve Fund, which would later 
become the Latin American Reserve Fund (CAF AR, 2010). 
 Meanwhile, by 1975, CAF had entered a new stage of administrative and institutional 
consolidation in which it established new goals for its operations, and focused on obtaining 
financial and technical resources and on promoting new projects (CAF AR, 2010). The 
administration decided to partially relax the institutional standards in the interests of making 
loans. In an article, CAF’s second president, Julio Sajines, recalled that “pressured by the need to 
survive, CAF had to move ahead with projects that were not strictly in accord with the restrictive 
parameters of its mandate” (Sanjines quoted in CAF, 1990, p. 28). By partially relaxing its 
lending requirements and initiating short-term trade finance lending through Safico, CAF began 
to build lending, with annual commitments rising from US$ 33 million in 1973 to US$ 107 
million in 1976—of which USD $17 million was trade financing (CAF AR 1970-1980).  
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 However, lending reversed sharply in 1977, as a result of Chile’s withdrawal from the 
Andean Group—now under a different approach towards development and integration focused 
on free market policies under Pinochet’s leadership— as well as changing development 
strategies of member countries. Chile’s withdrawal affected CAF’s activities, disturbing their 
normal development to the point that for more than ten months, CAF’s directors were unable to 
meet, which delayed loans’ approval as well as administrative measures (CAF AR, 1976). CAF 
experienced three years of net losses in this decade (1975, 1977 and 1978) reflecting not only 
difficulties in finding feasible projects but also CAF’s high cost of capital, which made it hard to 
offer loans at terms that were both acceptable to borrowers and profitable for the entity 
(Humphrey 2012; CAF, 1990). By 1979, in its efforts to survive, CAF’s management had 
changed its credit policy to give priority to development projects that were national priorities for 
its shareholder countries (CAF AR, 2010).  
 
3.4.1. Failure of industrial programs and impact on the institution 
To further understand CAF’s limitations during this decade and how it would shape CAF’s 
future, it is necessary to explore the failure of the Andean Region’s industrial programs. These 
programs were a key aspect of the integration goals and agenda. CAF’s original task was to 
provide capital for investment projects designed to have regional impact. Otherwise, it was felt 
CAF would merely duplicate efforts of existing development banks. CAF was assigned a role in 
the regional creation of manufacturing or service companies and in the expansion, modernization 
or conversion of existing ones. By the very nature of the economic policies of member countries, 
it was implicit that there would be a preference for public enterprises in this role.  
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 At the time, the private sector had little involvement in the development of so-called 
strategic sectors, which were those that should benefit according to sub-regional agreements 
(Sorensen, 1994). CAF began operating within this framework, which limited its scope of 
activity to finance operations. It began to finance investment projects directly linked to 
integration programs established by the Cartagena Agreement, particularly those arising from the 
industrial programs. In fact, the efforts of CAF’s early years were largely dependent on the pace 
of the Andean integration process, which began with a lot of momentum but was deadlocked by 
the mid-1970s. In later decades, CAF’s management would continue to closely monitor 
integration processes, but would focus on building its own agenda separate from the pace of 
regional initiatives. 
 It was hoped then that CAF would primarily pay attention to assisting the sectoral 
programs’ schemes (SPIDs) that would improve the woefully inadequate intraregional 
transportation and communications systems (Fontaine, 1977). The establishment of the SPIDs 
was an initiative taken by the Andean Pact to spread industrial growth throughout the Andean 
region (Fontaine, 1977). It was distributional in nature in that specific Andean nations   would be 
assigned the rights to certain industries that could then export to the others behind a common 
external tariff, giving them a large enough market for successful ISI.  It has been described as the 
“most ambitious attempt at central direction ever attempted by any transnational 
community”(Fontaine, 1977, p. 16). The SPIDs focused on four main industries: the light 
engineering program, the petrochemical program, the automobile program, and the iron and steel 
program. The automobile and iron and steel programs were agreed upon later, but never fully 
materialized in action. Nevertheless, defenders of the prevailing integration scheme could argue 
that all was not lost, since the petrochemical program had been approved in April 1975. 
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  However, numerous and substantial reforms had been introduced into the original 
proposal, completely subverting the principle of specialization, and the program approved left 
every member country much as it had been before, with the option of developing an integrated 
petrochemical industry if it so desired (Puyana, 1982).  Among the problems the Pact faced were 
the diverse and often contrasting economic policies of its members. This problem has been a 
constant throughout integration efforts in the region. For example, Colombia, Peru, and 
Venezuela already had well-established state-owned petrochemical industries (Fontaine, 1977). 
These countries were not comfortable with allowing other states access to technology without 
themselves also possessing that technology. In addition, Fontaine (1977, p.17) notes: “Delays 
also provided an incentive for member countries to rush into plant construction and thus create 
faits accomplis, or slipshod industrial development”. 
 Fontaine (1977) highlights two reasons for the apparent lack of success in financing the 
sectoral programs. First, only two SPIDs had been approved by then. Second, and of greater 
importance, the disagreements within the Andean Group over fear of losing one’s fair share 
made acceptable projects difficult to find and politically dangerous to promote (Fontaine, 1977).  
There were also technical aspects that complicated the preparation, negotiation and execution of 
the SPIDs. The negotiation could have been more successful if all or a large part of the programs 
were negotiated together, according to some observers (Salgado, 2009). Since more SPIDs were 
discussed individually, that meant that in each negotiation members had to come to an 
agreement. Finally, this industrial planning effort coincided with a turbulent period in the global 
economy. When the energy crisis took place in 1973, the preparation and negotiation of certain 
SPIDs such as petrochemical and automotive were immediately affected. In short, for many 
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political (national viewpoints) and technical reasons, the industrial program aspects of the 
Cartagena Agreement did not work properly and eventually were reduced to impotence. 
 In this context, it became difficult for CAF authorities to promote SPIDs since the 
institution was still very dependent on national contributions for much of its working capital (in 
later decades the insertion in global capital markets would provide more discretion to the entity). 
As such, the two main instruments of integration, the common external tariff and regional 
industrialization programs often conflicted with national development plans. By 1977, CAF had 
not done much in relation to assisting SPIDs, allocating a total of US$ 4.7 million to them. In 
contrast, US$ 18 million had been committed to strictly national projects and regional 
transportation improvement as well (Fontaine, 1977).  Therefore, since its creation, CAF has run 
up often against the tensions between its mandate to promote and finance regional integration 
and the desires of individual member governments. 
  During CAF’s first decade, countries had difficulty agreeing on the rules of the 
integration process. For example, Chile’s and Venezuela’s needs for foreign investments were 
very different and each country looked for different regulations. In fact, during the 1970-1975 
period, Chile experienced a profound political and economic crisis, while in that same period 
Venezuela was enjoying the economic advantages of being an oil exporting country. In this 
context, it was difficult to outline and promote projects with integrationist content. By 1979, as 
previously mentioned, CAF changed its credit policy to give priority to development projects 
that were national priorities for its shareholder countries (CAF, 2010a). By focusing on national 
priorities, CAF was trying to find common ground amongst its members so they could take 
notice that the institution could still be a timely financing agent, despite regional disagreements.  
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3.5 CAF and the regional environment during the 1980s – 1990s  
By 1980, the CAF had raised a total of US$ 260 million within its member countries, but only 
USD $137 million from outside the sub-region (CAF AR, 1970-1980). By 1981, CAF’s financial 
situation was not good, with only US$ 15 million in loan approvals that year. Moreover, in the 
sub-regional arena, 1981 brought with it a legacy of dissatisfactions and frustrations. This was a 
very hard year with the Peru-Ecuador armed conflict seriously aggravating the situation. From 
this low point, CAF began reframing its strategy and rebuilding itself as a multilateral financing 
agent. Leaving behind an operational model with a focus more on the political interests of its 
members than in its own bottom line, and constrained by a mandate to promote a sub-regional 
integration process that was at best stagnating, CAF began the painful process of reinventing 
itself as a RFI much closer, in terms of financial management, to the model of the IADB and 
World Bank (Humphrey, 2012).  
 CAF officials began to consider ways for CAF to revamp its operational activities in 
order to enhance its attractiveness as a potential lender. In the early 1980s, CAF’s Board 
approved a new operational policy, which enabled it to expand its field of action, while 
consolidating its position as the financial arm of Andean countries (CAF, 2010a).  The new 
policy was perceived as a significant tool since it took into account the urgent needs and 
priorities of the countries and incorporated sectors perceived by CAF as immediate priorities 
such as infrastructure and agricultural development (CAF AR, 1983; CAF AR, 1985). By 1985, 
CAF also embraced rural development as a priority (CAF AR, 1985). At the same time, during 
this decade, CAF took its first steps in the social arena by signing cooperation agreements with 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the OPEC Fund, and the World 
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Food Program. These steps gave rise to a new role, as fund manager, for the execution of 
projects financed by other institutions (CAF AR, 2010).  
 During this time, RFIs were looking for ways to cooperate with each other, in their 
efforts to support their members, which were going through a difficult economic period. At this 
time, CAF signed a cooperation agreement with the IADB, World Bank, and the authorities of 
the Andean Group, forming the joint Group for physical integration (CAF AR, 1982-1984). CAF 
began co-financing several operations in the 1980s with the IADB, which provided more 
opportunities to CAF for lending larger amounts for projects assessed and overseen by the 
IADB. CAF loans increasingly went as well directly to governments or state companies and 
development banks, rather than the private sector. As Humphrey (2012: 69) suggests, “this 
provided a higher degree of security to the CAF in troubled economic times and allowed for 
larger loan amounts, and would have been welcome to borrowing governments in the extremely 
difficult panorama of the early 1980s.” Meanwhile, in this decade, CAF’s administration began 
to systematically accumulate reserves, while convincing shareholders to allow CAF to keep 
unallocated net income on its books, rather than redistributing it to shareholders (which was 
permitted by its constitutive agreement) (Humphrey, 2012, p.70). 
 The 1980s debt crisis was indeed a test for CAF’s continuity and its preferred creditor 
status was ultimately fundamental in ensuring the survival of the institution. As Hugo Sarmiento, 
who has worked at CAF since 1993 and is currently its Chief Financial Officer, recalls: “We’ve 
been stress tested in the [1980s] debt crisis when four of our countries were in default. Colombia 
never defaulted, but four out of five members were D-rated yet we were always paid on time” 
(Sarmiento quoted in Barham, 2003). Against all odds, CAF lending began growing again in the 
1980s, while the entity evidently began selecting projects much more carefully; cancelled 
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projects went from 43% of total value during 1971-1980 to 10.6% in 1982-1986 (Humphrey, 
2012, p.69). 
 The regional environment in which CAF operated during this decade was not very 
promising. In 1983, trade broke down within the Andean Group. But the second half of the 
1980s witnessed a renewed integration spirit in the region. The recently democratized countries 
were keen to work together to deliver some regional goods (Dabene, 2012). The economic crisis, 
particularly the external debt, prompted the launch of a Latin American Economic Conference at 
the highest level among SELA member states in Quito in January 1984. This event was followed 
in June by a conference specifically on the debt issue among the eleven most indebted Latin 
American countries, which produced the “Consensus of Cartagena.” At the same time, new 
regional efforts were being made to find peaceful regional solutions in Central America, through 
the activity of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) formed in 
1983, and the Contadora Support Group set up in 1985 (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay). This 
increasing trend towards international cooperation together led to a transformation of the eight 
countries belonging to the Contadora and the Contadora Support Groups, at a meeting in Rio de 
Janeiro in December 1986, into the Rio Group (Best, 1991). 
 In 1987, the Andean Group signed a protocol in Quito providing for a less ambitious and 
more discretionary process of integration. Soon after, CAF approved the entry of banks and other 
private organizations of full member countries as Series B shareholders, with limited 
participation on the Board. In 1989, the private sector started to participate in CAF’s paid-in 
capital, by increasing to US$50 billion the capital accounted by Series B shares. These shares 
were undersigned by banks and private financial institutions of Andean countries. In addition, 
one private sector representative was incorporated  into CAF’s Board of Directors (CAF AR, 
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2005). CAF’s shareholders also approved a fund for promoting multinational Andean 
enterprises, to which they assigned US$ 1.5 billion dollars; another fund for biotechnical 
development was assigned US$1 billion dollars. CAF’s responsibilities during this new stage of 
integrationist activity included the promotion of integration by encouraging the private sector to 
assume a crucial role (CAF AR, 1988). However, whether for lack of projects or by design, 
CAF’s portfolio at the time was notably lacking in regional infrastructure projects (Bywater, 
1990). At the end of 1987, only US$ 37 million of the US$ 1.5 billion set aside for the Andean 
enterprises initiative had been used. This US$37 million was in fact money that CAF had already 
invested in two companies under its ordinary mandate (Bywater, 1990).  
 Meanwhile, within the regional context, there was some rivalry and overlap in terms of 
activities between CAF and the Junta of the Cartagena Agreement, despite their obligation under 
the agreement to remain in close contact and coordinate the activities between the two 
organizations (Bywater, 1990). Both were competing for funds from regional major banks for 
technical assistance projects, organizing seminars and studies on similar topics, while trying to 
involve the private sector more in integration. However, CAF had more resources and could 
afford to be more generous in the funding it offered industry for studies or attendance at seminars 
Moreover, CAF was also perceived as being less bureaucratic (Bywater, 1990, p.139). This 
perception of increasingly low levels of bureaucracy at CAF became a key attraction for South 
American countries considering multilateral loans throughout the years.   
 In 1989, the presidents of the Andean Pact announced new bold efforts to boost 
integration mechanisms, such as their decision to work toward a common market – together with 
intensified cooperation in a broad range of areas (Best, 1991). Following this announcement, 
CAF adopted a number of strategies to increase its resources and extend its field of action. In 
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December 1989, the entity doubled its authorized capital and decided to invite other Latin 
American countries to become Series C members (CAF, 2010a) within a regional environment 
that increasingly supported opening borders and reaching for capital outside the sub-region. As 
outlined in the introduction of this work, Series C members have less borrowing capacity and 
representation in CAF’s Board than the original shareholders. Initially, only Mexico was 
interested and was incorporated as a Series C shareholder in 1990. 
 By the late 1980s, CAF had not devised yet a clear strategy to raise funds in the financial 
markets. However, by that year, CAF had almost two decades of showing the international 
community that it could survive in tumultuous times. CAF had an excellent repayment record, 
even though four of CAF’s five founding members were in default to international markets at 
some point. These countries suspended international debt payments and fell into arrears with the 
World Bank, IMF and/or the IADB in the mid-1980s, but continued servicing all obligations to 
CAF. Some private lenders began noticing CAF and in 1989, the first placement of a private 
bond (albeit only for US$ 2.5 million) took place with First Interstate Bank, followed the next 
year by a three-year, USD $15 million bond placed privately in Japan at Libor +1% (Humphrey, 
2012, p.72). In 1990, CAF also received untied credit lines from European banks, and further 
untied loans from First Interstate Bank (CAF AR, 1990). Meanwhile, authorized capital was 
increased by US$1 billion in 1990, to a total of US$2.05 billion as shareholders perceived the 
institution as an useful and reliable source of financing (CAF AR, 1990). Despite this track 
record, CAF’s scope of action remained limited and it had to reinvent itself during the next 
decade in order to go beyond surviving in a turbulent region. 
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3.6 The arrival of Enrique Garcia and the beginning of a new era 
Enrique Garcia became CAF’s executive president in 1991. Garcia is a Bolivian economist who 
served as an officer of the IADB for 17 years until 1989, where he was Treasurer of the 
institution after holding other positions such as Division Head in the Project Analysis and 
Finance Departments and Representative in Argentina. As a Division Head in the Finance 
Departments’ unit, he became familiar with the relationships of countries’ industries and public 
sectors with other development banks, including CAF. Between 1989 and 1991, Garcia was 
Bolivia’s minister of Planning and Coordination and Head of the Economic and Social Cabinet. 
In this capacity, he represented his country in the Board of Governors at the World Bank, the 
IADB and CAF, as well as acted as a member of the IMF-IBRD Development Committee 
representing Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay and Paraguay. During his tenure as CAF’s 
president, Jose Cardenas (1981-1986) had asked Garcia to advise CAF on financing matters and 
even invited him to join the institution. Garcia declined the invitation, although he provided 
Cardenas with advice and even suggested he would help him find CAF’s next president (Enrique 
Garcia, personal interview, November 19, 2012). 
During his role as a Minister of Planning and Coordination and head of the Economic and 
Social Cabinet of Bolivia, Garcia became the president of CAF’s Board of Directors representing 
his native Bolivia. It was at this time that Garcia became better acquainted with CAF. 
Meanwhile, the Minister of Foreign Relations in Colombia, who was Garcia’s former boss at the 
IADB, talked to Garcia and let him know that his country would support him if he ever wanted 
to assume the role of CAF’s president (Enrique Garcia, personal interview, November 19, 2012). 
During his interview for this study, Garcia mentioned that once he got to know CAF better he 
decided to accept the presidency because he saw an institution with potential that could be 
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strengthened from the inside out. Garcia had already had a successful career in his country and at 
the IADB and was ready for a new professional challenge4 that would let him apply all the 
knowledge and relational abilities he possessed regarding development financing: 
I said yes, because I saw an entity that had potential, but needed to change in some ways. 
CAF had a constitutive agreement that gave it the foundations to adapt itself to changing 
times. It also had some governance mechanisms such as a non-resident board that gave 
the institution some advantages over the IADB and WB. I thought that well-managed, 
those features gave the institution the basis to have a solid entity that could be more 
significant in the region (Enrique Garcia, personal interview, November 19, 2012). 
 
Garcia had thus been very well acquainted with RFIs and had vast knowledge of 
multilateral agencies and processes in South America before joining CAF. He drew upon his 
previous experiences to redefine CAF’s overall vision and strategy to support long-term 
financing for development. To grow its operations, Garcia believed that CAF should focus on 
three key areas: credit expansion, membership, and funding, all of which were intertwined. 
Garcia was clear about his goals right from the start and believed that it was time for CAF to 
become more active in international capital markets and rely less on funds raised within 
members or short-term loans (Latin Finance, 1998). Moreover, Garcia perceived that although 
the bank’s original role was in trade finance, it was important to broaden that: “We [CAF’s 
management] saw that there was a need for development finance, especially in infrastructure” 
(Garcia quoted in Wilson, 2012).  
                                                        
4  As CAF’s president, Garcia has contributed to academic institutions and thinktanks. Currently, he is Vice- President of Canning House, 
member of the Board of Directors of the Inter-American Dialogue and of the Dialogue’s Advisory Group on Membership, the Council on 
American Politics of George Washington University, the Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center. He was 
formerly a member of the Advisory Board of the Center for International Development (CID) at Harvard University.  
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A key feature in CAF’s survival has been how Garcia has engaged with the prevailing 
regional and institutional dynamics while selecting those elements that could be useful in 
carrying out his vision for the institution. To be successful at those engagements, Garcia has 
employed his previous institutional experience and his charisma to establish and strengthen 
cordial relationships with political leaders throughout the region. Garcia’s actions support Cox’s 
(1969) analysis regarding how an executive head requires excellent political skills, while 
nurturing a personal network reaching into domestic politics of relevant countries. In the 
early1990s, Garcia identified that some operational and financing policies of large MDBs could 
be adapted to CAF. For example, in 1992, CAF hired consultants from Coopers and Lybrand and 
a former World Bank Vice-president to make an independent review of CAF’s operations, 
financial mechanisms and processes. The study was the basis to update CAF’s organizational 
structures in 1993. Similarly, CAF’s management reviewed the entity’s operative and financial 
policies   “for the purpose of expanding its financial sources and to adapt them to the new world 
dynamics” (CAF AR, 1992, p.57). Moreover, during that year, CAF put particular emphasis on 
investment co-financing. Hence CAF’s contribution of about US$ 401 million allowed for the 
channeling of external funds to the sub-region that totaled almost US$1.2 billion from loans 
granted for projects co-financed by different multilateral organizations and international bilateral 
financing agencies (CAF AR, 1992).  
By 1992, there was also greater concentration in long-term credit operations compared to 
medium and short-term credit (CAF AR, 1992). Operational activities during that year placed 
greater emphasis on the private sector, representing a significant change in CAF’s activities. 
To a great extent, this was due to the prevalent institutional paradigms regarding the importance 
of privatization and governance programs within the region. During this period, as outlined in the 
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previous chapter, regional institutions like ECLA and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) 
also experienced the paradigm shift, embracing “open regionalism.” This shift was a response to 
the demands of the increasingly noticeable dynamics of economic regionalization and 
globalization, while aligning regional economic integration with the liberal policies of the 
Washington Consensus. Open regionalism emphasized regional trade agreements with low 
external tariffs and trade barriers and broad intra-group liberalization, aimed at giving the private 
sector a bigger role in promoting efficiency and international competitiveness (Burki, Perry & 
Calvo, 1998).  
By 1993, CAF had become the largest medium and long term lender to the private sector 
in the Andean Group—more than 60% of CAF’s loan approvals in 1993 were in this category 
(CAF AR, 1993). CAF’s focus on trade financing had disappeared for both ideological and 
practical reasons. As such, the last mention of Safico, the short-term trade finance lending 
program, was in 1993. CAF also updated its mission statement in 1993, giving emphasis to 
regional integration, which became later an element of attraction that resulted in the eventual 
incorporation of new countries The turnabout in fundraising strategy that took place starting in 
1993 proved to be crucial in CAF’s history, allowing it to diversify its sources of financing and 
cut costs (CAF AR, 2000). CAF also authorized a group of Andean commercial banks to sign up 
for a portion of B Shares, as permitted in its constitutive agreement since 1989, in order to 
further diversify capital ownership.  
In 1993, CAF also adopted a new organizational structure and management process, 
“leading to increased levels of professionalism, greater development support for its staff, and 
increased use of technology” (CAF AR, 1993). An important aspect of this structure was related 
to the hiring of staff, since before Garcia’s arrival it was noted that there was some political 
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interference related to staff appointment (former World Bank and CAF official, personal 
interview, January 26, 2013). During his interview, Garcia himself recounted two instances when 
ministers or central bankers talked to him trying to convince him to appoint one of their nationals 
to the Executive Vice-Presidency. Garcia resisted these appeals and had to work with all the 
members of the Board in explaining how independence in the appointment of staff was beneficial 
for the institution’s credibility in international circles (Garcia, personal interview, November 19, 
2012). A CAF official who has worked for the institution since the early 1990s observed: 
“Garcia has had to use his charisma and political skills to develop and maintain a balanced 
relationship amongst leaders of distinct governments, not only to reaffirm CAF’s support but 
also to prevent political interference” (CAF senior official, Infrastructure Division, personal 
interview, November 19, 2012). 
After the 1993 reform, Garcia’s position was established as the only political role; for 
other staff members, a competitive process (which includes outsourcing the hiring of senior 
positions) was established in order to avoid political interference as much as possible. In 
securing these organizational changes, Garcia demonstrated—as Schroeder (2014) and Kille and 
Scully (2003) have shown in their studies about the role of leadership in IOs— how an executive 
head could make political choices in order to contribute to organizational adaption and progress, 
and put in place a strategic agenda while mobilizing support. Some of the early hires after this 
reform have become long-term trusted confidants of Garcia. These (now senior) officials have 
embraced Garcia’s vision and helped execute it since the mid-1990s and continue to have 
strategic roles in the institution. For example, Luis Enrique Berrizbetia, has been CAF’s 
Executive Vice-president since 1996, Hugo Sarmiento has worked in the institution since 1993 
and is now its Chief Financial Officer and Antonio Juan Sosa, VP of Infrastructure since 2000s 
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was hired by CAF in 1996 as Director of Public Financing Projects. 
 Garcia’ strategy to make CAF a relevant source of long-term financing for the region 
consisted of developing human and capital resources in order to achieve three main objectives: 
gaining access to capital markets, developing a niche in financing physical infrastructure and 
expanding its membership while strengthening the relationships with all country members in the 
prevalent regional environment. The next subsections describe the development of this strategy 
in detail, while showing how IOs are able to evolve and develop a distinct identity beyond their 
original mandates. 
 
3.6.1 Gaining access to capital markets 
In CAF’s story, the management of relations between the entity and the credit rating agencies 
(CRAs) can be explained to a great extent through an exploration of the role of leadership within 
the entity. Garcia’s top priority for the institution was to obtain an investment grade rating, in 
order to raise significant resources on the markets at a price that permitted CAF to offer countries 
long-term loans at attractive rates (Garcia, personal interview, November 19, 2012). Garcia knew 
the CRAs’ staff well from his previous positions at the IADB. Immediately after taking charge in 
1991, Garcia traveled to the U.S. to obtain a rating from Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. 
Nevertheless, as Humphrey (2012: 73) suggests, this was an ambitious request, considering that 
not a single borrower in Latin America had investment grade, and that four of the five founding 
members were among the most notorious debtors during the previous decade.  
 A former CAF official, who worked at the time in the area of raising funds, recalled that 
one of the strategies that CAF used to engage effectively with credit rating agencies was to 
differentiate the institution from the countries themselves. CAF officials (following Garcia’s 
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strategy) emphasized, first, that the institution had a separate constitutive agreement from the 
Andean Pact and was therefore a supranational entity and, second, that countries had respected 
CAF’s guidelines and had not stopped paying their loans (former CAF official, personal 
interview November 15, 2012). As such, CAF advertised itself as a “solid” and “healthy” 
institution with a very good financial situation, despite its size. This interviewee also attributed 
CAF’s success in obtaining investment grade to the technical and communication abilities of 
CAF’s staff, under the direction of Garcia, who were committed to establishing long-term 
relationships with the CRAs and to gain international exposure. At the same time, it is 
noteworthy that CAF was promoting itself internationally in the middle of a sub-regional crisis: 
in 1992, the Andean Pact suffered a severe blow when Peru unilaterally decided to suspend the 
preferential treatment granted to imports from countries within the Pact. This action was part of a 
general Peruvian policy aimed at forcing a lower common external tariff on the Pact.   
 Ultimately, the financial health of the institution combined with its ongoing support from 
shareholder countries—reflected in the constant increase of its share capital, loan repayment 
rates and a Board of Directors who trusted the staff—were fundamental for CAF in obtaining an 
investment grade rating. It was also important that there was a considerable amount of previous 
work done by CAF that was closely linked with that goal. Shortly after Garcia’s arrival, the 
institution began sending signals to investors regarding CAF’s capability to participate in capital 
market activities in the region (former CAF official, personal interview, November 15, 2012). 
For instance, since 1991, CAF had participated in limited recourse lending activities, particularly 
under its two varieties, BOT (Build, Operate, and Transfer) and BOO (Build, Operate and Own). 
Other areas of financing that CAF had cautiously expanded into by then were equity investments 
and financial leasing (CAF AR, 1994).  
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 Standard & Poor’s issued CAF an investment grade rating in 1993, soon followed by 
Moody’s and IBCA (CAF AR, 1993). During the same year, CAF issued three public bonds for a 
total of US$ 289 million, US$ 200 million on the Eurobond market and US$ 89 million Japanese 
“samurai” bonds (CAF AR, 1993). In one year, CAF raised more freely usable resources from 
outside the sub-region than it had in its entire previous two decades combined. Using data from 
annual reports, Humphrey (2012:74) remarks that project lending commitments increased by 
more than a factor of 10 in the five years between 1989 (US$ 103 million) and 1994 (US$ 1.4 
billion), a truly remarkable growth rate. A crucial aspect during this phase was that the investor 
road shows were handled by Enrique Garcia, with Juan Posada—CAF’s Vice-president of 
Finance at the time— in the apprentice’s role (House, 1994).  When asked what CAF’s 
objectives were in terms of returns, Garcia replied:  
In recent years we have put a lot of effort into running our shop with a private sector 
approach. We have introduced sound criteria for asset liability management and although 
high returns are not the main priority of the institution, we expect to continue having 
satisfactory returns on assets and equities. The fact that we have a high equity base is 
both good and bad. It makes for a very solid institution, but it is that much harder to 
achieve a high return on equity (Garcia quoted in Institutional Investor, 1995). 
 
 As Garcia courted the ratings agencies and prepared for road shows, he simultaneously 
began taking advantage of disbursement rules that were considerably more liberal than those of 
the World Bank or the IADB. That is the strategy he decided to employ for trying to balance 
shareholders’ needs with international markets’ requirements. In Garcia’s words: “We can do 
[finance] operations that are public or private, short or long term...We can provide loans or 
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equity guarantees. We can offer clients an integral package— not only to sovereigns but to 
municipalities, private companies and public and private financial institutions” (Garcia quoted in 
Institutional Investor, 1997). CAF was also focusing its efforts on securing medium-term 
funding in its member countries. In the process, it was slowly educating the market about how a 
small bank could actually raise funds internationally. Posada (quoted in House, 1994) described 
the strategy as follows: “We’ve chosen the approach of issuing no more than US$ 150 million, 
but several times a year…Little and often is the policy, and that sends out the signal, ‘These guys 
are serious, and they need money on a regular basis.’” During the mid-1990s, CAF sharply 
increased loans to the private sector to nearly 40% of outstanding loans at year-end 1997.5 
 
3.6.2 Physical infrastructure as a “niche” 
During CAF’s first two decades of existence, infrastructure accounted for a marginal percentage 
of its operations and financing, and it was mainly related to the entity’s financing of support 
equipment imports and not necessarily to the direct infrastructure projects (CAF AR, 2005). 
Twenty years later, CAF’s administration made it clear that supporting the infrastructure sector 
had become an institutional priority. Enrique Garcia strongly believed that CAF had to go 
beyond its mission and actually begin actively participating in physical infrastructure and border 
integration projects in the sub-region.  
During the 1990s, major multilateral lending agencies substantially lowered the amount 
of resources devoted to financing infrastructure projects in Latin America, even though loans for 
improving sectorial policies and governmental institutions increased significantly (Rozas, P., 
Bonifaz, J.L. & Guerra-Garcia, G., 2011). Overall, the decline in loans for infrastructure matters 
                                                        
5 CAF subsequently refocused on the public sector. Public-sector loans increased to more than 90% of outstanding loans as of year-end 2004. 
Since then, they have trended downward, and they stood at 79% as of year-end 2009. For more details see CAF’s Annual Reports.  
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was, according to institutional viewpoints, the result of several discussions within international 
multilateral lending agencies in the mid-1990s, which decided to favour assistance to sectoral 
authorities of each country in the region. This assistance was concentrated on the design of 
policies and instruments whose objectives were the multiplication of private investment flows in 
the sector (Rozas et al., 2011). Moreover, another reason why financing infrastructure went out 
of fashion in the 1990s was because, in line with strategies that embraced free market 
approaches, there was an exaggerated belief that the private sector would finance infrastructure. 
As a result, many felt that MDBs had better find something else to justify their continued 
existence. For example, in the case of the World Bank:  
Infrastructure was now lumped in with private sector development and finance, the whole 
package being merely one of five “networks.” The shift away from infrastructure was 
also because there was growing pressure to spend aid on the photogenic social 
priorities—health and education—and on the increasingly sacred environmental goals 
(both of which got networks all to themselves at the World Bank). So agencies shifted 
their budgets away from infrastructure to make room for increased spending on the new 
priorities (Collier, 2007, p.108). 
 
In addition, a former WB and CAF official who worked at the World Bank until 2001, 
remarked that by the mid-1990s, the WB was focusing on rebranding the institution by moving 
away from conditional lending (at least to be less associated with it) and concentrating on 
poverty issues and guidelines (former World Bank and CAF official, personal interview, January 
26, 2013). “Voices of the Poor: Reports ” were published by the World Bank in 2000, as the 
result of strategic discussions within the World Bank in the mid-1990s led by its Executive 
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President, James Wolfensohn. The three reports analyzed different aspects of the interviews that 
the WB conducted with 60,000 poor men and women around the world (World Bank, 2013).  
Garcia felt then that CAF could find a niche alongside existing IFIs in the region by 
focusing on infrastructure matters. That niche would also serve as a “window of opportunity” 
and as a “vehicle” to make CAF attractive for countries beyond the Andean region. In addition to 
the shift of institutional focus at the WB and the IADB, Garcia (2006) emphasized that there had 
been insufficient public investment in the region: 
After the adjustment and reform process initiated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, fiscal 
restraint mainly reduced public investment in Latin America. This negatively affected the 
stock and quality of infrastructure in the region. In this context, CAF viewed the 
financing of infrastructure projects as an area neglected by the market and consequently 
specialized in this sector (Garcia, 2006, p.185-186). 
At the time, according to Juan Antonio Sosa— current VP of Infrastructure and working for CAF 
since the early 1990s—various CAF employees did not agree with the idea, suggesting that 
infrastructure was a task for “big” development banks. However, to reinforce his position, Garcia 
began the hiring process of experts who were enthusiastic about physical integration, had 
experience in the area and consequently believed infrastructure was a feasible goal (Antonio 
Juan Sosa, personal interview, October 18, 2012; senior CAF official, Infrastructure Division, 
personal interview, November 19, 2012). 
 According to a current official who was hired at the time, Garcia’s mandate also indicated 
that CAF could not take longer than nine months to analyze the feasibility and funding of an 
operation: “that was ok for the IADB but CAF needed to start responding faster to its clients’ 
needs…CAF could not compete in terms of lower interest rates or better financing terms, but it 
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could provide a competitive advantage in understanding better client needs” (senior CAF 
Official, Infrastructure Division, personal interview, November 19, 2012). This official also 
remarked that Garcia was keen on reminding the staff that country members’ officials who 
requested financing from CAF needed it as soon as possible, since in about three years they 
would probably be gone (due to electoral cycles). Therefore, CAF needed to provide an agile 
response to financing requests if they were deemed feasible (senior CAF Official, Infrastructure 
Division, personal interview, November 19, 2012). 
 Garcia also hired international consultants for drafting an ambitious infrastructure plan. 
One of these people was Guillermo Vega Alvear, a Peruvian engineer and consultant who was 
also a well-known businessman in South America in the area of infrastructure. Garcia met Vega 
Alvear in Bolivia before he joined CAF and hired him as the lead consultant of a team of experts. 
Their task was to identify the sub-region’s most important projects, which could contribute to 
strengthening the integration process. The objective was that CAF would begin to actively 
promote the provision of the adequate physical infrastructure deemed essential for integration, 
the increase in productive and export capacity of enterprises, and the creation of the competitive 
advantages demanded by the global market. This plan assigned priority to the areas of road 
construction, energy and communications.  
 The task force concluded by identifying ninety integration projects in the energy, 
transportation and communication sectors. The ministers of transportation, communication and 
public works of the member countries also met in Caracas in October 1992, where they selected 
the twenty top priority projects. By 1994, CAF had published three books— “Road Integration,” 
“Energy Integration,” and “Telematics” in the Andean Region—that gave diagnostic analyses of 
the actual integration situation. While carrying out some of the initial projects, CAF also began 
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to promote border integration, of importance not only to the Andean countries, “but also to 
partners such as Brazil and Chile, for there are many projects to be carried out jointly that will 
increase trade by means of a broad common frontier” (CAF AR, 1995, p. 16). 
 The three books published by CAF, especially the one about road integration, were key in 
attracting attention from the other governments, such as Brazil. These publications shared the 
view of Eliezer Batista, a well-known businessman in Brazil and the president of Vale do Rio 
Doce company (a mining company and one of the largest logistics operators in Brazil, which was 
privatized in 1997 and is now known as Vale S.A.). Batista led the Strategic Affairs Secretariat 
at the end of the Collor government in Brazil. During this period, he published a comprehensive 
work called “Development Axes,” which analyzed integration alternatives in Latin America. 
This work went beyond traditional infrastructure analyses since it created development regions in 
seven areas of the continent. It soon became the “bible” of regional planning. According to 
various authors, through his work, Batista promoted linking commodities production centers to 
global markets and as such making substantial infrastructure investments along the export axes 
(Goncalves, Brandao, & Galvao, 2003). Although Batista’s work was temporarily forgotten after 
Collor’s impeachment, it was revived at the beginning of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
presidency and became an integral component of the Multiyear Plan (PPA) from 1996 to 1999 as 
well of the programs “Brasil em Ação” (Brazil in Action) “Avança Brasil” (Advance Brazil) and 
later, of course, of the IIRSA initiative. 
Garcia met Batista while the latter was a government official and shortly after, he helped 
Garcia coordinate a meeting with Cardoso in August 1993, who at the time was Minister of 
Foreign Affairs under President Itamar Franco (Garcia, personal interview, November 19, 2012). 
According to Garcia, the minister told him that Brazilian officials at the time were not interested 
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in joining CAF because they saw it as an institution that could mainly work on trade financing 
matters. He asked Garcia whether CAF could finance a highway between Brazil and Venezuela 
for example and Garcia replied that at the time they could not do it necessarily, but they were 
working on that (Garcia, personal interview, November 19, 2012).  
The meeting between Cardoso and Garcia is emblematic: it served as a first direct 
encounter between Brazilian authorities and CAF, while providing Garcia substantial arguments 
to present to CAF’s Board of Directors regarding the necessity of modifying the constitutive 
agreement. By extending CAF’s membership to other countries as associate members (Series C 
shareholders), Garcia hoped that the institution could expand its scope and become more relevant 
in the region. While attending a World Bank meeting in 1994, Garcia had a brief encounter with 
Cardoso (who at the time was a presidential candidate) and he mentioned to him that CAF had 
modified its constitutive agreement (Garcia, personal interview, November 19, 2012). After 
several discussions between Brazilian officials and CAF officials under Garcia’s direction, Brazil 
eventually joined CAF as a Series C member in 1995 after Cardoso became president. As such, 
CAF’s management engaged with the Brazilian and member states’ geopolitics in order to 
understand and deliver on strategies to strengthen the institution and make it attractive for several 
actors in South America. 
CAF’s actions and shareholders’ support in the area of infrastructure were possible due to 
various factors including the expansion of the institution’s sphere of operations with the 
accession of new shareholders. Meanwhile, it was also helpful that CAF began using financial 
instruments that fostered private-sector participation in the development of physical 
infrastructure, while increasing investment. Two examples were limited recourse lending, in 
which CAF had been participating since 1991, and the A/B loans, which were introduced in 1997 
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(CAF AR, 1997). Under this program, which remains in place at the present time, CAF offers the 
“A” portion of the loan from its own resources. CAF then partners with other financial 
institutions to provide the “B” loan. Under this structure, CAF is the lender of record in the 
transaction and acts as lead lender and administrative agent for the entire “A” plus “B” loan 
facility. This structure is promoted as benefitting both the borrowers and the financial institutions 
partnering with CAF because it reduces the risk of the operation. Another relevant factor was that 
in 1997 CAF started to provide direct financial support to subnational governments, without 
national state intervention, out of the conviction that many programs were beginning to be 
managed directly by municipalities, in keeping with the decentralization processes being pursued 
by shareholder countries (CAF AR, 1997). Direct loans to municipalities became important for 
engaging CAF as a financier for some countries like Brazil in the 2000s. 
From 1992-1997, CAF financed more than eighty physical infrastructure and border 
integration projects, for a total of close to US$3.5 billion, roughly one fourth of which was lent 
to the private sector (CAF AR, 1997). This figure, combined with the amounts co-financed and 
contributions by the local borrowers, meant that some US$ 10 billion had been mobilized for 
investments in infrastructure. The largest loan in this sector (US$ 215 million) was approved 
during 1997 for Petroleo Brasileiro S.A (Petrobras), to finance the construction of a gas pipeline 
between Bolivia and Brazil, followed by one of US$131 million to Ecuador in 1994 for the 
integration of a highway program, which aimed to improve communications along the principal 
internal road systems and in the border areas with Colombia and Peru (CAF AR, 1997). 
In 1995, CAF introduced the concept of sustainable development into all its management 
policies by adopting the criterion in the economic, social and environmental fields, while 
creating the Fund for Human Development (Fondeshu), designed to promote sustainable human 
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capital development among the poorest members of the Andean countries. Recipients could 
include private sector companies, cooperatives, small municipal governments, and other entities 
that have traditionally had limited access to conventional sources of credit. As such, during the 
mid-1990s, CAF began participating in the process of planning sustainable regional 
development; its involvement was focused on designing intermodal corridors and the integration 
of power networks and interconnections of gas and oil pipelines. During 1997, 63% of the 
investment projects approved by CAF were geared toward the construction of road and energy 
infrastructure, at both national and regional levels (CAF AR, 1997). 
 
3.6.3 Garcia’s first decade balancing shareholders’ goals and CRAs’ requirements  
The 1990s were characterized by an unprecedented upsurge of arrangements in the region. 
Mercosur was established in 1991 under Brazilian leadership, initially aiming to include Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay in a customs union but with aspirations for deeper integration 
on the model of the European Union. Brazil also launched the idea of a South American Free 
Trade Area in 1993, immediately before the establishment of NAFTA. Other sub-regional 
arrangements also gained momentum in the 1990s and a series of bilateral and trilateral 
agreements were signed between various countries in the region (Bull & Boas, 2003).  The 
Andean Group was also revitalized and became the Andean Community in 1996, consolidating 
and relaunching the idea of a common external tariff for the region. However, in the 1990s, an 
important challenge for Latin American regionalizing actors was to develop a Latin (or South) 
American identity for regional integration without challenging the new orthodoxies of economic 
policy (Bull & Boas, 2003).  
Taking into account the prevailing regional schemes, Garcia’s ambitions in the mid-
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1990s included raising the regional and international profile of CAF, while redefining and 
clarifying the institution’s role within the global lending community and contributing to regional 
initiatives. Garcia focused then extensively on explaining internationally CAF’s unique structure 
and identity. In an interview, Garcia suggested: “CAF should not be seen as a competitor, but as 
working to complement the work done by the World Bank, IADB, and other supranational 
institutions” (Garcia quoted in Institutional Investor, 1995). In another interview, Garcia 
remarked that CAF did not compare itself to the WB or the IADB, since CAF was different: “We 
definitely have a lot of respect for the World Bank, the IADB and the IFC—they have a lot to 
offer. But we are different and we cannot try and copy them. That would be a very serious 
mistake.  The success of CAF has been to have its own identity” (Garcia quoted in Latin 
Finance, 1997).   
By the mid-1990s, CAF was well known in the Andean region for its catalyst role. The 
institution had often supported long-term financing in countries that had previously had 
difficulties in securing loans and also lent during major regional and international economic 
crises.  Garcia described this role in a 1997 interview:  
Through the years, CAF has been very effective in supporting development in countries 
that previously had difficulties in securing financing. In the case of Peru, even though 
there was a time when it did not have access to capital markets, CAF continued its very 
good relationship with the country as a supplier of trade finance, and Peru was punctual 
in its payments to the Corporation. In Venezuela, when access to funds was shut off two 
or three years ago, we continued to do business as usual for the most part. CAF's role 
now is not so much to supply funds as to provide an umbrella to other lenders, thanks to 
our preferred status (Garcia in Burns & Sedelnik, 1997, emphasis added). 
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CAF saw its institutional role as a bridge between the global financial markets and the 
Andean region (CAF AR, 1994). CAF had also helped finance trade between the Andean 
members when early in the decade, commercial banks were not lending to these countries and 
demand for financing investment projects had declined substantially. With these actions, 
according to Garcia (2014), the institution took a first step to becoming not only the funding arm 
of the Andean integration process, but also a major supporter of a more comprehensive economic 
development agenda within its shareholder countries. As Biancarelli (2008) remarks, access to 
private financial markets can become limited and costly for some nations, since the insertion of 
developing countries in international financial structure is asymmetric. In this context, CAF 
acquired an important role within the region, as it began to show that it has the ability to provide 
financing conditions with less cyclical variation. Supporting the national efforts of its 
shareholders, CAF tried to fill the gap between the demand and supply of finance, at least to a 
certain extent.  
 Garcia wanted, however, to invite more Latin American countries to join the institution; 
countries that would be interested in contributing capital in return for loans to support their 
development priorities. Since Garcia had joined CAF, he believed that the organization could no 
longer remain an institution made up of five full member countries because this limited CAF’s 
financing scope, its role and risk diversification (Garcia, personal interview, November 19, 
2012). Moreover, due to ongoing identity and political crises that the Andean Community was 
going through during this decade, Garcia promoted the notion that CAF had to “look for its own 
identity” beyond its relation with the Andean Group – but within Latin America (Garcia, 
personal interview, November 19, 2012).  
Garcia mentioned that when he told other CAF officials about attracting new members 
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and redefining its identity, various officials suggested that they had tried this approach before but 
were unsuccessful. For Garcia, the key was to achieve the possibility to finance (or co-finance) 
“relevant” projects such as those in the area of infrastructure, which could be of interest to 
countries like Brazil and Argentina (Garcia, personal interview, November 19, 2012). As 
outlined in the previous chapter then, to understand the way CAF interprets its mandate and 
actions while defining its identity and role in infrastructure financing, it is crucial to take into 
account prevalent regional dynamics and how the entity has responded to them. 
As such, CAF found the need to set aside its distinctiveness as an Andean organization 
and accept members outside the Andean region with the goal of facilitating its access to capital 
markets. Although Mexico had joined in the 1990s when shareholders approved the inclusion of 
other Latin American countries, other countries did not show much interest until later in the 
decade. By that time, CAF staff, under Garcia’s direction, had engaged more actively in 
promoting itself within the region. Various countries joined the institution as associate members. 
Trinidad and Tobago joined CAF in 1994, and Jamaica, Panama, and Paraguay in 1997. During 
this period, it became very important for CAF to begin selling itself as a Latin American entity, 
not Andean but not global. In a 1997 interview, Garcia manifested:  
At present, we are not considering having OECD countries as stockholders. We aren’t 
closing the door, but we have held discussions with some of these countries and most 
have a general policy of not participating in multilaterals except institutions like the 
World Bank, the ADB or the IADB. Having triple-A countries as members would 
improve CAF’s ratings but might mean a change in terms of CAF’s objectives and 
policies. Not having OECD countries as members has made us adopt more conservative 
credit and financial policies than we might otherwise have done. We are proud to 
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consider ourselves a self-sustained institution (Garcia in Chang & Maxfield, 1997). 
 
Meanwhile, by the mid-1990s, integration was at the center of CAF’s concerns. Garcia 
suggested that CAF’s ideal was to be “an effective catalyst of ideas and initiative between the 
Andean Pact countries, the Mercosur countries and the G-3 countries, and that pragmatism could 
be reflected in the financing of projects in such areas as energy, telecommunications or 
highways/roads” (Garcia quoted in Burns & Sedelnik, 1997). In the same interview, Garcia 
explained how CAF was transitioning from an Andean to a Latin American institution. Garcia 
based his explanation on the prevailing economic paradigm of the decade but grounded within 
regional boundaries.  For Garcia, this was “a reflection of the change in the Latin American 
development model…. the new environment is different. We have open markets, lower tariffs, as 
well as a very positive attitude towards private investment” (ibid). For Garcia, the essence of 
CAF was “the ownership, the policy, the vision, the mission, the responsibility. Essentially the 
commitment is to the region, a region that has great potential” (ibid). It is noteworthy that the 
1998 Annual Report is one of the first documents where CAF began referring to itself as an 
institution with a mission for “Latin American integration,” as opposed to “Andean.”  
By 1997, even some Andean private sector enterprises had recognized the advantages of 
getting a loan from CAF. For some companies, these were related to CAF’s competitive rates 
and lending terms. But in others, such as Colombia—where enterprises could get lower funding 
costs—the advantages were seen in CAF’s speedy approval of transactions (Burns & Sedelnik, 
1997). In November 1998, CAF organized the “Third Conference on Private Participation in 
Infrastructure Projects of Multilateral Financing Institutions,” which was attended by most 
international development banks to discuss issues of great importance in the private financing of 
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infrastructure projects. These issues included instruments for mitigating political risks in 
developing countries, options for allowing access by low-income sectors to the services offered 
by private concessions, and the main actions that could be taken to improve the scope for private 
sector participation in infrastructure projects in countries beset by macroeconomic crises (CAF 
AR, 1998). Finally, in the late 1990s, CAF participated in the design of equity profiles for 
investment funds aimed at promoting infrastructure development for private productive activities 
in general (CAF AR, 1998). CAF obtained the renewed commitment of its member countries by 
securing an increase of its authorized capital to USD $3 billion and an increase of its subscribed 
capital up to US$ 606 million, thus paving the way for continued expansion (CAF AR, 1998).  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter outlined CAF’s actions and policies during its first two decades. Although Andean 
countries began enthusiastically to jointly promote integration in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
there were radical changes by the late 1990s in the economic policies of some member states, 
particularly regarding the openness of their economies to foreign interests. The integration 
process also experienced several challenges, including the failures of the industrial programs and 
the political and territorial disputes between members. Despite CAF’s survival within a difficult 
regional environment, the entity had to start looking soon for new strategies to ensure continuous 
availability of loans.  
 The way CAF was established in the early 1970s proved an advantage in subsequent 
decades: various features of its institutional design provided CAF officials with a foundation to 
build upon a strong constitutive agreement including its preferred creditor status, a non-resident 
board that gave its management more independence to draw policies, and a unique shareholder-
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borrower position that resulted in member continuous support for the institution.  CAF 
shareholder structure has meant that full member countries have had strong interests in ensuring 
harmonization between the institution’s activities and the countries’ requirements. One of the 
results is the respected preferred creditor status of the institution vis-à-vis member countries and 
an excellent recovery rate for its loan portfolio. The flexibility that the constitutive agreement 
embodies allowed Garcia, for example, to gain the Board’s approval among the founding 
members in the early 1990s to further the inclusion of other Latin American countries as Series C 
shareholders, while emphasizing physical integration. 
 This chapter has highlighted Garcia’s early leadership in terms of the framework for 
explaining CAF’s growth, outlined in Chapter 1. CAF underwent extraordinary changes during 
the 1990s: the institution was resized both internally and externally. CAF changed from being an 
institution funded mainly with capital contributed by member countries to one acting as a 
catalyst for attracting resources from outside the region. Attracting these resources was not an 
easy task. It required Garcia’s leadership, charisma, his knowledge of CRAs and several road 
shows to promote the institution, while raising funds—whether they were going to be large or 
small quantities. Moreover, Garcia had to build a successful bureaucracy that supported the core 
goals: he promoted a new policy for hiring staff in 1993 in order to prevent political interference 
and ensured that CAF officials were enthusiastic about the potential of the institution. Garcia 
also used his knowledge of capital markets to train CAF staff in regard to the promotion of the 
institution outside the region and within member countries.  For CAF, it was important to 
balance the ongoing regional dynamics, while demonstrating to the international lending 
community that the institution was determined to survive and keep the support of its 
shareholders. As Humphrey (2012) suggests, CAF’s limitations in accessing capital markets 
 112 
were to a degree offset—after the reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s— by greater flexibility 
and agility in lending as well as the 100% repayment record that came with being a more 
egalitarian and cooperative RFI.  
 Similarly, CAF’s actions and country members’ support in the area of infrastructure were 
possible because the institution carefully expanded its sphere of operations with the accession of 
new shareholders and by framing the institution as an “agile” partner in supporting long-term 
development. Garcia facilitated the transition from an “Andean” to an increasingly Latin 
American development bank, by first inviting non-Andean countries to join as associate 
members. He also focused on ensuring that larger countries like Brazil became eventually 
interested in CAF’s lending propositions. Andean countries did not oppose this transition, which 
was framed as a way to capture more funds in order to finance larger projects in an environment 
that favoured open regionalism, while strengthening relationships in the region beyond the 
Andean Community but within Latin America. CAF did not want to be left out of regional fora, 
such as Mercosur, in which non-Andean countries began to participate and voice their regional 
priorities. In addition, an element of attraction that resulted in the eventual incorporation of new 
countries was the emphasis given to regional integration (and to a lesser degree to sustainable 
integration) in CAF’s mission statement, which was updated in 1993. This focus on physical 
infrastructure eventually became an attractive factor to non-founding member countries that have 
subsequently joined the institution. 
 CAF’s operational and ideational changes promoted by Garcia were successful in gaining 
some international exposure and recognition. In 1995, CAF became the first Latin American 
issuer to access the international capital markets after the Mexican crisis and was recognized as 
“Best Latin American Issuer” by the British publication Euromoney (CAF AR, 1995).  
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Chapter 4: CAF as a financial bridge between shareholders and the 
international financial markets  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyzes how CAF has been able to survive and expand its lending portfolio by 
nurturing and balancing two key relationships: the relationship that the institution has with its 
principals (member states) and the one it has developed with the credit rating agencies (CRAs) 
since the mid-1990s. Examining both of these relationships is important to understand how a 
development bank like CAF has had to often walk a fine line between the requirements and goals 
of two different sets of stakeholders. As the previous chapter outlined, Garcia has been a crucial 
agent in building coalitions and alliances to ensure institutional support. Meanwhile, member 
governments have endorsed the institution throughout the years through their actions—such as 
increasing their capital commitments, supporting the inclusion of new Latin American members 
and paying their CAF loans on time—according to their national and regional priorities 
 The chapter first examines CAF management’s strategies for raising funds in the 
international markets, through gaining investors’ confidence and situating the institution as an 
attractive investment option. The chapter then explores CAF’s outreach to the global financial 
community and how its management has conducted extensive work in order to raise funds in the 
global financial markets, while developing and maintaining a solid relationship with the CRAs. 
The institution’s leadership took advantage of CAF’s institutional design and features to build a 
convincing narrative in order to promote CAF to global investors. CAF’s self-promotion as an 
institution with solid financial results and technical knowledge and expertise on infrastructure 
lending —as opposed to an entity that results from the mere combination of various nations in 
the region—have been important elements in this narrative.  
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Credit rating agencies have gained a prominent role in the global financial architecture 
and RFIs in Latin America and other regions have formally and informally internalized the need 
to constantly improve the numbers and classifications issued by these agencies. CAF has 
employed a mix of strategies to balance both members’ and CRAs’ needs. This chapter discusses 
the following strategies: ongoing and sustained increases in its paid-in capital (to later raise more 
funds globally) and a cautious expansion of membership within the region (to also reduce the 
concentration of loans in individual countries). At the same time, in order to preserve its South 
American (and nowadays its Latin American) essence, the institution has had to forgo its 
capability and/or willingness to improve its callable capital, part of its capital structure. Callable 
capital is a financial provision considered as high quality for the CRAs only when it is provided 
by industrialized country members of a RFI. This chapter also discusses how members’ support 
of CAF is based on the notion that it is an institution that provides financing options during both 
good and bad times. This runs against the rationale of CRAs, which implicitly encourage 
investors to stay away from nations during recessions and economic crises. 
Although Enrique Garcia has been a fundamental driver of change in the entity, CAF’s 
members as principals have endorsed the institution throughout the years and helped ensured its 
success. Some of the principals’ preferences have remained constant throughout the years. For 
example, member governments have paid CAF’s loans on time and have continued borrowing 
from the entity (despite increased financing options in the last decade), while developing a sense 
of ownership and responsibility in the survival of the institution. Shareholders appreciate CAF 
because it has played a catalytic role in its member states, raising funds from various global 
sources to channel them, along with its own funds, to finance projects in sectors considered as a 
priority by national governments. Additional key factors that have contributed to ensure that 
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country members continue to participate and invest in CAF are also examined here including: the 
speed of loan approval, the ways CAF has tried to stay away from conditions linked to loan 
approvals and its development of specialized knowledge according to national governments’ 
priorities. 
To put this chapter in the context of international political economy, it is fundamental to 
understand the relationship of countries in the region with the global capital markets in the last 
three decades. Bond financing in South America today is very different from what it was in the 
1980s and 1990s and access to external bond financing has become more widespread and less 
costly. Debt in the region has come full circle since the 1982 debt crisis. In 2012, there were 
several firsts in debt markets for the region, including: the first wind energy project bonds, the 
first covered bond (a security backed by a separate group of assets), Bolivia’s first foray into 
international bond markets since the 1920s, and the first issuances in Chinese offshore renminbi 
and Australian dollars (Bustillo & Velloso, 2013). These events highlight the significant 
evolution and expansion of the region’s access to global bond markets in the past three decades.   
From 1982 to 2012, several countries moved from facing a shortage of funds to learning 
how best to manage available financing options, and even in some cases lending funds amongst 
themselves (e.g. Venezuela and Argentina) (Bustillo & Velloso, 2013). In 2005, CAF’s only 
members with investment grade ratings were Chile, Mexico and Spain. It now has ten member 
countries with investment grade ratings: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, 
Peru, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay (Moody’s, 2013). Individual countries in Latin 
America still have different access to global finance and it is more difficult for those countries 
that are not in the group of ten nations mentioned above. As such, access to external debt 
financing in Latin America is still not comprehensive and despite increased resilience, 
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vulnerability to external financial shocks can still be a threat (Bustillo & Velloso, 2013). CAF 
has then the following balancing dilemma: it needs to lend to all its member governments, but 
only some of them are favoured by the CRAs.  
Nevertheless, the increased access to private capital markets has provided various 
countries in the region with more funding options, impacting the landscape for development 
financing. RFIs like CAF continue, however, to play an important role as suppliers of financing. 
Reviewing CAF’s history as it relates to its entry and main activities in the international markets 
is critical for understanding why the institution has been able to survive in a region that has been 
constantly affected by national, regional and international financial and economic crises. CAF 
has issued bonds in international capital markets under increasingly competitive conditions. To a 
great extent, CAF owes its now recognized credit quality to its status—enshrined in international 
treaties—as a preferred creditor. As mentioned in the previous chapter, CAF has collected on 
loans throughout Latin America’s successive debt crises when other lenders were forced to 
reschedule loan payments. The final section of the chapter highlights the contemporary relevance 
of CAF’s story by discussing how the founders of newer institutions like the New Development 
Bank (NDB) have approached CAF officials to better understand the institution’s dynamics and 
its potential as a model in multilateral development financing.  
 
4.2 Overview of CAF’s strategy for raising funds 
CAF now raises funds for operations primarily in the international financial markets, although a 
small part is raised within its shareholder countries. CAF’s strategy with respect to funding (to 
the extent possible under prevailing market conditions) is to match the maturities of CAF’s 
liabilities to the maturities of its loan portfolio. CAF also takes deposits and obtains loans and 
 117 
credit lines from central banks, commercial banks and (for imports related to projects funded by 
CAF) export credit agencies. Within the shareholder countries, CAF raises funds from central 
banks and financial institutions and by means of regional bond issues. Outside Latin America, 
CAF obtains funding from public sector development and credit agencies, from development 
banks, from various North American, European and Asian commercial banks, from capital 
markets and from the U.S. and European commercial paper markets (CAF, 2013a). The 
breakdown of CAF’s outstanding funded debt, both within and outside the shareholder countries, 
at each of the dates indicated below is as follows: 
 
Table 4. CAF’s sources of outstanding funding debt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CAF 2013a.  
 
CAF’s borrowings are primarily U.S. dollar-based: 80.6% of CAF’s total borrowings, or 
98.3% of borrowings after swaps, were denominated in U.S. dollars on December 31, 2012. The 
principal amount of non-U.S. dollar borrowings outstanding included 892 million Euros, 50,400 
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million Yen, 1,365 million Swiss Francs, 1.4 million Canadian Dollars, 484,930 million 
Colombian Pesos, 798 million Hong Kong Dollars, 1,317.1 million Mexican Pesos, 331.6 
million Peruvian Nuevos Soles and 600 million Chinese Yuan; all of these non-U.S. dollar 
borrowings are swapped or otherwise hedged into U.S. dollars (CAF, 2013a). CAF has never 
defaulted on the payment of principal of, or interest on, any debt security it has issued, and CAF 
has always met all of its debt obligations on a timely basis. At present, less than 60% percent of 
CAF’s bonds are currently denominated in U.S. dollars. CAF’s management has highlighted, 
however, that it is mainly interested in diversifying its investor base while minimizing its 
borrowing costs, as opposed to pursuing currency diversification (Moody’s, 2013).  
CAF now has an established and recognized presence in the international capital markets 
and has shown the ability to raise funds in difficult market conditions. For CRAs such as 
Moody’s (2013), this presence has resulted in favorable funding costs and attests to investor 
appetite for a range of medium and long-term loans, as well as good secondary market trading 
for its debt issuances. For the CRAs, it has also been important that CAF benefits from market 
diversification. For example, it raised US$ 2.7 billion in 2012 with 12 bond issues in six distinct 
markets, after raising US$ 3.4 billion with 18 bond issues the previous two years, and in the first 
six months of 2013 it issued another US$ 750 million.  In addition to its issuances in the United 
States, the European Union, Switzerland, Japan, and Hong Kong, CAF issues bonds and notes in 
the local markets of several of its member countries—Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela— in order to help develop their capital markets (Moody’s, 2013). In 2012, CAF 
placed bonds in renminbi for the first time, which also shows the bank’s efforts to strengthen 
Latin America-China relationships, as many of its member countries have tried to do in the last 
couple of years. While bonds comprise the majority of CAF’s financial liabilities, CAF also 
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relies heavily on short-term funding and term deposits, each of which accounted for about 18% 
of total liabilities as of December 2012 (Moody’s, 2013).  
CAF’s funding strategy has contributed to CAF’s growth rate, which has increased 12% 
annually for the past seven years. CAF’s loan portfolio totaled US$ 16.4 billion by the end of 
2012, double its size from 2006 (Moody’s, 2013). By the end of 2012, the public sector was the 
recipient of 85% of the loans—96% of which had a sovereign guarantee. Of the 15% to the 
private sector, half was loaned to financial institutions. The majority of the private sector lending 
is now concentrated in just three countries—Brazil, Colombia, and Peru (Moody’s, 2013). 
Within compliance and risk, CAF’s officials pay particular attention to the loans granted to the 
private sector, since public sector loans are mostly covered by a sovereign guarantee. CAF’s 
organizational structure has strengthened its focus on risk management capabilities over the past 
several years by establishing fully integrated risk control systems (while adopting ISO 
certifications) and creating a dedicated Treasury Risk Management Unit in addition to the 
general risk management functions handled by an independent Controller’s office (CAF senior 
official, Compliance and Risk Division, personal interview, December 1, 2012; Moody’s, 
2012b).  
 
4.3 Outreach and relationship with CRAs 
To explain CAF’s growth, it is also vital to understand, as Barnett and Coleman (2005) discuss, 
how the drive to secure external resources can strongly shape the strategies and activities taken 
by an IO as well as individuals within it. The drive to secure funding is also related to the 
financial character of the institution.  Borrowing on international capital markets has been a 
fundamental pillar for major MDBs. As Humphrey (2014) explains, 
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Unlike most other international organizations, the vast majority of MDB resources come 
from borrowing on international capital markets. The fact that MDBs can access 
international bond markets, use those resources to make loans and cover the bulk of their 
administrative costs on the margin between borrowing and lending costs—and, hence, do 
not require regular budgetary allocations from member governments—has 
unquestionably been key to the spectacular success of this particular model of 
international organization. Thus, understanding the relationship between MDBs and 
capital markets is important for a broader understanding of how MDBs function and why 
they may differ from one another (p.617).  
 
At the global level, a unique confluence of events has helped the CRAs gain prominence 
in global governance, particularly with IOs. Factors such as the growth in the importance of 
credit in the current international financial system, the interconnectedness of that system across 
borders, disintermediation of finance, and distinct stakeholders’ demand for recognized 
knowledge related to creditworthiness and investment decisions, have combined to empower 
CRAs. In particular, CRAs now perform a crucial function in the ‘international creditor 
economy’ by creating access to capital, which circumvents the traditional role of banks in 
lending practices, as well as in conditioning the practices of states (Seabrooke, 2006). Moreover, 
the political power that CRAs wield in governance of the global economy is increasingly 
being understood as a particular form of authority whose effects, despite suggesting 
economic stability and prosperity, can constrain not only corporations, but also municipal 
governments and ultimately states themselves (Mühlen-Schulte, 2012, p.481). 
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Therefore, in the international economy—at least amongst major financial institutions—
there is a consensus (or at least acceptance) of the importance of securing a strong rating from 
the CRAs. Most RFIs within and beyond Latin America started raising funds in the international 
markets long before CAF did; consequently, the institution began following this practice at least 
a decade late, once Garcia began emphasizing the need to access international capital markets to 
grow its portfolio. In CAF’s particular situation, it is not then that CRAs wanted to particularly 
influence CAF’s lending terms, but that CAF’s management realized that, according to the 
strategy devised by Garcia, it needed the agencies’ ratings if it wanted to expand its lending 
impact and presence in the region. CAF’s management felt that it needed to gain CRAs’ 
favourable attention and recognition if it wanted to increase its relevance in the region. 
For CAF, raising awareness of the institution amongst investors and improving its credit 
rating has required a considerable amount of work from the institution’s staff throughout the 
years. CAF’s management has had to constantly stress the institutional features that are the 
foundation it used to build a reputation as a solid financial entity. For example, an official 
involved in managing external relationships highlighted this point: “we [CAF’s staff] emphasize 
that CAF is a supranational entity—that is commonly used within the finance community. We 
also always mention that CAF has immunities and privileges and that it was created under an 
international treaty” (CAF official, personal interview, October 19, 2012). Further, when CAF 
issued a US$ 350 million euro, seven-year bond in Europe in 2002, Dan Vallimarescu—Head of 
Latin America Debt Capital Markets at Merrill Lynch at the time— remarked: “Newcomers to 
the credit had some questions on CAF’s preferred creditor status and CAF was able to 
demonstrate that through good and bad, its preferred creditor status has been respected. It is the 
first to get paid and foreign currency is always made available for payment to CAF” 
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(Vallimarescu quoted in O’Brien, 2002). In 2002, CAF went on a road show to six European 
cities to meet with investors, which helped further spread CAF’s story outside Latin America. 
To convince investors of its creditworthiness, CAF has had to go beyond financial ratings 
and to actually use its staff’s ability to tell investors all the non-financial milestones and 
institutional features within CAF in order to develop an effective narrative to account for CAF’s 
big and small successes during its first twenty-five years. According to CAF’s Hugo Sarmiento: 
“There is nothing like talking to investors face to face and explaining CAF’s structure and how it 
is designed to withstand volatility in the region” (Sarmiento quoted in O’Brien, 2002). Talking 
face to face with investors has been key in carrying out CAF’s funding strategy. That strategy 
has gradually opened doors for CAF. For example, in 2002, CAF successfully placed a 350 
million euro, seven-year bond with European institutional investors, led by Dresdner Kleinwort 
Wasserstein and Merrill Lynch International (O’Brien, 2002). Forty investors from insurance 
companies, pension funds and banks from six countries placed 440 million euro in orders for this 
bond and CAF upsized the issue from 300 to 350 million euros. Twelve of the forty accounts, 
mainly from France and Germany, bought CAF for the first time (O’Brien, 2002). 
According to Latin Finance (2003), persuading European investors with the support of 
book runners Merrill Lynch and Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein was remarkable, considering 
that the 2002 bond was placed at a time when the euro market was still suffering a vicious 
hangover from the Argentine default in January 2002. A similar article, regarding a sterling bond 
placed in the United Kingdom, also highlighted the importance of CAF’s marketing efforts: “To 
get the deal done, however, CAF had to spend time explaining to U.K. institutional investors its 
strong credit story and also that its ratings have remained stable throughout the crises afflicting 
Latin America in recent years” (Euroweek, 2002). In recognition, CAF received in 2003 and 
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2004 three prizes for its performance in the most demanding financial markets of the world 
“Issuing Agency of the Year”, “Best Bond Issue for Financing Development” and “Best 
Multilateral Institution” from the specialized magazines Euromoney, Emerging Markets and 
LatinFinance, respectively.  
Global investment bankers have recognized CAF’s unique situation regarding its strategic 
actions to raise funds. In 2005, Chris Canavan, Head of Latin American Debt Capital Markets at 
Goldman Sachs remarked: “CAF doesn’t fit any conventional model, therefore people needed to 
be open-minded when looking at the credit. Its portfolio is made up entirely of loans to the 
Andean region, but it has an A2/A rating. That is testimony to the Board’s very sound financial 
management” (Canavan quoted in Emerging Markets, 2005). Therefore, CAF’s strategy even 
until now puts a lot of emphasis in its personnel being effective in telling investors “CAF’s 
story,” which may seem difficult at the beginning. But after discussing with investors the 
institution’s past successes— solid financial results, constant growth and zero default on loans—
CAF’s staff has been able to convince several investors around the world to place their funds in 
the bonds issued by the institution. 
At the same time, CAF officers need to simultaneously emphasize the institution’s 
favourable relationship with its members, cautiously trying to stay away from commenting on a 
member’s particular domestic policies. For example, CAF officials have to often be ready to 
answer question about member governments’ actions that may affect the institution. For 
example, when asked about why CAF continues to be headquartered in Caracas despite tense 
political situations in the last decade, officials have explained that the relationship with the 
Venezuelan government is optimal and that Caracas was established as the headquarters through 
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an international treaty in 1968 (CAF official, personal interview, October 19, 2012). A senior 
official in the Treasury Division also explains: 
It is hard for the [international] investor to understand why are we in Caracas and why 
this eighteen-members institution, where not all countries are “investment grade” quality, 
has an AA rating. Then you tell the investor, my members have never stopped paying me. 
That is the beautiful part of this story…We tell investors about CAF’s track record with 
all governments, how well they have behaved with us, how well we have behaved with 
them. We strive to make the investor understand that kind of dynamics (CAF senior 
official, Treasury Division, personal interview, November 26, 2012).  
 
Moreover, Garcia exhibits a long record working on enhancing the level of “international 
personality” of CAF, which has greatly added to disseminating CAF’s story and successes within 
the global investment and IFIs’ communities. Garcia has contributed extensively as well to the 
discussion of the role of regional development financial institutions in the global economy. 
Enrique Garcia was described by several interviewees as the “public relations person par 
excellence” because of his extensive knowledge about the region and his good relationships with 
senior government officials of all member countries. He has been a key figure in developing and 
strengthening relationships with CRAs. In the last decade, CAF’s growth has been also sustained 
by training personnel in various areas related to public relations to support Garcia’s “diplomatic” 
role: “before the work [of raising funds] was really heavy on Garcia, but now I see that there is a 
better balance and various senior officials and operations’ specialists support Garcia in CAF’s 
public relations and marketing functions (CAF official, personal interview, October 19, 2012).  
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Another official working also in the public relations division remarked that CAF’s 
Executive Vice-president has become more active when it comes to planning and attending 
finance-related meetings (which Garcia used to attend in the past). The official mentioned: 
“Garcia is not going to international finance meetings that often anymore. Now he attends more 
high-level political meetings. He is sort of an ambassador for Latin American issues” (CAF 
official No. 2, personal interview, October 19, 2012). Indeed, there are not many people in Latin 
America like Enrique Garcia who have dealt with governments in the region from a wide 
political spectrum, while trying to generate consensus at least at the diplomatic—and often at the 
action—level. 
Moreover, CAF has co-organized events periodically to keep different stakeholders 
informed about the entity’s work in the region, as well as its perspective on regional cooperation 
matters. For instance, CAF has co-organized with the Inter-American Dialogue and the 
Organization of American States (OAS) an international event—“Conferencia CAF”— that has 
taken place in Washington, D.C. since 1997. The objective of this event is to highlight the 
importance of global economic and political relations with Latin America, and also to provide a 
detailed review of hemispheric economic affairs. This event now has an attendance of 
approximately 400 U.S. and Latin American government officials, international economists, 
journalists, lawmakers, leading policy analysts and corporate leaders.  
This conference has also served as a platform for CAF to disseminate information about 
its mission, lending policies and programs. In recent years, CAF has gone beyond hosting events 
in the U.S. An official involved in managing external relationships highlighted that CAF has 
gradually hosted other events in different regions for the following reasons:  
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First, to be known and be present in all regions; second, to support the process of 
knowledge creation and sharing through partnerships with universities and think tanks 
and; third, to support the process of raising funds in the international markets…through 
investors’ forums, contacting the media, analysts, etc. (CAF official, personal interview, 
October 19, 2012). 
Consequently, CAF has strengthened its Latin American dimension, but at the same time, it is 
building bridges of cooperation with the rest of the world in ways that do not affect its distinctive 
characteristics or its Latin American identity and that actually strengthen its presence in global 
financial markets. In addition, CAF has signed cooperation agreements with countries outside the 
region and around the world, including RFIs, export agencies, and research and technical 
cooperation centers of various countries from the Southern hemisphere, and in Europe and Asia 
(Garcia, 2014). 
A key goal for CAF since the early 1990s has been to build and maintain a good 
relationship with the main CRAs in order to increase its rating and prospects for raising funds in 
the international markets. To do so, CAF has employed a mix of strategies such as: carefully 
expanding its membership since the mid-2000s, increasing its paid-in capital, and reducing the 
country concentration in its loan portfolio. These strategies have contributed to improved credit 
ratings throughout the years. CAF has moved to address the issue of capitalization through 
constant increases especially in the last decade, which has been boosted by an expanding 
membership base as the corporation evolves into a regional—from sub-regional— development 
lending entity.  
Meanwhile, CAF’s management has committed to preserve the entity’s Latin identity 
(see Section 4.4.3) and as such CAF has had to forgo the ability to strengthen certain financial 
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indicators such as callable capital, which it is only considered as high quality for the CRAs, 
when it comes from industrialized countries. Nevertheless, CAF’s credit rating evolution since 
the 1990s is remarkable. It has been upgraded twelve times by the CRAs since it obtained its first 
rating (BBB) in 1993, which has allowed CAF to sell itself in the international markets as an 
institution with a good financial profile and as an alternative for those looking to invest in Latin 
America with limited risks (CAF, 2013b). Between 2012 and 2013, Standard and Poor’s, 
Moody’s, and Fitch raised CAF’s credit rating to AA- or equivalent, while the Japan Ratings 
Agency upgraded CAF to AA. These ratings are substantially higher than those of its country 
members and they give CAF a competitive edge in capital markets (Garcia, 2014). 
Further, as a strategic decision, CAF has tried to maintain a presence in international 
markets, regardless of the amount of money it can raise. Factors such as diversification and 
prestige remain important points of the institution’s overall strategy. For example, in 2010, CAF 
raised US$ 74 million from what it called the first ever retail-only placement in the Japanese 
market by a Latin American issuer. It was also the first sub-AAA rated name to tap that market 
(LatinFinance, 2010). As Gabriel Felpeto—CAF’s Director of Financial Policies and 
International Issues—suggested, the Japanese placement was not that big in terms of its size, but 
for CAF it was very important given that this market is very exclusive and reserved for AAA 
rated issuers (Felpeto quoted in Latin Finance, 2010). In addition, CAF is also trying to 
consolidate its position as an important bridge to strengthen the regional integration between 
Latin America and Europe and Asia (CAF AR, 2011).  
Credit rating agencies closely follow member countries’ economic performance and 
credit quality. For example, when CAF’s long-term debt rating was lifted in 2012 to Aa3 from 
A1 with a stable outlook by Moody’s, the agency justified this decision by highlighting how the 
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member countries’ credit quality had improved steadily since CAF’s last upgrade, in 2005. 
However, for the CRAs, factors setting CAF apart from more highly rated RFIs include its heavy 
dependence on short-term funding and relatively weak liquidity ratios, as well as its high 
exposure to countries like Argentina and Venezuela. By 2013 for example, all of CAF’s new full 
members except Argentina had their credit rating upgraded since 2005. According to Moody’s 
(2013), generally speaking, the upward trend for higher credit ratings is continuing for most of 
CAF’s members—Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay were all upgraded 
since the beginning of 2012, and Brazil, Colombia, and Peru all have positive outlooks. 
However, Argentina and Venezuela have negative outlooks. 
CAF has limits on lending to individual borrowers that vary depending on the class of 
borrower. According to CAF’s new credit manual, loans to the original Andean shareholders are 
limited to 25% of the bank’s total loan portfolio and the new Series A shareholders6 are limited 
to just 15% (Moody’s, 2012a). While these new limits are considerably more restrictive than 
those in CAF’s board-approved policies, which cap exposure to a single country at 35% of the 
loan portfolio and 100% of net equity, they remain very liberal compared to the IADB and IMF. 
In practice, however, CAF’s exposures to its founding members are below even the new lower 
limits. CRAs continue to emphasize, however, that CAF’s lower ratings compared to the WB 
and the IADB derive from its development mandate: “the mandate exposes the loan portfolio to a 
high degree of regional concentration and results in narrow profitability as the institution seeks to 
provide its members with the lowest possible cost of funds” (Moody’s, 2013, p.1). The next 
section discusses key factors in building and sustaining CAF’s relationship with the CRAs. 
 
                                                        
6 Brazil, Panama, Paraguay, Argentina and Uruguay  
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4.3.1. Paid-in capital and callable capital 
The higher credit rating of CAF compared to that of its member countries is also helped by the 
high ratio of paid-in to subscribed capital. CRAs’ framework suggests that this is an efficient use 
of countries’ reserves, as it allows the CAF to borrow at terms lower than their own. Paid-in 
capital shows shareholders’ willingness to support the institution “here and now” in a 
complementary way to CAF’s ongoing efforts to continuously raise money in the international 
markets. Member countries have witnessed how CAF could quickly leverage their contributions, 
while providing governments an alternative source to take out loans for top projects on their 
development agendas. As such, countries in the region have not hesitated to display their support 
for CAF’s work, since any capital contributions would be increased in the capital markets and 
consequently return as larger and more influential loans. Moody’s (2013) has remarked: 
CAF’s greatest credit weakness, the absence of highly rated non-borrowing members 
from outside the region and significant levels of callable capital, is arguably also the root 
of one of its key strengths. CAF is a development institution of its borrowers, for its 
borrowers, and by its borrowers, free from outside interference. As a result, while its 
lending rates are relatively high due to its lower credit rating, CAF is more flexible than 
other MDBs in terms of environmental requirements and other restrictions attached to its 
loans. Furthermore, CAF serves as a lender of last resort to its members, providing them 
access to funding when markets are closed to them. This role results in a very high level 
of member support for the institution. The Bank’s very high level of paid-in capital 
reflects the support, as do the significant capital increases that have been subscribed to 
over the last few years and the growth in the Bank’s membership (p.4). 
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Since 2005, when total paid-in capital equaled less than US$ 2 billion, CAF’s shareholder 
countries have approved a series of capital increases for both original and new members totaling 
US$ 6 billion. At 31 December 2012, the full member shareholder countries of CAF collectively 
accounted for 91.4% of the nominal value of CAF’s paid-in capital and the associated 
shareholder countries collectively accounted for 8.5%. CAF’s shares are also held by 14 
financial institutions based in the full member shareholder countries, which collectively 
accounted for 0.1% (CAF, 2013a). At 31 December 2012, CAF’s subscribed paid-in and un-paid 
capital was USD $4.7 billion, of which USD $3.6 billion was paid-in capital and USD $1.1 
billion was un-paid capital, which is receivable in installments according to the agreements 
subscribed with the shareholder countries. Over the years, CAF has had several increases of 
subscribed capital (See Appendix C).  
In addition to CAF’s subscribed paid-in and un-paid capital, CAF’s shareholders have 
subscribed to callable capital totaling USD $1.5 billion (CAF, 2013a). CRAs value callable 
capital, since to a certain extent it demonstrates countries’ support of a RFI and it brings peace of 
mind to creditors in the private markets. This thinking has been a key feature since the 
establishment of the World Bank, when founding countries were required to pay 20% of their 
capital commitment in cash, with the remaining 80% committed as a guarantee that would be 
called upon should the institution ever require it to pay off its creditors (Humphrey, 2012). The 
“Big Three” credit rating agencies— Standard & Poor's (S&P), Moody’s, and Fitch Group— 
only consider callable capital from industrialized non-borrowing countries to be of any real 
worth (Humphrey, 2012). Callable capital for developing nations is not taken into account 
because in the CRAs’ pervasive model, in difficult financial times when RFIs may need to access 
this capital, it is not certain that these nations would be able to comply. 
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CAF, as a late player to the global markets when compared to other RFIs, has come to 
terms with the fact that callable capital will never be one of its competitive advantages. The 
initial incorporation of Spain as a series C shareholder in 2002 was consequently well-received 
by the CRAs since it improved the quality of CAF’s callable capital, given the AAA rating of 
Spain at the time. For example, Moody’s (2003) suggested that: 
The most important financial development at CAF, from Moody’s perspective, during the 
past 18 months has been the February 2002 entry of Spain as a shareholder… Spain’s 
entry as a shareholder ensures that at least one member country (with a AAA rating) 
would quite likely be able to fulfill its callable-capital obligation with minimal delay” 
(p.1).  
 
Nevertheless, by 2012, ten years after its incorporation, Spain accounted for just 4% of 
CAF’s member capital and its rating was downgraded (to A-) as a result of the difficult economic 
situation that some European countries (including Spain) had been experiencing (Moody’s, 
2013). The downgrade of Spain’s rating did not affect CAF’s usable required capital ratio since 
Spain remains an investment grade non-borrowing shareholder. Initially invited partly to provide 
higher rating to CAF, Spain has now a lower rating than CAF itself. Meanwhile, while CAF’s 
only members in 2005 with investment grade ratings were Chile, Mexico and Spain, by 2012, it 
had, as previously indicated, ten member countries with investment grade ratings. However, 
CAF’s only current AA shareholder is Chile, which has less than a 1% share. At present, over 
half of CAF’s callable capital now derives from members with investment grade ratings, up from 
just 4% in 2005 (Moody’s, 2013).  
The concept of callable capital is then somewhat antagonistic to CAF’s South 
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American/Latin identity. Improving this indicator would perhaps require that the institution 
would be willing to invite advanced economies to join as Series A shareholders, which neither 
member governments nor CAF’s management are interested in doing. As such, callable capital is 
a financial indicator that the institution’s senior management is willing to sacrifice in its search 
for higher credit ratings. This is despite CRAs’ recommendations that future upgrades in its 
ratings would partially depend on attaining more creditworthy shareholders. For example, 
Moody’s (2013) states: “CAF is distinguished from more highly rated MDBs by its lack of AAA 
and AA-rated members. As a result, its capital adequacy levels (which include callable capital 
from highly rated members) remain relatively weak despite recent improvements” (p.1). 
 
4.3.2. Balancing membership and concentration risk 
Despite the credit rating upgrades to many of its members and the addition of new shareholders, 
the weighted median rating of CAF’s loan portfolio is the same now as it was in 2005, at BA3. 
This rating is another indicator that CAF has sacrificed due to its shareholder structure. However, 
the institution has tried to find a midpoint between members and CRAs by diversifying its 
portfolio—by growing its full membership within Latin America and by allowing Spain and 
Portugal to join as Series C shareholders (with limited representation within the Board). This 
decision has also benefited from the fact that the original shareholders—the Andean nations—
themselves have experienced considerable growth in recent years, which has put a spotlight on 
infrastructure needs, while opening the possibility to diversify their financing sources. 
 Although the Andean countries continue to eagerly apply for and obtain CAF loans, new 
avenues for funding infrastructures have emerged for these nations including loans from Chinese 
governmental agencies and infrastructure facilities created by private pension funds (AFPs). 
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Therefore, in recent years, some of these countries have not entirely relied on CAF to carry out a 
considerable portion of their infrastructure agenda, as they did in previous decades. This 
development has ultimately contributed to CAF being able to expand its membership—without 
original members’ opposing this action— while reducing its concentration risk.  
CAF’s loan portfolio has also become more diverse. Whereas its original five members 
accounted for 95% of its loan portfolio in 2005, this number has been declining steadily. In 2012, 
they represented less than 50% of loans approved for the first time (Moody’s 2013). As a result, 
by the end of 2012, they accounted for 58.4% of the total portfolio, and this percentage is likely 
to drop further. CAF’s five largest borrowers account for a slightly higher 63.5% of its total loan 
portfolio, as Argentina surpassed Bolivia as the fourth largest borrower in 2010 (see Table 5). 
CAF’s largest single exposure has also fallen from 25.5% in 2005 (Colombia) to 17.2% in 2012 
(Venezuela) (Moody’s, 2013; CAF, 2013a).  
 
Table 5. CAF’s ten largest borrowers 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: CAF 2013a. 
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However, CAF’s exposure to countries rated B2 and below has not diminished. In 2005, 
there were six such borrowers, whose combined loans equaled 47% of the total loan portfolio. 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela alone accounted for 97% of this exposure. In 2012, there were 
just four borrowers rated B2 or lower (of which exposure to Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela 
accounted for 99.9%), but their combined borrowings again totaled over 45% of the total loan 
portfolio (Moody’s, 2013). Yet, CAF’s credit exposure to countries with very low ratings does 
not reflect the benefit of its preferred credit status. As a CAF senior official in the Compliance 
and Risk Division manifested while explaining her work within the division, in regard to 
assessing loans with sovereign guarantees:  
All sovereign clients have the same risk for me, in four decades there has not been default 
by CAF, then I cannot apply the CRA criteria and evaluate them in different ways from 
each other. Member countries are my own shareholders and CAF’s credits have always 
been honoured. What I do during the credit review for these [public sector] loans is 
checking on them during the process of disbursement by verifying that certain conditions 
are being met...including liquidity limits, exchange arrangements, special clauses, etc. 
(CAF senior official, Compliance and Risk Division, personal interview, December 1, 
2012, emphasis added). 
 
As previously stated, member countries have not defaulted on CAF’s debt obligations.  
For example, when Ecuador faced a financial crisis in the late 1990s, it continued servicing its 
debt to CAF, even though it was not doing so to other creditors; similarly when Peru limited debt 
service payments to 10 per cent of all creditors during the 1980s debt crisis, CAF debt continued 
to be serviced in full (Griffith-Jones et al., 2008).  A more recent example of this scenario is also 
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provided by Ecuador, which defaulted on debt obligations in December 2008, but did not default 
on its debt to CAF. The bank is arguably a preferred creditor among RFIs. According to 
management, both Ecuador and Peru remained current on their obligations to CAF even while 
they defaulted or were in arrears on their obligation to other RFIs, including the World Bank and 
the IADB (Moody’s, 2013).  
 
 
4.4 Key factors in sustaining the relationship with member countries  
As previously mentioned, shareholders’ support towards CAF relies on the notion that it is an 
institution that can provide financing options during both good and bad times. As Garcia has 
remarked: “We have an umbrella up for members when it rains and we’re the taxi that is always 
at hand in the wet. More than that, as a member you can get into our taxi and say I am an hour 
late. I am in a vast hurry and I have got to get there as fast as possible. Well, we’ll get you there” 
(Garcia quoted in O'Shaughnessy, 2009). Several factors— including speed of loan approval, 
lack of dogmatic agenda, and an ability to understand local governments’ current needs— which 
will be discussed below have ensured that members continue to support CAF’s strategic and 
institutional goals throughout distinct economic conditions and diverse preferences for regional 
integration.  
 
4.4.1. Speed of loan approval 
CAF is often praised for its agility, not a typical feature of RFIs. At the IADB and World Bank, 
for example, the financial strength of OECD members as shareholders may support their credit 
rating, but it creates the need for more elaborate institutional mechanisms to approve loans and 
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transactions. The speed of approval of CAF loans is linked to the fact that formal conditionality 
does not exist at the institution (Griffith-Jones et al., 2008). According to German Jaramillo—
CAF’s Director for European Affairs—: “We [CAF] are proud of the speed of loan approval. A 
major project can be approved within six months, which is not easy to accomplish in these 
institutions…”(Jaramillo quoted in Madrid Network, 2011).  
CAF’s constitutive agreement limits the total amount of disbursed and outstanding loans, 
guarantees and equity investments to 4 times stockholders’ equity. CAF’s actual ratio on 31 
December 2012 was 2.4 times stockholders’ equity (CAF, 2013a). The modality employed for 
approving loans is linked to strict economic evaluations of projects: CAF applies commercial 
banking standards for credit approvals and maintains policies and procedures regarding risk 
assessment and credit policy. Matrices of agreed actions are then designed; reportedly, not 
meeting these agreed actions does not stop disbursement of loans, but may trigger additional 
technical assistance to ensure these conditions are met (Griffith-Jones et al., 2008).  
 Another institutional feature that helps accelerate approval of its loans is that, unlike the 
IADB or the World Bank, CAF does not have a permanent resident board. Consequently, loans 
and technical assistance are generally approved by senior management of the institution, which 
facilitates the approval process. Garcia has often acknowledged CAF’s speedy approval: “The 
organization of CAF is such that the Board doesn’t deal with loans. Most things are approved by 
management. It’s very easy to move quickly” (Garcia quoted in Arnold, 2008). Without a clear 
leadership with a commitment to the success of the institution, this situation could be very 
dangerous since it could lead to approvals that might damage the financial health of the 
institution in the long run. But in the hands of Garcia and with senior management’s support, the 
speed of approval has become a comparative advantage. According to its credit policy, CAF’s 
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Executive President, upon the recommendation of the Loans and Investments Committee, may 
approve the following: 
(a) loans of up to $75 million for sovereign credits, (b) loans of up to $50.0 million for 
private credits, (c) investments of up to $25 million in the case of equity investments, (d) 
investment of up to 1% of total liquid assets of any issuer... The Executive Committee of 
CAF’s Board of Directors or the Board of Directors itself may approve (a) loans of up to 
$150 million for sovereign credits, (b) loans of up to $80.0 million for private credits, (c) 
investments of up to $50.0 million for equity investments, (d) investments of up to 2.5% 
of the total liquid assets for any issuer...Loans and investments in excess of the 
aforementioned Executive Committee’s limits require the approval of CAF’s Board of 
Directors (CAF, 2013a). 
 
The structure above has also helped in limiting political interference. CAF is subject to 
fewer disclosure requirements than other RFIs and has had fewer regional and national 
committees with which to negotiate. According to Arnold (2008), “Garcia – who is also able to 
take decision more like a CEO – maintains that it’s been possible to keep political interference at 
bay.” This structure stands in contrast to the IADB, owned by its 48 member countries from 
around the world, with the U.S. taking the largest share at 30%, while the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean combined hold 50%. With another 20% from Europe, the U.S. can 
veto decisions. Moreover, at CAF, since donor and creditor countries are two sides of the same 
coin, no national government wants to interfere with the lending processes. As Humphrey (2012) 
has remarked,  
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With the “principals” unified in their goals for the MDB, the “agent” has considerably 
less incentive to develop or pursue interests that do not coincide with those shareholder 
goals. Hence the administration is much more vertical with far fewer bureaucratic layers, 
and management is given much greater freedom and trust by the shareholders. As well, 
borrowing shareholders have no incentive to impose any extra rules or procedures that go 
beyond their own national laws, such as the environmental, social and financial 
safeguards at the other two MDBs [the WB and the IADB] (p.136). 
As such, CAF’s model of governance allows a high level of delegated authority to management 
and the relevant committees on issues related to lending, operations and administration, which 
allows for flexibility and speed when making decisions.  
 
4.4.2. Staying away from dogmatic economic growth recipes 
For its 35th anniversary, CAF published a special issue of its magazine “Sinergia” with the 
headline: “A place where everybody feels at home” (CAF, 2005). In this issue, Garcia suggested 
that CAF was not a dogmatic institution and it welcomed different ways of thinking: “Here [at 
CAF] leaders or senior officials with very different ways of thinking see each other and everyone 
feels very comfortable” (Garcia quoted in CAF, 2005, p. 22). In a more recent interview for this 
dissertation, Garcia remarked that CAF does not tell countries whether they should pursue an 
open market or state-based economy (Garcia, personal interview, November 12, 2012). Other 
RFIs may be more upfront in their prescriptive recipes for economic growth but at CAF 
respecting a shareholder’s model for growth is what prevails and what has worked for keeping 
countries close to the institution.  
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It is not surprising then that governments with very different ideologies have kept a close 
relationship with CAF because of its catalytic role (attracting other funds for financing within 
and beyond the region) and its anti-cyclical role (lending resources even during the bad times), 
which has been fundamental for financing large public sector projects. For Enrique Garcia, “the 
philosophy of CAF is not to impose things—we give members what they ask for…It’s about a 
sense of ownership” (Garcia quoted in Arnold, 2008). According to CAF’s Antonio Juan Sosa, at 
other RFIs, countries have to adapt to specific financing “products,” while at CAF the priority is 
to serve the client’s unique needs:  
If we had followed a more “wholesale” approach like the IADB and the WB, we would 
not have gone very far, because we would have been repeating what they have being 
doing with less resources…Instead, especially since the early 1990s, we have tried to 
serve each client and try to look for tailored ways to fulfill their [financing] 
needs…Presidents liked what they saw: less bureaucracy…With a seventy million dollar 
loan for example we were not trying to change the economic practices of countries, 
neither asking for compromises or attached conditionalities (Antonio Juan Sosa, Vice-
President of Infrastructure, personal interview, October 18, 2012).  
 
In 2013, during a conference in the U.K., Garcia was asked how governments such as 
Argentina and Venezuela reacted to CAF programs since they may not be compatible with these 
countries’ policies. Garcia first highlighted how loans for both countries were concentrated in the 
public sector. Then, his reply was centered on how CAF tries to work and adapt itself to the 
reality of the member countries:  
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We [CAF] do not have a recipe that is applied to all countries, because not all countries 
are the same. They decide the course of action they want to take. We try to select 
however, our projects from projects we establish that are feasible, good, etc. In the case 
of Venezuela, we are by far the first multilateral lender, of course the first non-
multilateral lender is China…in other countries what you see in Latin America is a 
combination of public and private sector investment (Garcia, 2013, presentation at the 
Canning House). 
 
Further, the Vice-Presidency of Country Programs was created in 2000 and since then, it 
has had the mandate to get to know the development agenda of CAF’s members and to deepen 
the strategic alignment with its partners’ goals. At the beginning of each presidential term, CAF 
conducts programming missions. With the participation of a multidisciplinary technical team 
headed by Enrique Garcia, these missions establish an agenda for dialogue to bring its 
institutional capacity for technical and financial support into line with national priorities (CAF, 
2005). In that initial mission, CAF officials meet with senior national officials in order to 
exchange views while trying to establish what are the ongoing and upcoming projects considered 
at that time as a priority for those governments: “for example, in the specific case of Bolivia, the 
areas of priority are gas and electricity. CAF outlines projects that it can support in that area and 
then reviews [those projects with Bolivia]” (Senior CAF official of the VP of Development 
Strategies and Public Policies, personal interview, November 26, 2012). Moreover, CAF then 
establishes a formal mid-term working commitment by issuing a joint statement endorsed by the 
presidents, which is updated on a regular basis. 
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CAF also prepares on a yearly basis an internal document for each country called 
“Documento Estrategia Pais” (Country Strategy Document) which intends to be operational and 
strategic. For example, according to Colombia’s Presidential Agency of International 
Cooperation in Colombia (APC, in Spanish): 
CAF does not have a public strategic document to follow for the medium term with 
Colombia. The “Documento Estrategia Pais” that CAF manages is an internal working 
document, in which the medium term guidelines are compiled combining the general 
objectives of the corporation [CAF] with government goals raised in the National 
Development Plan (APC, 2013, p. 3). 
 
Finally, even the CRAs have acknowledged the institution’s outstanding channels of 
communication and networking with member countries. Fitch (2003) affirmed that CAF was 
held in high regard within the region and the bank’s directors maintain good relationships with 
local politicians: “This contributes to have a flow of information regarding priority sectors of the 
economy and enables CAF to remain well informed of political changes that could impinge on 
the development of major projects” (p. 5). 
 
4.4.3 Sense of ownership and compromise 
Garcia recounted how when he accepted CAF’s presidency, he also had drafted an informal plan 
B for the institution (in case his original strategy would not work). His plan B consisted of 
having a model closer to the IADB if he did not see much progress with his strategy in the first 
3-5 years: 
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According to my plan B, I would have had to invite European countries to have a large 
participation in CAF, but fortunately things have worked. In the early 2000s, we [CAF’s 
management] took the decision to let Spain and later Portugal have a minor participation 
in CAF because we wanted to strengthen Iberoamerican relations (Enrique Garcia, 
personal interview, November 19, 2012). 
 
 As previously mentioned, the incorporation of Spain and Portugal contributed to initially 
strengthening financial standards in the eyes of the CRAs, in terms of guaranteed capital (and not 
necessarily paid-in capital). Both countries have joined as Series C members. As of 2011, only 
Spain was represented on the Board with 3.1% voting power, sharing representation with 
Trinidad and Tobago (Humphrey, 2012). Ultimately, Spain’s incorporation to the institution (and 
the inauguration of an office in the country in 2007) has contributed to an extent to promote the 
strategic presence and globalization of CAF’s business in Europe by consolidating institutional 
links through academic and thought networks and business groups with the objective of serving 
as a bridge between Europe and Latin America (CAF, 2014c).  
During fieldwork for this dissertation, officials confirmed that OECD countries would not 
be allowed to have more than 10% of shareholding power at least in the next decade (CAF 
official, personal interview, October 19, 2012; Senior CAF official, Infrastructure Division, 
personal interview November 19, 2012; CAF official, Public Policy and Competitiveness Unit, 
personal interview, November 21, 2012). Although none of CAF’s documents mentioned this 
fact, in a recent policy brief for the Global South Unit at the London School of Economic, Garcia 
(2014) reaffirmed that CAF has made the geopolitical decision to keep more than 90% of its 
equity in the hands of countries in the region (Garcia, 2014). This primary participation of non-
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OECD countries has generated an authentic sense of shared responsibility among member 
countries, leading to a high level of commitment to the success of the institution. Thus, the 
absence of countries with “donor” status turns an apparent weakness into strength by generating 
a sense of mutual loyalty. As previously discussed, no country has defaulted on any financial, 
statutory, or other obligation. CAF’s members feel they have vested interests—and even a sense 
of obligation—in the success of CAF’s performance.  
At times, this situation has resulted in higher rated countries such as Colombia continuing 
to get loans from CAF, despite the higher cost of their loans and limited technical assistance 
when compared to other RFIs (Humphrey, 2012). According to a Colombian official, when 
thinking about getting loans from CAF, “there are considerations that go beyond just the 
finances. The finance minister, the head of the central bank, they sit on the board of the CAF so 
they feel they are owners, so they don’t treat it like the World Bank or the IADB” (Agudelo 
quoted in Humphrey, 2012, p.177).  
 CAF members have also been ready to assist with capital contributions, which have then 
enhanced the institution’s ability to secure intermediate funds from global financial markets for 
the countries of the region. This has allowed CAF to play a key role in difficult situations, such 
as the recent global crisis. The post-2008 crisis clearly showcases CAF’s ability to raise funds 
within its members. Raising funds during an ongoing crisis was to a great extent possible 
because members have come to an understanding that the institution plays a counter-cyclical and 
catalytic role when international sources become scarce. When the crisis began in 2008, CAF’s 
members knew that sooner or later they would be affected because private and multilateral 
lenders would begin withdrawing from non-core markets. 
Officials around the region continue to approach CAF— despite the higher cost of its 
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loans compared to other MDBs—since it allows them to diversify their sources of financing for 
areas such as infrastructure where there are more projects than resources available. A Colombian 
public official puts it this way: “When all goes well we have access to resources, but when the 
markets close, we have to open doors, so we can’t turn our backs on the CAF knowing that when 
we need them they can throw us a lifeline” (Bargans quoted in Humphrey, 2012, p.176). 
Similarly, a Venezuelan minister commented: “this institution has been always there with us, in 
large infrastructure projects and in other that are smaller. In this sense, CAF has been with us in 
the good times, but above all during bad times” (Giordani quoted in CAF, 2005, p. 7). CAF now 
remains the main source of multilateral financing for the five founding member countries and has 
become a well-known source throughout Latin America. Indeed, while CAF accounted for less 
than 5% of multilateral financing in the region in the 1980s, today it provides about 30% of that 
funding (Garcia, 2014). 
CAF also went beyond infrastructure lending during the global crisis. During 2008, CAF 
acted rapidly to mitigate some of the effects of the global crisis over the region. CAF offered a 
contingent credit line of US$ 1.5 billion to support the governments’ financing strategies through 
a preventive financing instrument (CAF AR, 2008). Further, as an additional and timely strategy 
to confront the crisis, Unasur member countries agreed on strengthening the sources of financing 
within the region, such as CAF. In August 2009, CAF’s Board of Directors approved an 
extraordinary capital increase of US$ 2.5 billion. The increase, which had been proposed by 
several member countries at the previous meeting, responded to the need to strengthen the CAF’s 
capital in order to cover the substantial demand for loans it had been receiving in the wake of the 
global economic crisis, and to strengthen its ability to further support the long-term development 
of the region (CAF News, 2009). Commenting on the general feeling of the Board, Alexandre 
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Meira da Rosa—Director for Brazil—said the unanimous decision reflected “a political 
expression of support for CAF’s uniqueness, its democratic decision-making, its capacity for 
rapid and effective response to the crisis, and the fact that it has become a truly Latin American 
institution, key to the region’s integration” (Meira da Rosa quoted in CAF News, 2009).  
In addition, Oscar Zuluaga—minister of Finance and Public Credit and Director for 
Colombia—said that the Board’s meeting was historic because of “the transcendence of the 
decision to increase the capital, which will strengthen the Latin American region, while 
conveying a message of confidence to the markets” (Zuluaga quoted in CAF News, 2009). 
Moreover, at that time, Garcia stated the following:  
This backing from CAF members reflects their confidence in the institution's capacity, 
based on its financial strength and increasing activity, which is possible thanks to the 
important capital contributions made by shareholders, reinvestment of profits, and 
permanent presence in the international financial markets. The latter is made possible 
thanks to the high credit ratings granted by the leading international agencies (Garcia 
quoted in CAF News, 2009). 
 
In November 2011, CAF’s Board of Directors approved another extraordinary capital 
increase, this time of US$ 2.5 billion, in anticipation of possible adverse effects of the European 
sovereign debt crisis on the Latin American region. This increase decided by the Board was in 
fact proposed by Unasur’s South American Council of Economy and Finance in view of the 
outlook of a worsening global crisis (CAF News, 2011). Extraordinary capital increases directly 
improve CAF’s readiness to provide support and thus mitigate possible short-term negative 
impacts, which may occur in the region, without affecting its capacity to continue providing 
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long-term financing for investment projects. Capital increases also send a positive message to the 
CRAs and the international markets. In addition, even though the recent financial crisis and 
global economic recession have affected CAF’s business, they have not had a material adverse 
effect on CAF’s results of operations or financial position. This is because, based on CAF’s 
investment strategy and given its investment guidelines, CAF’s liquid investment portfolio is of 
short duration and has no material exposure to structured products such as mortgage-backed or 
asset-backed securities (CAF, 2013a).  
 
4.4.4 Getting to know clients beyond the Andean region, while responding to targeted needs 
Another important factor in CAF’s survival and growth relates to the ways the institution has 
been able to build knowledge that is relevant for all of its shareholders, while understanding each 
country’s unique financing needs. Over the past decades, CAF has developed a fundamental 
locally grounded capacity. According to Santiso and Whitehead (2006), CAF’s technical and 
cognitive capacity, which is totally grounded in Latin America, contributes more directly to the 
policy-making debates and regional agenda discussions between and within the countries on 
issues as different as fiscal sustainability and pension reforms or growth strategies in Latin 
America. Since the mid-2005, CAF has also hosted an in-house research program (further 
discussed in Chapter 5) that has helped to attract and maintain technocratic capacities in the 
countries, be it directly (through financing technicians in government offices) or indirectly 
(through providing research resources to local think tanks or academic centers) (Santiso & 
Whitehead, 2006).  
In his interview, Garcia highlighted how top central bankers and ministers of finance in 
the region—which are members of CAF’s Board—enthusiastically attend CAF’s meetings 
 147 
because it gives them a forum of discussion and it is also seen as very informative, giving 
members a better sense of what is going on in the region, in particular in respect to financing for 
key projects or best practices for project finance (Enrique Garcia, personal interview, November 
19, 2012). This knowledge in technical and regional matters has resulted—particularly since the 
mid 1990s—in shareholders granting a considerable amount of discretion to the institution since 
they see both positive financial management and formal and informal knowledge management 
opportunities. Garcia has strived to promote an internal culture of cohesiveness, enhancing 
specialized knowledge and pride in the institution’s work.  
But CAF’s survival and relevance have also been possible due to the efforts of senior 
officials to go beyond research agendas and to actually establish meaningful cooperation and 
financing links between the institution and the individual members. For example, in the case of 
Brazil, even though the country has its own national development bank and several bilateral 
agreements with other nations, the infrastructure needs of the country are enormous and, 
consequently, CAF has been able to finance various strategic projects in specialized geopolitical 
sectors. For instance, CAF has been able to work with Brazilian municipalities since the 
country’s Foreign Financing Commission (COFIEX) has enabled municipal governments to 
request direct financing from multilateral organizations. In 2006, CAF presented its Program in 
Support of Municipal Governments in Brazil (PRAM) and COFIEX authorized the 
implementation of the program in three states (CAF, 2010a).  
In April 2007, CAF approved the first loan to the municipalities of Canoas and 
Florianopolis. In 2009, the PRAM’s success resulted in a request from the Brazilian government 
for the preparation of a CAF program to assist the governments of municipalities and states that 
would be venues for the 2014 Soccer World Cup (CAF, 2010a). CAF’s support of this program 
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for Brazilian municipalities amounts to US$1 billion and the funds that have been granted serve 
to partially finance projects in the fields of urban transportation, economic and social 
infrastructure, basic services, the environment, and sustainable tourism, through individual loans 
to each host city or state in Brazil (CAF, 2010a). In this way, CAF has supported the Brazilian 
state with one of the government’s priorities—the development of local infrastructure through 
administrative decentralization. In regard to municipalities and states, Brazil has an annual 
demand of over US$ 600 million with CAF, and it could be even more if it were not for the 
limits set up by the institution (Senior CAF official of the VP of Country Programs, personal 
interview, November 26, 2012). By the end of 2012, the state of Rio de Janeiro had become 
CAF’s 9th largest borrower, with 1.3% of the total loan portfolio (US$ 209 million) (CAF, 
2013a). 
Loans to municipalities are by and large sovereign sector operations, but CAF has also 
been involved in supporting the private sector in Brazil. Even before Brazil became a Series A 
shareholder, national officials had already identified that one of the greatest advantage of 
increasing its membership in CAF would be to obtain guarantees for national institutions and 
companies. During his presidency at BNDES, Guido Mantega remarked: “the biggest problem 
for trade creditors of [Brazilian] goods and services abroad are the guarantees” (Mantega quoted 
in Business News Americas, 2005). Once Brazil became a full member, CAF has been able to 
allocate, for example, US$ 200 million through a line of credit to Odebrecht, S.A. to issue partial 
credit guarantees and finance short-term working capital operations. With this facility, CAF 
plays an important role in meeting the need for new guarantors to continue the execution of 
relevant projects in the region, particularly in the infrastructure sector (CAF AR, 2011). When 
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CAF can act a guarantor for a BNDES project, the national development bank does not need to 
draw upon its own resources (e.g. the Workers’ Assistance Fund7) for that kind of activity. 
Brazil also became interested in full participation in CAF as a consequence of its 
international strategic policy promoted by the current and former governments. For Brazil, 
cooperation on infrastructure matters has been at the center of its regional engagement agenda 
(see Chapters 5 and 6), not only for the public sector but also for private conglomerates. Several 
Brazilian enterprises have been involved in the construction of highways throughout South 
America in recent years within and beyond IIRSA’s scope, while CAF has accumulated 
knowledge (both technical, political and public policy related) on road infrastructure like no 
other RFIs. Consequently, as a CAF official mentioned during an interview, Brazil’s interests in 
joining CAF as a full member are a ‘no brainer’:  
It makes sense as a ‘signaling’ mechanism that is very consistent with its foreign policy 
on regional matters. Brazil also didn’t have to contribute with an onerous capital…and 
considering the flow of Brazilian investments to Latin America, which are, to a great 
extent, linked to infrastructure services…it just made sense to join an institution like CAF 
(CAF official, Public Policy and Competitiveness Unit, personal interview, November 
21, 2012). 
Moreover, as a Series C shareholder, Brazil could borrow from CAF up to four times its capital 
invested in the Andean entity, but as a full-member (Series A) the limit is eight times. 
For the original CAF shareholders, the relationship with the institution is truly based on 
the combination of the factors discussed above—sense of ownership, speed of loans, lack of 
                                                        
7 The Workers’ Assistance Fund (FAT, in Portuguese) is a government-established fund composed of compulsory contributions deducted from 
net operating revenues. At least 40% of annual revenues of FAT are transferred to the BNDES (Constitutional FAT). Because these funds are 
meant to support employment in Brazil, BNDES usually requires that other actors provide guarantees for international projects. 
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dogmatic recipes and access to local and regional expertise—but at the same time, CAF also 
continues to look for ways to strengthen its relationship with founding members through new 
avenues. For example, in 2012, CAF assisted Bolivia in issuing the first sovereign bonds in 
nearly a century. The Bolivian government sold US$ 500 million worth of 10-year bonds and 
earmarked the funds for investment in infrastructure and industrialization projects in energy and 
mining (Reuters, 2012). The issuing of sovereign bonds was preceded by approximately a year of 
work with CAF, which accompanied the process at the New York Stock Exchange. The selection 
of the international investment banks Goldman Sachs and Bank of America Merrill Lynch—
banks that have experience working with CAF—was another important step in the process 
(Bolivia’s Ministry of Economy and Public Finance, 2012). According to Enrique Garcia, CAF 
worked with Bolivian officials first by discussing the current role of CRAs in opening doors for 
infrastructure financing and second, by formally advising them through internal units (e.g. on 
how to set up a road show and recommending external consultants) (Garcia, personal interview, 
November 12, 2012).  
 
4.5 CAF and members’ increasing avenues for funding infrastructure 
The growth that several countries in the region have experienced in recent years has put the 
spotlight on infrastructure needs, generating opportunities for new lenders. As mentioned 
throughout this thesis, the combination of various elements—the need for better infrastructure, 
the willingness of governments in the region to take on projects and the improved financial 
situation due to the favourable export of commodities— has resulted in an increased demand for 
infrastructure financing throughout the region. Most member countries, for example, would like 
to receive more loans from CAF, but due to supply restrictions, this wish has not been possible. 
As Humphrey (2012) has remarked: “this supply restriction comes mainly from the danger of 
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over-exposing the CAF’s loan portfolio to a country seen as unstable by financial markets, which 
could impact its own credit rating” (p.193). CAF aims to limit exposure to a single member to 
less than 25% of the total portfolio. Meanwhile, various member countries have been able to 
diversify their financing sources because of political motivations and/or due to more favourable 
terms from other lenders—whether it is speed, fewer conditions or lower interest rates. 
The traditional method for infrastructure financing in the region has been loans from 
RFIs or international tenders to attract capital for large projects, but it has never been easy. For 
example, in Colombia, while capital has flowed into certain infrastructure sectors—primarily 
oil/gas and electricity— administrations for the past decade have identified the massive gap in 
transportation infrastructure as a major bottleneck for economic growth, including the country’s 
capacity to take better advantage in the export sector due to recent FTAs with the U.S. and the 
European Union (Chauvin, 2014).  
New avenues for funding infrastructure projects have included public-private 
partnerships, private pension funds, and funds from the Chinese government. For instance, 
infrastructure facilities created by private pension funds (AFPs) are a growing source of 
financing in a number of countries, particularly in the Andean region. Peru’s AFPs have invested 
in energy, transportation and sanitation projects and are looking for more projects (Chauvin, 
2014). Peru, including projects within the IIRSA initiative, has also benefited from public-
private partnerships (PPP) and a plan that allows companies to invest in public works in lieu of 
taxes. PPPs accounted for US$ 5 billion in infrastructure investment commitments in 2013, up 
four times from 2012, and more than US$100 million was secured from ten companies that will 
invest a percentage of their tax payments directly in infrastructure projects (Chauvin, 2014). 
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The Chinese government has become an increasing source of capital for infrastructure 
projects in Latin America. According to data gathered by the Inter-American Dialogue, China 
provided loan commitments upwards of US$98 billion between 2005 and 2013 (Garcia-Guerrero 
& Casanova-Allende, 2014). The bulk comes from China’s policy banks, such as the China 
Development Bank (CDB) and China Ex-Im Bank. However, Chinese lending in the region is 
highly concentrated by country. Over half of these loans went to Venezuela, followed by 
Argentina and Brazil, with the rest of Latin America accounting for slightly over 20% (Garcia-
Guerrero & Casanova-Allende, 2014). Chinese and Western banks barely overlap when it comes 
to their borrowers. Only Brazil and Argentina have received significant shares of lending from 
both. In both cases, the vast majority of the Chinese funds came from a single loan (Gallagher, 
Koleski & Irwin, 2012). 
Chinese loans do not come with the policy conditionalities that are tied to MDBs such as 
the WB and IADB. Therefore, China is a growing source of finance in parts of South America, 
especially for those countries having certain difficulties gaining access to global capital markets. 
For instance, Argentina and Ecuador have alienated themselves from the traditional sources after 
defaulting on their sovereign debt in 2001 and 2008-2009, respectively (Gallagher et. al. 2012). 
In the case of Venezuela, foreign investors have been scared off by its domestic political turmoil. 
For Ecuador and Venezuela, loans from China have been added to IADB and CAF lending, 
while replacing sources such as the World Bank. The WB has had almost no lending presence in 
these countries in the last decade. In regard to the IADB’s lending to these countries: 
[It] was higher in both absolute and relative terms in 2009-2010 than it was in 2006-2008. 
The increase in lending in 2009-2010 is significant, since Chinese lending over the same 
period exploded from zero to over 20 times IADB lending. IADB lending had been 
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higher in 2005, but it fell years before China began lending to these countries. Viewed in 
this context, Chinese lending is adding to, rather than replacing, IADB lending 
(Gallagher et. al. 2012, p.7.). 
 
According to Gallagher et al. (2012), with Chinese loans, nations in the region can get 
more financing for infrastructure and industrial projects to enhance long-run development rather 
than to support the latest Western development fads.  Chinese banks have become major 
development financiers in the region, but their lack of transparency has left many observers and 
policy makers understandably uneasy about the size and nature of their loans (Brautigam & 
Gallagher, 2014). For example, the composition and volume of Chinese loans are potentially 
more environmentally degrading than Western banks’ loan portfolios in the region (Gallagher et 
al. 2012). In a recent study, however, Brautigam and Gallagher (2014) find that Chinese finance 
is generally not out of line with interest rates found in global capital markets, does not bring 
windfall commodity profits to China, and does not mandate the use of Chinese workers.  
 Garcia-Herrero & Casanova-Allende (2014) suggest that China’s efforts in the region 
greatly resemble the United States’ decision to pivot its foreign policy towards the Asia Pacific. 
Not surprisingly, Chinese lending seems to favour those countries that are aligned with its 
strategy in Latin America, a claim that is reinforced by Chinese outward direct investment in the 
region. In this context, the proposed BRICS New Development Bank, which includes Chinese 
foreign reserves’ contributions, may serve to further enhance bilateral lending agreements 
between China and some South American countries (Garcia-Herrero & Casanova, 2014). As 
such, for some CAF members, China has already formalized its role as an alternative partner for 
development, representing a shift away from US-dominated financial institutions. 
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 CAF has not opposed the entry of China as a new partner for infrastructure lending and in 
2010 it actually signed a memorandum of understanding with the Export-Import Bank of China 
(China Ex-Im Bank) to jointly advance activities related to the economic, financial and social 
development of CAF’s shareholder countries. CAF also signed a cooperation agreement with the 
China Development Bank (CDB). The agreement calls for the cooperation between the banks in 
joint financing, trading of financial products, and exchange of human resources and information 
(Business News Americas, 2010). CAF has also so far hosted four academic conferences with 
the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In 
these conferences, Garcia has also enhanced CAF’s networking activities by meeting with high 
authorities of the political, financial, business, and education world in Beijing and Shanghai 
during work visits in the framework of the conferences. 
 In regard to other possible entrants such as the Bank of the South (BOS), CAF’s 
management has been very careful in staying away from political commentary and instead, 
focusing on the main principles that have worked for CAF to survive and growth in the current 
multilateral lending environment. When asked if the Bank of the South would compete with 
multilateral institutions in the region, Garcia replied:  
We see no other problems with the birth of new multilateral institutions, especially 
considering the financing needs of the Latin American countries… When the Bank of the 
South begins operations, if it has appropriate policies, we can even co-finance and share 
projects. The philosophy of the CAF, and I think that will be the Bank of the South, is to 
act with respect for differences that may exist between countries in approach, ideology, 
and to be not paternalistic but active partners…(Garcia quoted in Figueroa, 2008). 
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Further, when asked about the political objectives of the Bank of the South, Garcia 
diplomatically replied that is not advisable to have an opinion in that matter. However, for any 
agency such as the Bank of the South to succeed, Garcia remarked that “it must have three 
fundamental principles: having a paid and appropriate capital to leverage projects, to have 
sustainable policies and finally to have a legal instrument that qualifies the agency as a 
multilateral” (Garcia quoted in Figueroa, 2008, author’s translation). 
 
4.6 CAF as a model for other development banks? 
As Desai and Vreeland (2014) have suggested, long-standing dissatisfaction with the Bretton 
Woods institutions has to a great extent motivated BRICS countries to envision their own 
alternative to global development finance, the New Development Bank (NDB). What is 
interesting in the context of this chapter is that BRICS countries have decided to study CAF to 
guide the creation of their own institution. According to Stuenkel (2013) who interviewed 
various policymakers from South Africa, India and Brazil involved in the creation of the BRICS 
bank, CAF is frequently referred to as a model (Stuenkel, 2013). After the BRICS summit in 
Durban in March 2013, the countries set up an implementation committee to discuss the details 
of the bank. They have selected to study CAF carefully, because of its particular characteristics 
such as its unique shareholders’ structure and its progressive growth over the years. 
CAF’s Executive Vice-President remarked that Enrique Garcia was approached by senior 
officials from BRICS countries first at a meeting at the Asian Development Bank and then more 
formally in Brazil to discuss the technical aspects of the institution (CAF’s Executive Vice-
President, personal interview, November 6, 2012). Garcia thought that when he was first 
approached, it was because perhaps BRICS countries wanted to discuss enhancing bilateral 
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relationships between them and CAF. Instead, national officials involved in BRICS told him that 
they wanted Garcia to tell them CAF’s story and invited CAF officials to speak at one of their 
forums. Later, Garcia sent one of CAF’s financial officers to Brazil to discuss the topics that 
most interested them: “[BRICS countries] were very interested in knowing more about CAF’s 
financial structure, governance practices and how we have been able to obtain our current rating 
by the credit rating agencies” (Enrique Garcia, personal interview, November 19, 2012). As 
such, CAF’s story of how it has obtained its current credit rating (despite being composed of 
some members that were not investment grade until recently) seemed instructive for officials 
dealing with BRICS bank. Further, when discussing the secretariat structure of the BRICS bank, 
Brazilian officials for example, have suggested the bank should have a lean structure, like CAF 
(Stuenkel, 2013). In a recent paper for UNCTAD, Griffith-Jones (2014: 7) suggests that:  
Naturally, the ultimate decisions on the BRICS development bank will be made by the 
BRICS Governments themselves, but discussions of the technical options, and of related 
relevant experiences (for example of the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) and 
the EIB) may provide helpful insights for those decisions. 
Similarly, in a report produced by the Indian Council for Research on International Economic 
Relations (ICRIER) and Oxfam, the authors point out various lessons that BRICS official could 
draw on based on CAF’s experiences, including how the bank allows a far greater voice to its 
regional borrowers (Preet, Sapra & Mehdi, 2014). The authors also suggests that studying CAF’s 
financing instruments may be useful, as well as how CAF has managed to expand and create 
loans with smaller amounts than other RFIs. What is more, the report even highlights how the 
New Development Bank could learn from CAF in framing its HR policy, by not using country 
quota criteria to appoint staff, but going by professional merit (ibid. p. 13).  
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 Further, Humphrey (2015) considers a number of options for the NDB to increase its 
operational impact and indicates a number of directions where the NDB may follow the direction 
of CAF such as developing a leaner and more vertical administrative structure, which would also 
keep down staff costs (p.20). Another area where the NDB may follow CAF’s steps could be 
regarding project approval and disbursement, which might be considerably less bureaucratic and 
faster than at the major existing RFIs: the NDB is likely to rely heavily on national systems 
rather than imposing external requirements related to environmental, social and procurement 
issues (Humphrey, 2015, p.26). Finally, Humphrey (2015) suggests that “the NDB could 
improve its rating above that of its member countries by demonstrating an outstanding 
repayment record and technical excellence, but this will only occur after at least a decade of 
operations, as the example of CAF illustrates” (p.18). 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
As this chapter has discussed, since the mid-1990s, CAF has continuously tried to find a balance 
between strengthening its financial position in the eyes of the CRAs, making its operations more 
complex, keeping up good relationships with member countries and increasing resources to 
provide loans in key sectors such as infrastructure. Finding a balance is not an easy task, since it 
requires combining a mandate for serving members that do not carry the most “optimal” credit 
ratings and constantly engaging with CRAs that worry about risk and portfolio diversification. 
By now, CAF has the advantage of being a development bank with a long and very positive track 
record, including the fact that members have unconditionally respected the institution’s preferred 
creditor status and not defaulted on any of its loans. 
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Therefore, shareholders’ trust and support have been fundamental in this process: they 
have a clear self-interest in maintaining and increasing CAF’s institutional credibility and have 
opted to keep their obligations to CAF in full despite numerous crises. Throughout the years, 
shareholders have developed a strong interest in preserving CAF: it is an institution that has 
proven that it can grow their governments’ capital contributions (without interference from 
industrialized non-borrower countries) by using its staff to secure funds from international 
capital markets. CAF has also acted as catalyst of funds for all its members, despite the fact that 
some of them may seem more “creditworthy” than others to international investors.  Various 
senior staff interviewed for this project separately commented (when asked how is CAF 
differentiated from other RFIs) that it is a bank that “has an umbrella even on sunny days when it 
is not needed, and opens it when it rains”  (CAF senior official, Vice-presidency of Development 
Strategies and Public Policies, personal interview, November 26, 2012; Enrique Garcia, CAF’s 
Executive President, personal interview, November 19, 2012; Antonio Juan Sosa, VP of 
Infrastructure, personal interview,  October 18, 2012; Luis Enrique Berrizbeitia. CAF’s 
Executive Vice-President, personal interview, November 6, 2012). 
CAF members believe that the institution has the capacity to provide them with timely 
financing based on its financial strength and growing activity made possible by the solid and 
ongoing contributions from shareholders, reinvestment of their profits and constant presence on 
international financial markets. Ultimately, the fact that CAF is essentially a Latin American-
owned institution—which at first glance might seem to be a limiting factor for success given the 
absence of AAA/AA rated countries as is the case of the IADB and WB—has been a 
determining factor in CAF’s survival. Member countries share a sense of ownership and 
responsibility and this has a very positive impact on CAF’s credit rating and cost of funding, 
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which in turn lowers costs to members seeking a loan—a successful cycle, with governance as a 
crucial component (Humphrey, 2015, p. 27). Moreover, as Humphrey (2012) remarks, when 
CAF began to work in earnest on winning the trust of international markets, it did so through its 
constant operations, not callable capital. Callable capital and portfolio risk due to concentration 
in certain low rated countries have been the main factors that CAF has had to “sacrifice” to 
maintain its Latin identity and the backing from CAF’s members throughout the years. 
CAF’s story is now serving as a case study for newer institutions like the NDB. Some of 
its features—anti-cyclical and catalytic roles, financing mechanisms, lean organizational 
structure, image as a non-dogmatic institution and hiring practices—may be worth studying since 
these features continue to contribute to the growth of its lending portfolio despite the appearance 
of new alternatives such as Chinese loans and increasing PPP options in some countries. CAF 
has also had an excellent repayment history and consistent profitability. All these factors, 
combined with the support of its shareholders, have led international markets (and increasingly 
academic and development institutions’ studies) to gradually recognize CAF as an issuer of 
attractive options and a model for emerging development banks. 
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Chapter 5: CAF, the regional environment and cooperation on infrastructure 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter highlights the main developments within CAF in the area of infrastructure since the 
early 2000s and provides a brief introduction to IIRSA, which will be further explored in Chapter 
6. As examined in previous chapters, CAF has dedicated extensive internal resources to the 
financing of infrastructure since the mid-1990s. In the last decade, CAF has renewed its focus on 
promoting infrastructure projects for regional physical integration, which remains one of the 
strategic pillars of its corporate mission and serves the purpose of making CAF more attractive 
and relevant for member countries. Over the last decade, CAF reportedly provided more 
financing for infrastructure in Latin America than any other RFI (Moody’s, 2013). The biggest 
share of CAF’s loan portfolio currently goes towards funding infrastructure projects 
(transportation, telecommunications, electricity, gas and water). At the end of 2012, 
infrastructure accounted for about 70% of CAF’s total portfolio, followed by social development 
(19%) and financial intermediation (10%) (Moody’s, 2013). 
For national governments and RFIs alike, infrastructure is a major ingredient for 
economic growth and development. Improvements in connectivity and mobility have the 
potential to enable access to economic benefits and basic services, such as education and health 
care. Promoting infrastructure financing has been one of the key pillars in Garcia’s strategy and 
has carried more weight in terms of impact than getting involved in other areas of regional 
cooperation such as trade and finance. CAF’s focus on infrastructure has allowed the institution 
to survive and grow, while facilitating its principals’ development agendas. This chapter 
analyzes how infrastructure, as a key component for development, has been understood and 
promoted by CAF’s leadership. It examines how CAF, from a theoretical and operational 
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perspective, has engaged with the financing of infrastructure in the region. In South America, 
infrastructure reentered the agenda of regional cooperation in the 2000s. CAF’s work in this area 
since Garcia’s arrival provided the basis to update a mandate that now increasingly needed to 
take into account and respond to regional developments, emerging cooperation and financial 
alternatives, and a favourable economic environment that lasted until the 2008 global crisis. 
Garcia’s leadership during the last decade has covered various fronts. First, Garcia and CAF’s 
senior officials needed to highlight the role of MDBs like CAF in promoting regional 
cooperation in infrastructure with member countries and the international community, following 
CAF’s mandate and goals to enhance its portfolio in this area. Second, they had to ensure that 
despite emerging alternatives for financing and cooperation (Alba, Unasur, IIRSA, Bank of the 
South and bilateral initiatives with countries like China), CAF would find a way to either 
participate in these alternatives or frame itself as an entity that could co-exist with newer ones. 
CAF’s involvement in infrastructure financing and technical cooperation has also been 
facilitated due to changes in the regional environment, particularly Brazil’s involvement and 
leadership in promoting cooperation on infrastructure. Moreover, within member countries, the 
fiscal scenario has improved in the last decade, which combined with ideational motives in 
regard to national development, has helped in that various governments began perceiving 
infrastructure as an attractive channel to prompt regional cooperation. This chapter also 
examines CAF’s parallel agenda to infrastructure, which consists of supporting knowledge 
transfer related activities. This agenda also consists of accepting existing environmental practices 
within countries where projects are funded. In regard to its activities for supporting the creation 
of knowledge in this area, CAF is locally grounded and interacts on a regular basis with the main 
technocratic and political circles in the region, which has facilitated knowledge transfer. 
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However, its activities regarding the environmental components of the projects the entity 
supports lag behind other RFIs, despite improvements since the mid-2000s. 
Countries in South America have always been interested in infrastructure development 
(especially in transportation) but what has changed at the present time is that, first, they have 
more mechanisms and alternatives for financing projects and second, as explained in Chapter 2, 
there has been an erosion in the 1990s model that suggested that the private sector had to be the 
force behind infrastructure development. While discussions of trade and to a lesser degree 
financial cooperation were prominent until the 2000s, it is now the physical infrastructure agenda 
that has a more prominent role in regional fora—particularly in Unasur. Development models in 
various Latin American nations now have the state at the center of infrastructure planning and 
execution at the national and regional levels. Meanwhile, the economic integration and trade 
dimension have lost ground due to a lack of consensus between countries and to the redrafting of 
the priorities in cooperation at the regional level. In fact, to a great extent, the trade dimension 
was put aside in the 2008 Unasur Treaty that includes only a general reference to the Andean 
Community of Nations (CAN, in Spanish) and Mercosur (Sanahuja, 2012). 
 
5.2 The status of infrastructure in Latin America and CAF’s approach to the subject 
Diverse international and regional organizations agree that Latin America’s economic 
development is seriously hampered by the lag in building necessary infrastructure. Despite 
increased private-sector participation in the last two decades the region is still behind Asia and 
other emerging economies. According to Perrotti and Sanchez (2011)—ECLAC researchers— to 
satisfy firms’ and households’ new demand for infrastructure between 2006 and 2020, Latin 
America would have to invest around 5.0% of regional GDP, assuming an average annual real 
 163 
growth rate of 3.9%. The effort needed is considerable given that infrastructure investment in 
2007-08 was only 2% of GDP. From an economic viewpoint, increasing the availability and 
quality of infrastructure reduces logistics costs and increases countries’ productivity and 
competitiveness. Moreover, development banks and multilateral institutions often claim that 
improved access to transport infrastructure contributes to reducing inequality and social 
exclusion. For ECLAC and OECD (2011), access to roads, railways and waterways facilitates 
the connection between agricultural centers and the main internal urban markets. The challenge 
for the region is to supply infrastructure that strengthens the economy and fosters equality in a 
sustainable manner. 
After the debt and fiscal crises of the 1980s, the 1990s saw a reduction in capital 
investment as part of fiscal consolidation programs. Fiscal consolidation limited the levels of 
debt that states were able to assume, which together with low levels of taxation seriously limited 
public financing capabilities. Moreover, leaving aside the long lasting effects of the balance of 
payment crisis in the 1980s, Latin American state officials prioritized fiscal discipline to restore 
macro and financial stability. Improvements in fiscal balances achieved in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s did not come from retrenching current expenditure, but rather from revenue hikes 
and sharp declines in public infrastructure investment (Carranza, L., Daude, C., & Melguizo, 
2014). 
In addition, ECLAC figures show that while in 1980-85 public investment hovered 
around 4% of GDP, in 2007-08 it was only 2% (ECLAC & OECD, 2011). This decrease in 
public investment was not compensated by a proportional increase in private investment. 
Although there was an increase in private sector involvement through diverse schemes, this was 
not enough to compensate for the decline in public investment compared to economic growth in 
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the 2000s. Private investment was less than the contraction of public investment in most sectors, 
except in telecommunications and, to a lesser extent, energy (ECLAC & OECD, 2011). 
Moreover, in some cases, public policies were not adequately designed to involve the private 
sector, resulting in insufficient supply and sometimes causing delays and cost overruns.  
Infrastructure shortfalls differ considerably across sectors and states in Latin America. At 
the regional level, gaps tend to be concentrated in transport and energy, but even in 
telecommunications, where the aggregate gap is smaller, there are important challenges in 
specific segments such as broadband Internet access (OECD, 2012). Like most regional 
cooperation endeavours, infrastructure projects must also struggle with the challenges posed by 
the diverse priorities and interests of the different countries involved. Clearly, projects are often 
of greater interest to one country than another. Conflicting opinions may exist then as to the 
appropriateness of certain infrastructure projects. Indeed, among the different players involved in 
these integration processes, there are distinct views that tend to reflect contrasting interests and 
preferences when it comes to supporting or opposing projects. Countries have distinct 
regulations and laws when it comes to the approval and materialization of infrastructure projects, 
which creates significant challenges in the development of regionally integrated projects. 
Amongst the factors that present a challenge in furthering regional physical integration, it is 
possible to highlight: conflict of interest between governments, between service providers from 
various countries (fearing competition from other entrepreneurial initiatives) and between 
segments of the private sector itself (service providers and users). 
Several countries in the region, however, have identified infrastructure as a priority in the 
public policy agenda. For example, in the case of Brazil, the Plan to Accelerate Growth (PAC, in 
Portuguese)— launched in 2007 and continued by the Rousseff administration under the name 
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PAC-2— is the backbone of the productive development policies in the country. The PAC 
contemplates large infrastructure projects in the energy, transportation, and sanitation sectors, as 
well as the development of airports and railroads (CAF AR, 2008). Smaller countries also show 
this emphasis on buttressing their infrastructure agenda; for example in Bolivia, investment in 
infrastructure represents 50% of total public investment and the National Development Plan 
includes critical investments in water projects and basic sanitation, as well as in transportation 
and telecommunications infrastructure (CAF AR, 2008). 
For RFIs like CAF, the advancement of infrastructure has often been justified as having 
an impact on the rate of economic and socially sustainable growth and thereby upon poverty 
alleviation. In the late 1990s, discussions within CAF Annual Reports also highlighted the need 
for shareholders to attract direct private investment for infrastructure development. CAF’s 
Annual Report in 1997 suggested that “the most important requirement, however, is that the state 
should guarantee the provision of essential infrastructure and services (potable water, power, 
high-speed communications and transportation systems) needed to make the environment 
conducive to private productive activity”(CAF AR, 1997, p.27). Since the early 2000s, CAF 
began promoting the importance of infrastructure and continental integration as a way to link 
countries together, creating networks for transportation and telecommunication, and erecting 
power grids to take advantage of the region’s energy resources. In a recent presentation in the 
U.K., Antonio Sosa (2012)—CAF’s VP of Infrastructure—also highlighted that doing 
infrastructure is not enough, that people should “beware of white elephant projects” since the 
infrastructure itself does not necessarily generate development. Sosa (2012) stated that it is the 
innovation, resourcefulness, business vision and productivity of its people, which generates 
markets, sales, jobs and development. As such, “infrastructure must be proportional to the 
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economic activity and potential for development” (Sosa, 2012). CAF summarizes its view on 
why infrastructure is a key variable for development as follows: 
Beyond all the academic knowledge that supports this view, it is believed that 
infrastructure may contribute to the consolidation of the comprehensive development 
process in the region through four key dimensions: i) by favouring the improvement in 
the quality of life, social inclusion, and opportunities for isolated communities; ii) by 
supporting economic growth and the competitiveness of enterprises; iii) by facilitating 
integration within the national boundaries and regionally, decentralization, and internal 
mobility; and iv) by contributing to the diversification of the productive fabric by 
promoting the development and internationalization of national or regional companies 
specialized in the production of goods and services linked to infrastructure (CAF IDeAL, 
2011, p. 13). 
In 2012, CAF and ECLAC published a report “CAF IDeAL 2012,” intended as a joint 
effort to begin measuring the levels of infrastructure investment in the region. This initial report 
covers ten countries (see figures below) and highlights countries’ investment preferences and 
actions in infrastructure. For these countries, CAF IDeAL (2012) reports that total (public and 
private) infrastructure investment has grown by 17% between 2008 and 2010 in current values 
and it fluctuates around 3% of GDP. The sector with the highest share in investments is 
transportation (54%) and its relevance is growing. It is followed by telecommunications (20%), 
energy (18%), and drinking water and sanitation (8%). Moreover, private participation 
represented half of the investment in 2008 and 2009, and reached 34% in 2010. In the three-year 
period analyzed, private participation reached 8.5% in drinking water and sanitation, 20.7% in 
transportation, 65.8% in energy, and 93.4% in telecommunications. The sector that promotes 
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public participation the most is transportation (more than 90% of public investment in 2010).  
When analyzing individual countries, we can observe that Bolivia and Peru have the highest 
investment in infrastructure as a percentage of their GDP.  
Figure 2. Infrastructure Investment in Latin America by year and sector - % of GDP, 2008-
20108 
 
Figure 3. Investment in infrastructure by country (all sectors) - % of GDP, 2008-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
8 The countries included in this preliminary study by CAF and ECLAC are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Peru and Ecuador. 
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Source: CAF IDeAL 2012. 
CAF’s actions in infrastructure have two main dimensions according to its institutional 
policies: i) financing investment projects, and ii) establishing a dialogue with country members 
related to sectoral policies and technical assistance programs (CAF, 2010). Pre-investment 
studies conducted by the institution is a common first step for members looking to obtain CAF’s 
financial support, followed by technical assistance resources for the design and preparation of the 
projects. These resources include advice to match the financing mechanisms with the 
characteristics of each project, with or without sovereign guarantees. The dialogue on sectoral 
policies and technical assistance programs enables the institution to strengthen its work with 
shareholder countries, while providing a closer look at the financing priorities of a government at 
a specific point in time. Moreover, CAF, as mentioned in the previous chapter, can also provide 
direct loans to subnational entities (cities and states) and support the structuring of PPPs. 
Throughout the years, CAF has also implemented co-financing with other RFIs and agencies and 
A/B Loans (with the participation of private financiers) in trying to attract more resources 
towards the sector. 
In 2012, CAF officials presented the institution’s current approach to infrastructure in 
London at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office Conference. CAF’s current approach is based 
on three elements: finance, knowledge and networks (see Table 6), according to a recent 
presentation by the VP of Infrastructure in the U.K. The next sections emphasize the core of 
CAF’s approach, the financing function, while discussing its links to the broader goal of regional 
integration of CAF’s principals. 
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Table 6. CAF approach to support infrastructure (as presented in London) 
Finance – Knowledge – Networks 
Financing of infrastructure projects 
 CAF: $10 billion a year in new approvals 
 67% in infrastructure: transport & logistics, energy, water & sewage, telecom & ICT 
including sovereign and corporate loans, structured finance, guarantees and capital 
investments 
Knowledge generation of infrastructure 
 We have a department for the generation of knowledge with 15 specialists in different 
sectors of infrastructure 
 Studies & publications on infrastructure sectors, markets, financing, public policy and 
good practices 
 IDeAL Report 2011, 2012 
Network of authorities and experts 
 Authorities and experts networks for sharing strategic vision and practical sector 
knowledge 
 OMU 15, an Urban Mobility Observatory for the largest cities in Latin America 
www.omu.caf.com 
 GeoSUR, network of geographical institutes and NGOs producing digital maps with 
geo-referenced information in a variety of themes www.geosur.info 
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 GeoPOLIS, an Observatory to improve adaptation of cities to the effects of 
earthquakes and climate change (glacier melting, coastal erosion, flooding) 
Networks for knowledge 
 IIRSA, regional authorities and expert network to study, promote and build trans-
Latinamerican roads, railroads, waterways, energy and telecom lines 
 Cities with a future, an observatory for Latin America cities where CAF has a strong 
presence, with the purpose of enhancing our support and add value 
 Road safety, sustainable transport, CAF participates in IWG/ICC, SLoCat, 
International Transport Forum 
Source: Sosa 2013.  
 
5.3 How infrastructure initially reentered the regional agenda 
CAF encountered a new regional environment in the early 2000s, which marked a new era in 
regional integration. By then, regional opposition to neoliberalism had strengthened significantly 
in some countries and regional projects began reflecting both a continuation of the neoliberal 
model and opposition to it. Meanwhile, Mercosur continued to face the difficulties resulting from 
the international situation of the late 1990s, including the Brazilian devaluation and numerous 
currency crises in emerging economies. Two forces combined to produce a shift from the open 
regionalism of the 1990s to the post-liberal regionalism of the 2000s. Already in the late 1990s, 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project elicited opposition in both the United 
States and Latin America. The U.S. Congress proved unwilling to extend fast-track negotiating 
 171 
authority to the White House, which would have allowed it to move quickly on proposed trade 
agreements. And in the region, Brazil started to articulate its own alternative to the FTAA, which 
eventually emerged as the South American Community of Nations in 2004. The latter brought 
together Mercosur, CAN, Chile, Guyana, and Suriname, and by 2008, it had morphed into the 
Union of South American Nations (Unasur) (Serbin, 2011). 
By 2000, CAF had become the leading source of external financing for the countries of 
the Andean Community (CAF AR, 2000). From 1995-2000, from a total of US$ 27 billion 
approved for the Andean countries by the IADB, World Bank and CAF, CAF approved 51% of 
that total amount (Titelman, 2004). Meanwhile, while trade negotiations advanced slowly at the 
regional level during the late 1990s, the Cardoso Government in Brazil attempted to strengthen 
the process’ political profile and broaden its agenda. In August 2000, Cardoso invited the twelve 
heads of state of South America to attend the Brasilia Summit. The event was of great 
significance and unique in the history of the sub-region because it included only South American 
nations (and was not framed as a “Latin American” event). The attendants discussed in detail 
topics such as the consolidation of democracy, the expansion of regional trade, and the 
commitment to expand the physical infrastructure for integration, taking greater advantage of 
South American complementarities. While democracy and trade had been on the regional agenda 
since the 1990s, physical infrastructure was an underexplored area with a lack of shared 
understandings or commitments at the regional level. Integration amongst countries was given 
then a powerful momentum, particularly in relation to the development of large infrastructure 
projects and logistics endeavours. Integration was also presented as an avenue for countries to 
reexamine and position “regional” integration as a South American issue, with its own agenda—
distinct from U.S. trade-led projects that were popular in previous decades and especially linked 
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to Mexico and Central American nations. 
As a product of this meeting and at the request of the governments, the IADB, CAF and 
Fonplata drafted a “Plan of Action for Integrating South America’s Regional Infrastructure”— 
the IIRSA initiative— which set out the mechanisms for the initiative’s implementation and 
monitoring. Through the Brasilia Communiqué, the South American Heads of State asked 
directly for these three institutions to support them and to use their experiences from the last 
decade and their knowledge to assist the states in promoting and executing physical 
infrastructure. By the end of 2000, the IADB published the document “A New Impetus for 
Regional Infrastructure Integration in South America.” CAF conducted and published studies on 
each country in South America to identify the main axes for integration and development with its 
neighbours; these were presented to the presidents gathered at the Summit and at subsequent 
meetings to the ministers of infrastructure (CAF AR, 2000). Meanwhile, the presidents of three 
multilaterals—IADB, CAF and Fonplata— combined their efforts to create a Technical 
Coordinating Committee (CCT) within IIRSA in coordination with the infrastructure ministers. 
The next year, 2001, proved to be a difficult year within and beyond the region. Most 
countries were adversely affected by a series of external events which included the collapse of 
the stock markets around the world, the financial volatility generated by the crisis in Argentina, 
Brazil and Ecuador, the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the deepening process of economic 
slowdown in the United Sates, Europe and Japan. These events had an adverse effect upon 
financial markets, narrowing and making more expensive the access of countries in the region to 
international capital markets, thereby reducing financing options for both public and private 
sector investments, for the management of public sector finances, and for the region’s external 
indebtedness (CAF AR, 2001). The main uncertainties at that time resulted in a set of factors that 
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countries needed to take into account for pursuing development, both in terms of progress in the 
competitiveness of the private sector, as well as in the opportunities to advance regional 
integration. As such, there was the need to draft a regional perspective on common development 
issues. This was the context that influenced how South American countries would create and 
develop plans for physical integration at the regional level for the next couple of years, including 
the IIRSA initiative.   
CAF, which by that time had ample experience supporting countries during financial 
crises (e.g. the oil shock in the 1970s and the debt crisis in the 1980s), framed ongoing 
cooperation opportunities and challenges in terms of countries needing to actively respond to 
economic liberalization. Similarly, the IADB justified the resurgence of regional integration in a 
book published in 2002, linking it to the search for additional policy tools to manage insertion 
into an increasingly globalized and competitive world economy: 
There is substantial evidence that successful countries deploy policies that can 
proactively harness the forces of globalization for economic growth and development, 
while those countries that distance themselves from these same forces lag behind. In 
effect, regional integration initiatives represent a third tier of trade policy reform, which 
aims to complement and reinforce the unilateral and multilateral liberalization undertaken 
as part of the structural reform process that has been underway since the mid- 1980s. 
Seen in this light, regional integration is an integral part of the structural reform process 
itself (IADB, 2002, p.2). 
 
However, by 2005, the regional political landscape in South America looked very 
different from that of the 1990s. A range of elected presidents became not only critical of 
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neoliberalism, but also were willing to push for the adoption of alternative models of governance 
(Tussie, 2009). Although difficult to classify—due to various countries’ preferences to actively 
participate in various schemes at different times— Table 7 summarizes perspectives on market 
ideologies and preferred venues for regional cooperation. There are three main positions in the 
sub-region; two of them are led by individual countries (Brazil and Venezuela) while the third 
one can be referred to as a continuation of economic and regional practices favouring open 
regionalism. Consequently, as Tussie (2009) suggests, a patchy picture has emerged of many 
coexisting and competing projects with fuzzy boundaries. Although Brazil has assumed an 
undeniable leadership in pursuing regional cooperation through initiatives like IIRSA, some 
countries have, for the most part simultaneously, also favoured Venezuela’s search for an 
alternative to neoliberalism, while maintaining a high level of ‘presidentialism’ and reliance on 
the leaders, often referred to as popular socialism. This has been the case for nations like Bolivia, 
Ecuador and to a lesser extent, Argentina and Uruguay.  
Nevertheless, among the greatest challenges that initiatives like the South American 
Community of Nations (and later Unasur) have faced is the conflicting vision between Brazil, 
Venezuela and other countries relating to the organization’s scope and nature. For example, 
although both Brazil and Venezuela wanted to give the process a more prominent political 
profile and use it as an instrument to produce more inclusive development policies, they disagree 
on how this idea should be carried out (Sanahuja, 2012). Additionally, the countries that remain 
committed to open regionalism and closer economic links with the U.S. (Colombia, Peru and 
Chile) favour a flexible institutional design able to encompass different international strategies in 
economic matters (Sanahuja, 2012). 
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Table 7. Regional cooperation and underlying market ideologies  
Ideology Countries Involved Preferred Institutions and 
Visions for Regional 
Cooperation 
Capitalist 
Developmentalism  
• Promoted by Brazil; the 
national economic ideology 
is procapitalist, yet 
unapologetic about the need 
for state planning, public 
ownership, and promotion 
of priority economic sectors  
• Regular supporters include 
Southern Cone countries 
• Issue oriented. At times 
supporters include countries 
which have benefited from 
Brazilian-led initiatives (e.g. 
Peru in IIRSA) 
• Initially, the South 
American Community 
of Nations (CSN) and 
since 2008, Unasur 
• Mercosur (as a tool for 
Brazil to manage 
relationships with its 
neighbours) 
• Brazilian leadership 
established the CSN to 
realize its vision of 
South – as opposed to 
Latin – America as a 
region in its own right, 
coinciding with what 
Brasilia has defined as 
its sphere of interest  
Popular Socialism • Promoted by Venezuela; 
emphasizes political and 
social aspects of integration, 
with new economic and 
welfare commitments, 
reclaiming the principles of 
socialism in direct 
opposition to neoliberal 
globalization  
• Key partners include 
Bolivia and Ecuador 
• Other countries that 
participate at times include 
Argentina and Uruguay 
• Alba 
• CSN and Unasur, to a 
lesser degree 
Supportive of open 
regionalism 
• No leader but mostly 
identified with Chile, 
Colombia and Peru 
• Refrains from participating 
in projects with socio-
political content: for 
• Countries usually 
prefer to cooperate on 
projects with a strong 
emphasis on 
commercial integration 
as a transit to broader 
 176 
example, these countries 
have declined to participate 
in initiatives like the Bank 
of the South 
multilateralism 
 
Sources: Author’s elaboration based on Armijo (2013), Malamud and Gardini (2012), Riggirozzi 
(2012), Sanahuja (2012), Tussie (2009) and Tussie and Riggirozzi (2012). 
 
Furthermore, by 2005, at a broad level, regional cooperation on infrastructure matters 
became a manifestation of renewed efforts reasserting control over infrastructure and energy for 
the remapping of the regional political economy around natural resources. Rosales (2013), for 
example, argues that the revival in national ownership over natural resource sectors has been 
central to the dismantling of neoliberalism in countries like Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. 
Coordination over natural resources is key in a context where the global incentives structure is 
based on sustained demand and rising commodity prices in world markets (Tussie & Riggirozzi, 
2012). Further, cooperation on infrastructure has represented, at large, a move away from 
neoliberalism in the regional context; it gave more space (when compared, for example, to issues 
surrounding trade cooperation) for countries to coordinate their economic activity without 
requiring them to coordinate national development models. Cooperation on infrastructure, as 
such, could be positioned within any development model and preferred market ideology. The 
following section discusses how CAF navigated the changing regional environment in the 
context of infrastructure financing. 
5.4 CAF’s growth and institutional approach through the financing of infrastructure works  
 
While many countries continued to try negotiating free trade agreements with the U.S. in the 
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early 2000s, larger regional integration initiatives gained considerable strength— in particular 
with the launching of the South American Community of Nations during the Presidential Summit 
in Cusco, Peru in December 2004. CAF, in its official documents, began to often emphasize 
infrastructure and not trade as an area of opportunities for integration. Trade in the region has 
always been perceived as a more dogmatic and prescriptive area in which larger RFIs have had 
considerable missteps. CAF took advantage during these years of the fact that multilateral and 
intergovernmental organizations showed willingness to cooperate in physical integration 
initiatives, also prompted by the increasing frustration of CAF’s principals in the trade area.  
Overall, the international landscape of trade agreements was not very promising. In 
September 2003, trade ministers around the world returned empty-handed to their respective 
countries after the breakdown of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations at Cancun. 
During this time, a series of core negotiating groups gained prominence centered on the U.S., 
E.U., Brazil and India, which have been at the heart of the negotiations since then (Hopewell, 
2014). The rise of Brazil and India as significant players at the WTO was intertwined with a 
broader revolt on the part of developing countries. As Hopewell (2014) suggests:  
Brazil and India worked to position themselves as leaders of the developing world and 
assumed a confrontational stance in relation to the U.S. and E.U., as a means to elevate 
their status and influence. Highly vocal and assertive, Brazil and India have been a major 
source of initiative and played a central role in shaping the agenda of the Doha 
negotiations (p.332). 
 
 The Cancun meeting left developed countries frustrated and unsatisfied, while 
underdeveloped countries forged new alliances.  The aftermath of Cancun was one of standstill 
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and stocktaking. Negotiations were suspended for the remainder of 2003. In early 2004, then-
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Zoellick offered proposals on how to move the round 
forward. The USTR called for a focus on market access, including an elimination of agricultural 
export subsidies (Fergusson, 2011). After intense negotiations in late July 2004, WTO members 
reached what has become known as the Framework Agreement, which provided broad guidelines 
for completing the Doha Round negotiations, which has collapsed since 2008. By this time, 
Brazil, India (joined by China) had become key players whose assent is considered essential to 
securing a Doha agreement—though the nature of their behaviour and impact differ (Hopewell, 
2014). With the traditional and emerging powers unable to reach agreement, the Doha Round 
negotiations were officially declared at an impasse in 2011 (Hopewell, 2014). 
By the time the South American Community of Nations (which would later become 
Unasur) was established in late 2004, the FTAA initiative had lost importance. The Summit of 
the Americas held in Mar del Plata, Argentina in 2005 evidenced strong differences of positions 
in the region: on the one hand, the U.S., Mexico, Central America and most Andean countries 
agreed to advance in the negotiations and, on the other, Mercosur member countries and 
Venezuela decided to postpone these negotiations. As such, faced with the delays of the 
multilateral liberalization process and the reduction of scope of the FTAA, various Latin 
American countries continued to negotiate FTAs with the U.S. Unlike FTAs negotiated in past 
decades, these agreements included not only trade obligations, but also commitments in areas of 
domestic reform. Chile and the Central American countries signed agreements of this type. In 
2005, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Peru were also negotiating a FTA with the U.S., with 
Bolivia participating as an observer.9 In general, U.S.-Andean agreements caused major 
                                                        
9 Peru concluded the FTA in 2007, while Panama and Colombia did it in 2011. Ecuador and Bolivia never entered a FTA with the U.S. at the 
end.  
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divisions among the members of the Andean Community in this period. Three countries, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru (although Ecuador backtracked afterwards), pushed for a decision 
to delay an Andean customs union and later discarded the goal of the custom union altogether, 
making possible the bilateral FTAs with the U.S. These agreements provided the immediate 
excuse for the Venezuelan government to abandon the Andean Community in 2006 and to ask 
for membership in Mercosur (Sanahuja, 2012).  
Further, taking advantage of soaring oil prices in the mid-2005, Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez began to more vocally diverge from the Brazilian-led South American regionalist 
strategy. The result was Venezuela’s establishment of Alba in 2004. Chavez established Alba as 
a tool to promote Venezuela’s influence in the region by making oil available at discount rates, 
being especially attractive for smaller Caribbean economies in the region (Briceño-Ruiz, 2010), 
but without a larger economic impact or political interest as a sub-regional initiative. Alba 
emphasized popular sovereignty, collective (state) ownership of natural resource wealth and 
public utilities, and regional mutual aid. Alba’s core members include Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Nicaragua, and six small Anglophone Caribbean states (Armijo, 2013). Ultimately, 
Venezuela has acted mostly as a financier for concrete initiatives within Alba such as 
Petrocaribe—looking to sell oil under a concessionary financial agreement to fourteen member 
nations situated in the Caribbean. 
During the mid-2000s, the stagnation of trade negotiations, combined with the 
dissatisfaction of various governments with neoliberal reforms in Latin America affected 
patterns of regional economic cooperation in the Western hemisphere in the 2000s (Gomez-
Mera, 2015). Two new patterns of trade and economic agreements in the region have since 
materialized: (i) the expansion of preferential trading agreements with intra- and extra-regional 
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partners; and (ii) the rise of the larger projects of post-neoliberal regionalism that seek to go 
beyond trade cooperation (Gomez-Mera, 2015). CAF has continued its work side by side with 
these two patterns, and also within the ongoing trade dilemmas. Understanding the ongoing 
regional environment is vital then for having a more complete picture of how CAF has taken 
advantage of prevailing circumstances to expand its infrastructure agenda and impact in the 
region. At the time, recently elected left and center-left governments were trying to consolidate 
their participation within the CSN (later to become Unasur) and/or Alba with the purpose of 
increasing cooperation between countries to move toward a more inclusive regional agenda. 
In regard to CAF’s presence in regional and international events, Enrique Garcia 
participated actively in various regional presidential summits in the mid-2005. For example, he 
attended (amongst others) the Monterrey Hemispheric Summit, the two Andean Presidential 
Summits, the two Mercosur Presidential Summits, and the deliberations of the Group of Rio 
(CAF AR, 2004). Attending these meetings gave Garcia the necessary facts to assess CAF’s next 
steps regarding regional cooperation and its role in the process in upcoming years. For the heads 
of state, these meetings were crucial for the definition of a new agenda of regional integration, 
which included greater stimulus to projects of physical and energy infrastructure, while 
continuing—although less enthusiastically—to promote trade agreements 
Within this regional framework, CAF also continued offering technical and financial 
assistance in areas complementary to trade, but focusing primarily on infrastructure matters 
during the mid-2000s. For example, CAF offered the Andean countries various programs aimed 
at improving the quality of technical assistance in areas of competitiveness, financing and 
associative capabilities of small and medium enterprises, and improvement of logistics and 
infrastructure (CAF AR, 2005). By 2005, infrastructure accounted for 37.1% of total loan 
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approvals at CAF and 34.8% of disbursements (CAF AR, 2005). During the mid-2000s, Garcia 
attended several regional meetings to enhance the institution’s presence and get a closer look at 
shifting regional preferences. In its 2005 Annual Report, CAF asserted this vision:  
CAF is advancing toward a deeper integration viewed in an integral way. Although this 
focus has emphasized the promotion, structuring and financing of physical infrastructure 
projects, it also includes other objectives like the promotion of macroeconomic 
convergence, competitiveness, capital market development, social, cultural, political, and 
commercial integration, governance and corporate government, among others…In this 
context, during 2005 CAF has consolidated its support to the strengthening of the 
hemispheric and Latin American and Caribbean integration processes. The presence of its 
Executive President, Enrique Garcia, in the main regional forums held this year, enabled 
CAF to actively participate in the regional dialogue on the fundamental issues 
confronting each one of the different integration schemes (CAF AR 2005, p.21). 
 
The year 2005 was also emblematic for CAF because the entity took a very significant 
step that year within its mission to enhance and support regional integration by having the 
shareholders’ assembly approve a reform of its constitutive agreement in October, in order to 
allow non-Andean shareholders in the region (Series C shareholders) such as Brazil to attain full 
membership. This reform was unanimously approved at the shareholders’ Extraordinary 
Assembly. It was ratified by the congresses of all countries that were then full members of CAF, 
and took effect on July 9, 2008. This decision was put into place with CAF’s goal of 
strengthening the presence of Latin American countries in the organization and of enhancing the 
implementation of CAF’s agenda on infrastructure financing, within a favourable regional 
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environment. Moreover, this decision, as explained in the previous chapter, was a step toward 
taking into consideration the CRAs’ rating criteria, which include the extent of diversification of 
a RFI’s portfolio as a measure to reduce risk.  For CAF, it was also seen as a strategic decision to 
invite Brazil to join the institution during an era in which the country was leading cooperation on 
infrastructure matters.  
Further, within the regional environment, economic integration and trade have all but 
disappeared before a number of objectives in other fields in the final design of Unasur. The shift 
in Unasur’s focus could be seen in the adoption of a “priority agenda” in the First Summit 
(Brasilia, September 29-20, 2005) and the definition of Unasur’s goals (13 in total) in the Second 
Summit (Cochabamba, Bolivia, December 8-9, 2006). Both meetings show that Unasur, in the 
shift from open regionalism to post-liberal regionalism has given preference to the political, 
social, defense and security agendas (Sanahuja, 2012). Ultimately, Unasur is a vehicle for 
Brazilian leadership to materialize its vision of South (as opposed to Latin) America as a region 
in its own right. To countries like Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, Unasur is a political forum to 
increase autonomy from the U.S. and promote their agenda without significant economic or trade 
commitments (Sanahuja, 2012). Therefore, for most South American countries, key factors in 
their support of Unasur have included its low demands and flexibility concerning trade and 
development—probably some of the most contentious issues in the regional agenda in previous 
decades—and consequently its ability to accept the different strategies pursued by its members in 
those areas. 
 For CAF, the regional momentum convened by the establishment of Unasur, gave 
impetus to its infrastructure financing goals. By 2007, CAF had financed forty-six physical 
infrastructure projects that represented around US$ 4.5 billion of a total investment of 
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approximately US$ 13 billion. This was due to a combination of the high profile of the IIRSA 
initiative (discussed in detail in Chapter 6) and its own efforts to support countries with their 
infrastructure plans. CAF, for instance, advanced its plans for cooperating on border integration 
by promoting more than 12 bilateral and multilateral initiatives through its “Cross–Border 
Integration and Development Program” in 2007. At the same time, Enrique Garcia continued to 
be an active participant that year in regional meetings, promoting CAF’s participation within 
cooperation schemes agreed with regional integration organizations and secretariats, including 
projects within traditional and newer organizations such as the Organization of American States 
(OAS), the General Secretariat of the Andean Community, the Andean Parliament, the Mercosur 
Permanent Representatives Commission, the Pro-Tempore Secretariats of the Summit of the 
Americas, Mercosur, Unasur, and the Latin American Integration Association (Aladi), amongst 
others (CAF AR, 2007). 
Even though Latin America was experiencing an economic boom during these years, 
Garcia emphatically reminded the international community that multilateral lending was more 
urgent than ever. For him, a generally benign macroeconomic picture could easily obscure the 
deeper economic needs of the region: “The idea that on a sunny day you don’t need an umbrella 
is misguided…On good days, infrastructure financing is needed because there are more projects 
to finance” (Garcia quoted in Verna, 2007). In an economic bulletin published by the Ministry of 
Economics and Competitiveness in Spain, Garcia (2009) highlighted the role of regional banks 
for supporting physical integration: 
Promoting regional cooperation in infrastructure projects is complex, because countries 
tend to prioritize national benefits valued differently and regional public goods. In this 
sense, regional development banks and other institutions play an important role in 
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regional cooperation in infrastructure. First, they provide equity directly and help to 
mobilize resources from other sources such as the private sector, by providing guarantees 
or other instruments of risk mitigation, helping to reduce the risk premium of an 
investment project. Second, MDBs provide technical support and advice from experts … 
to attract private investment and assist in the formulation of a project to attract more 
participation from capital markets as a source of funding. Finally, multilateral agencies 
serve as a catalyst for collective action in cross-border projects, facilitating the interaction 
of multiple entities involved in the planning and implementation stages…Regional 
cooperation is also required to collect and channel financial resources towards 
infrastructure projects of high quality (p.34). 
 
For countries interested in becoming full members, it was especially attractive that CAF 
could act as a bridge between public and private sectors. For Southern Cone nations, RFIs like 
CAF can be crucial in ensuring that riskier projects (in terms of securing financing) become 
commercially viable. For those projects, it can be beneficial for countries to go through an 
intermediary like CAF, rather than going through the global capital markets: these can 
significantly improve the investor profile and secure additional benefits such as lower premiums.  
It is not surprising then that during 2007, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay began the process of 
becoming full-fledged members of the corporation. At the same time, CAF received US$ 206 
million in new capital contributions from its shareholders in 2008. From this total, US$ 199 
million (97%) were contributions received from non-core countries, “which underscores the 
growing importance of these shareholders in CAF’s capital structure as well as their 
unquestionable role in the transition from a mainly Andean-focused lending institution to a 
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multilateral bank with a scope covering most of Latin America and the Caribbean” (CAF AR 
2008, p.184). 
In 2008, the financial crisis that began in the U.S. was already manifesting itself in Latin 
America, although the region had better tools this time around to respond to a global crisis. In its 
2008 Annual Report, CAF highlighted how the considerable accumulation of international 
reserves (more than US$ 460 billion throughout Latin America), the lower levels and improved 
profile of external debt, greater fiscal discipline, consolidation and strengthening of domestic 
financial systems, and the almost non-existent exposure to high-risk mortgage assets contributed 
to mitigate the impact of the deterioration of the external environment (CAF AR, 2008). The 
improved fiscal standing allowed various governments greater degrees of freedom to apply 
counter cyclical policies and to take actions to defend the financial systems, if necessary. 
However, the region did not escape the effects of the collapse of the financial markets. The 
financial panic led to a widespread movement of capital toward low risk assets, which in a few 
weeks led to the collapse of the region’s stock markets, currency depreciations, and liquidity 
problems in banks that ultimately affected commercial activity and resulted in higher costs and 
restrictions on credit. The beginning or deepening of recession in the main industrial economies 
added to the financial problems, leading to a deceleration of exports in the region through a 
reduction in trade volumes and/or commodity prices. 
 CAF, in line with other RFIs, put in place a plan to mitigate the effects of this financial 
crisis over the region. To this end, it offered a contingent credit line of US$ 1.5 billion to support 
governments’ financing strategy, through a preventive financing instrument that grants resources 
to shareholder countries in the event of difficulties accessing financing in capital markets. In this 
way, as seen in Chapter 4, the institution demonstrated its adaptability, foreseeing the possible 
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needs of shareholder countries, given the deterioration of the international financial situation and 
the potential effect it might have over its performance in the short term. In 2009, despite the 
ongoing financial crisis, CAF achieved record approvals for US$ 9.2 billion, a 15.4% increase 
over the previous year. This indicates the counter-cyclical role played by CAF in the context of 
the international crisis.  
In 2009, the Bank of the South (BOS) was created with the aim of becoming an 
ambitious alternative to the IMF, the WB, and other “neoliberal” development banks that work 
throughout South America (including CAF).  However, these initial proposals regarding the BOS 
were watered down by Brazil and other countries in the region that had no desire to break from 
the Bretton Woods institutions.10 What has been remarkable in the case of CAF, in the middle of 
emerging regional alternatives, is that the institution has been a constant presence within its 
country members amongst all kinds of regional initiatives since its creation. In 2009, CAF 
approved US$ 2.9 billion for infrastructure sectors, particularly for energy and roads; these 
approvals represented 32% of the total, of which 25.3% was directed to national economic 
infrastructure activities, and the remaining 6.5% targeted infrastructure integration projects 
between countries. Some significant project approvals included the Federal Energy 
Transportation Plan in Argentina; the La Paz-Oruro Divided Highway; the Zudáñez-Padilla and 
the Monteagudo-Ipati Highways in Bolivia; the II Centenario-La Línea Tunnel in Colombia; the 
Program to Support Public Investment in the Electricity Sector in Ecuador; the Urban Electric 
Train Project for Lima, in Peru; the Public Investment Program for Road Infrastructure in 
Uruguay; and the Termozulia III Thermoelectric Project in Venezuela. It is worth noting that 
                                                        
10 At the end of 2014 five countries out of seven had ratified the Treaty, with Brazil and Paraguay being the two still awaiting approval. The 
BOS is not operational at the present time.  
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amongst those approvals were some of the strongest supporters of the BOS, including 
Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. 
In 2010, CAF approved US$ 4.8 billion for the infrastructure sector, especially in the 
energy and road areas. These approvals represented 45.5% of the total, of which 34.9% was 
directed to support economic infrastructure projects, and the remaining 10.5% was aimed at 
financing integration infrastructure projects among countries. These numbers reaffirm CAF’s 
commitment to financing infrastructure at the national level but under a framework that 
embraces regional integration. CAF’s work at the regional level also goes beyond financing and 
includes the involvement of the institution in cooperation programs’ organizations and 
secretariats that jointly promote regional integration. These programs included projects 
undertaken with Unasur, the OAS, CAN’s General Secretariat, the Andean Parliament, and the 
Common Market Group of Mercosur amongst others (CAF AR, 2010-2012). 
 During this last decade, the continuous participation of Enrique Garcia in all regional 
presidential summits, as well as his presence and permanent technical support in monitoring the 
region’s multilateral agenda, allowed CAF to be an active participant in the consolidation of 
priority projects in the integration objectives of its shareholder countries. Meanwhile, 
governments have recognized CAF’s relevance at the regional level within and beyond the 
dominant discussion on how to carry out regional cooperation. For example, although the 
infrastructure committee (Cosiplan) of Unasur took some distance from RFIs’ input in this area 
(see Chapter 6), the financial committee of Unasur agreed unanimously to strengthen CAF. 
During the first meeting of the financial committee—which comprised the central bank 
governors of the region who for the most part also attend CAF’s high-level meetings and 
assemblies—it was agreed to push CAF forward as an instrument of South American political 
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and economic integration (Business News Americas, 2011). Moreover, during 2011, Paraguay 
fulfilled the requirements to become a full member, bringing in the final Mercosur member state.  
In the last years and especially since the post-2008 crisis, CAF has also tried to 
strengthen its relationship with East Asian countries. For instance, in 2012, CAF and the 
Japanese Bank for International Co-operation (JBIC) signed an agreement to finance Latin 
American projects in the energy, mining, railway and transport sectors, as well as environmental 
sustainability. The alliance comes shortly after CAF announced a partnership with German 
development bank KfW to support projects working to mitigate the effects of climate change. In 
addition, Garcia was in Beijing in 2012 and met with economic, financial, regional, business and 
academic authorities such as the vice president of the Central Bank, Yi Gang and the Vice- 
President of the Export-Import Bank of China (Eximbank), Liu Liange, amongst others (CAF 
News, 2012). CAF also signed an Agreement of Understanding with the Institute of Latin 
American Studies (ILAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Moreover, Garcia was 
invited as a special guest to the annual assembly of the Asian Development Bank in 2012. 
Therefore, infrastructure, with its tangible results and high demand during the last 
decade, has been of great importance to country members. The projects that the entity supports in 
this area have been previously identified and assigned strategic importance by the countries. 
Table 8 shows the infrastructure portfolio by country from 1997-2012. Taking a look at the 
portfolio— which indicates materialization of projects as opposed to approvals which show 
credit agreements that do not always materialize— it is possible to appreciate which country 
members have actually accessed CAF’s infrastructure funding more often. Countries with 
different ideological positions towards integration and distinct development paths have been 
equally eager to obtain CAF’s funds. Venezuela is the country with the largest share of 
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infrastructure portfolio (US$ 8 billion between 2009-2012 or 24% during that period) and it has 
doubled the dollar amount from 2005-2008 to 2009-2012. Other countries with large increases in 
the 2009-2012 period include Peru, Brazil and Bolivia, countries that as previously mentioned, 
have put infrastructure as a national priority within their development agenda. 
Table 8: Infrastructure portfolio by country 
 
Source: Data provided by the CAF's Country Programs VP in November 2012, compiled by the 
author. 
 
5.5. Infrastructure’s parallel agenda: knowledge components and environmental 
management 
5.5.1. CAF as knowledge broker 
CAF’s work in the region has not been limited to financing projects. It also is reflected in the 
development of a distinct framework carried out to identify and structure the infrastructure 
agenda of a region from an institutional point of view, while providing a platform for countries’ 
and multilateral agencies’ discussions. As infrastructure was reentering the regional agenda—
and in many cases becoming a priority in various countries’ national programs—CAF began 
framing its role as a knowledge broker in this area. This role has been briefly explored by Santiso 
and Whitehead (2006), emphasizing how CAF is locally grounded and continuously interacts 
within the technocratic and political figures of the region.  
BOLIVIA COLOMBIA ECUADOR PERU VENEZUELA ARGENTINA BRAZIL URUGUAY PARAGUAY OTHER
%	of	Total	
Portfolio
97-00 733 713 1497 412 1756 0 795 0 0 36 37.3%
01-04 1214 2245 2101 1276 2362 0 1201 40 121 132 41.6%
05-08 2373 2021 2197 1590 3967 1281 787 325 154 359 42.4%
09-12 4109 2865 2689 5554 8058 5039 2165 1169 199 1779 58.7%
USD	Millions	-	Transportation,	Telecommunications	&	Electricity
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Since its creation, CAF has published reports on the status of physical integration in 
South America, but it was in 2004 when it formally created a unit promoting a technical dialogue 
with its shareholder countries on infrastructure at a sectoral level. As such, CAF strengthened its 
efforts regarding the dissemination of best practices in relevant management and investment 
areas. Besides sponsoring workshops and seminars, CAF began publishing a series of bulletins 
on the status of this sector in each country, while launching programs to improve performance in 
specific areas (CAF AR, 2004). The sectoral reports present an analysis of the regulatory 
frameworks, institutional arrangements and indicators of the evolution of diverse sectors, as well 
as tendencies and proposals being considered in the industry. For example, among the topics 
published during its inaugural year were: Analysis of the Electrical Sector (Bolivia and 
Venezuela), Analysis of the Telecommunications Sector (Colombia and Venezuela), Analysis of 
the Transportation Sector (Bolivia and Peru), and Analysis of the Waterworks Sector (Ecuador 
and Venezuela). Moreover, CAF carries out and compiles technical studies in different areas that 
are usually required by member countries. In 2012, 67% of these technical studies were in the 
area of transportation and 22% in the area of social development (Terrazas, 2012). 
CAF’s research agenda has been conceived within the framework of regional cooperation 
and with a global perspective to study the requirements of shareholder countries. Throughout the 
years, CAF has sustained discussions on a wide range of topics with public figures and experts 
from the region and from abroad. At the same time, it has begun to increase its presence in the 
many forums that deal with debates surrounding long-term development (CAF, 2010a). CAF 
plays a visible role in the region as a channel of communication and networking among country 
members, while trying to promote interaction between several government actors on specific 
policy issues relevant for the infrastructure matters of the member countries. This takes place 
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through interactive conferences or more focused meetings between the top management of the 
institution and its shareholders’ board. 
 Further, in order to reinforce and strengthen its participation in the different areas of 
sustainable development and integration, CAF counts on a series of strategic programs that 
complement its business activities and which provide both financial and non-financial services. 
These programs—mainly created by CAF, but at times complemented or managed by other IOs– 
have a regional scope and range from strengthening integration, developing physical 
infrastructure and increasing competitiveness, to promoting more equitable, humane and 
participative societies in a context of democratic governance. Starting in the mid-2000s, CAF’s 
activities have been aimed at the following fields of action with specific initiatives listed below: 
 Sustainable physical and logistic integration 
o IIRSA – Initiative for Regional Infrastructure Integration in South America 
o Plan Puebla Panama 
 Competitiveness, productivity and international insertion 
o PAC – Andean Competitiveness Program 
o Kemmerer Program for the Development and Integration of Financial Markets 
o Research Program in Development Topics 
 Governance, human development and equity 
o Governance Program 
o  SMEs and Microfinance 
o Cultural and Community Development Program 
o PDHS – Sustainable Human Development Program 
 Sustainable environmental agenda 
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o PLAC – Latin American Carbon Program 
o BioCAF – Biodiversity Program 
o Sustainable Development Program in Financial Institutions 
o PREANDINO – Andean Program for Disaster Risk Prevention and Mitigation 
In 2011, CAF began publishing a new report called “IDeAL.” Initially, this report was 
prepared at the request of the Ibero-American General Secretariat (ESGIB, in Spanish) to be 
presented in the XXI Ibero-American Summit of Chiefs of State and Government held in 
Asunción, Paraguay. The goal of this first report, called “Infrastructure in the Comprehensive 
Development of Latin America,” was to provide a strategic diagnosis of infrastructure in the 
region, by analyzing the main components and by taking into account the strong disparities 
between countries, infrastructure sectors, and even regions within the same country. It was 
expected that this diagnosis would contribute to “recognize the current situation, identify and 
determine the scope of the needs for its development, and propose a strategic agenda for coming 
years” (CAF IDeAL, 2011).  
According to Antonio Sosa, CAF’s VP of Infrastructure, the IDeAL report was the result 
of simultaneous events. First, the more CAF’s portfolio expanded in the area of infrastructure, 
the more CAF staff realized that it had to enter the debates on the creation of knowledge (and 
later its dissemination) in some infrastructure sectors that it was financing. Moreover, CAF had 
begun to hire and retain specialists in infrastructure, especially in the area of urban 
transportation, since roads constituted a large component of CAF’s approvals. As such, CAF had 
identified the need to “research more systematically the state of infrastructure in the region and 
to see how things are developing and what is being improved or not” (Antonio Juan Sosa, 
personal interview, October 18, 2012).  
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In 2012, CAF introduced another IDeAL report (discussed briefly at the beginning of this 
chapter) in collaboration with ECLAC. This report represented a joint effort to begin measuring 
the levels of infrastructure investment in the region. Although some economic studies published 
in the first half of the 2000s began studying investment behaviour in infrastructure in Latin 
America, there has been a striking absence of detailed analysis and mapping regarding the status 
of infrastructure as previously mentioned in this chapter. CAF and ECLAC have carried out a 
preliminary detailed study with staff from ten countries in order to delineate an overall 
perspective on the investment effort in the region. CAF and ECLAC suggested that countries in 
the region are increasing their investment and that public sectors are making a great effort, while 
the private sector participates in only some infrastructure sectors. The first results are presented 
in the fourth chapter of the IDeAL 2012 and it is the first installment of an effort that would try 
to cover all the countries in the region in upcoming years. To achieve this objective, the available 
information in the official data sources of the countries was compiled and systematized (starting 
with those which offered the greatest facility to obtain information) and interviews in the 
different ministries were carried out (CAF IDeAL, 2012). 
 
5.5.2 Environmental agenda 
Despite the existence of an environmental agenda—and of the institution’s substantive 
improvements to its own procedures for evaluation and supervision of environmental aspects in 
loan operations since the mid-2000s— CAF’s environmental policy and actions lag behind other 
RFIs. Its institutional environmental principles are fairly general and do not usually include 
formal obligations for borrower countries, which is very different from the detailed policies and 
guidelines at the WB and IADB. A key CAF environmental principle states that the bank 
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“respects, cooperates and coordinates the national policies, strategies and standards of its 
shareholder countries, as determinant elements that guide its institutional environmental 
management practices” (CAF, 2013c).  
Therefore, for CAF, the priority and main objective is to ensure that a borrowing country 
follows its national environmental standards during the project duration. Yet, according to its 
environmental strategic policy, CAF (2010b) calls for the application of additional precautions or 
selects internationally accepted technical standards where necessary. Moreover, only eleven 
private banks in Latin America have signed the Equator Principles. These are a risk management 
framework adopted by financial institutions for determining, assessing and managing 
environmental and social risk in projects. As such, there are not many chances that CAF would 
end up co-financing a project with a bank that has committed to providing a minimum standard 
for due diligence. Furthermore, throughout the years, CAF has been emphatic in distancing itself 
from any potential environmental damages during a project’s execution: 
As a result of the review of the environmental and social assessment for operations, CAF 
is seeking to internalize in its operations’ budgets any environmental and social 
management costs needed to tackle environmental and social development impacts and 
opportunities. It is down to the client to adopt the necessary measures to avoid, control, 
mitigate, and offset any environmental and social impacts and risks (CAF 2010b, 
emphasis added). 
 
In 2008, CAF established a one-time dialogue with the Bank Information Center (BIC), 
an international NGO monitoring RFIs’ activities, and provided the BIC a variety of documents 
with regard to CAF’s environmental and social policy. The BIC also conducted twelve 
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interviews with current and former CAF officials. After analyzing a variety of documents, 
Hamerschlag (2008)—the BIC’s report author—concluded amongst other things that: 
 [There was] a weak and inadequate implementation of CAF’s policies… 
 The environmental and social studies are often concluded in a later stage of the process or 
after the project has been approved, limiting their impact on the design of the project 
 [There was] failure to condition funding on compliance with specific parameters of social 
plans and environmental management that would reduce and mitigate the damage caused 
by the project… 
 [CAF] does not follow its peers’ safeguards, at least in a very highly sensitive project… 
 The weak [national] institutional capacity is overlooked when evaluating projects, which 
leads to disregarding and potentially solving this important project risk… 
 [CAF has] lax environmental standards (Hamerschlag, 2008, p.viii). 
 
Various CAF officials, including Enrique Garcia, said during 2012 interviews for this 
project that they thought that several of the BIC’s criticisms in 2008 were valid. Nevertheless, 
Garcia argued that: 
The criticism is valid, but I go back to the point that many of the required disclosures that 
the IADB and the WB have are because the donor countries ask for that, while in CAF that 
is not the case...in any case now we are improving to have better [environmental] 
information, because we are now obsessed with improving that (Enrique Garcia, personal 
interview, November 19, 2012). 
Similarly, another official emphasized that adopting environmental standards at CAF has been a 
slower process because other RFIs have had to deal with both pressure from different interest 
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groups in Washington and from donor country members, who are significantly represented on 
the boards. This official remarked that that kind of motivation does not exist in CAF: “Within 
CAF, countries do not control each other; they do not get in the way of each other’s projects. It 
has been CAF that has put in place stricter environmental standards, not the countries. At the 
same time, countries have begun to improve these standards themselves” (CAF official, personal 
interview, October 19, 2012). 
Moreover, Humphrey (2012), based on 2007-8 documents, suggests that while CAF’s 
environmental strategy refers to numerous documents involved in the approval process, none of 
those documents are publicly available (nor, indeed, does the CAF have any transparency policy 
regarding public access to information, unlike the IADB and the World Bank). In recent years, 
CAF has made some improvements to its Environmental Unit (DMA, in Spanish) and within its 
departmental policies. From November 2012, the DMA became part of the Vice-presidency of 
Development Strategies and Public Policies (previously they were part of the Vice-presidency of 
Social Development) as part as a process of strategic revision. This process also includes a 
revised and updated “Manual of Environmental and Social Monitoring and Assessment for 
Credit Operations, Infrastructure and Social and Environmental Development”11 which seems 
more extensive and detailed than any previous document. Although the extent to which this 
document has been put in practice could not be confirmed, in theory—according to one of the 
latest versions of the Manual: 
The DMA…is responsible for the direction and execution of the EIA process and 
environmental and social monitoring credit operations and in this context it should work to 
ensure the proper application of the criteria, tools and procedures in the manual. Also, the 
                                                        
11 During an interview with a senior official of the VP of Development Strategies and Public Policies, the author 
was given access to various ongoing drafts of the manual.  
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DMA must issue timely technical reviews of the conditions and recommendations to which 
the financing of credit operations, and, in general, all other related environmental and social 
issues, will be subject to in instances where it is required (CAF, 2012b, p.9. author’s 
translation, emphasis added).  
 
However, the DMA is still a small unit and therefore limited for assessing all the 
environmental complexities that projects within and outside IIRSA projects demand, especially 
when taking into account its large loan and equity investments portfolio of US$ 16.5 billion in 
2012. With a team of about 20 people12 (although CAF often supports the unit with staff 
advisors), it is still debatable how a team of this size can ensure a comprehensive integration and 
ongoing monitoring of social and environmental concerns. Nevertheless, some national country 
officials have started to notice CAF’s changes regarding its environmental policies. According to 
an Ecuadorian public official, CAF has been lately trying to enforce a similar mandate as that of 
the IADB when it comes to environmental safeguards. This official mentioned a specific case 
when CAF did not grant the Ecuadorian government a loan after three months of evaluating an 
infrastructure project because one of the main roads was planned to be built very close to a 
national park. Ultimately, that project was financed with loans from the Chinese government 
(senior official, Ecuadorian Ministry or Transportation and Public Works, personal interview, 
November 14, 2012). Moreover, this official mentioned that the dynamics with the IADB and 
also with CAF lately resemble the following analogy:  
It is like if an individual wants to get a loan for buying a car, and she wants to get a 
Toyota but the agency (in this case the IADB and CAF) declines the loan application 
                                                        
12 A senior official of the VP of Development Strategies and Public Policies mentioned that the DMA is composed 
by a team of about 20 people during an interview on November 26, 2012. 
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because it thinks the client should get a Mercedes instead. The RFIs are trying to often 
tell us how projects should be built and they add too many components and restrictions. 
CAF didn’t use to be like that but it is increasingly acting like the IADB. We [the 
governments] already have our own national standards and comply with them (senior 
official, Ecuadorian Ministry or Transportation and Public Works, personal interview, 
November 14, 2012). 
 
Ultimately, it seems that CAF is becoming more demanding than in previous years when 
it comes to environmental policies, at least in the eyes of member countries. Nevertheless, the 
institution’s policies are still not comparable to the standards of other RFIs operating in the 
region. Recently, in May 2015, CAF introduced an environmental manual, as a result of a 
partnership with the Global Environment Facility (GEF): “Policy guidelines for environmental 
and social safeguards for GEF projects13” to comply with the minimum standards of GEF’s 
environmental and social safeguard policies. The institution aims to implement CAF/GEF-
funded projects and the goal of the guidelines is to protect people and their environment from 
potential adverse impacts. Key safeguard areas include: environmental and social evaluation, 
natural habitats, involuntary resettlements, indigenous peoples, pest control, cultural and physical 
resources, dam security, accountability and address of complaint and gender equity. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The 1990s was the decade that CAF decided to focus on infrastructure as its niche. Making 
infrastructure a priority in its mission has also meant that the institution has had to pay closer 
                                                        
13 GEF is a partnership for international cooperation where 183 countries work together with international institutions, civil society 
organizations and the private sector, to address global environmental issues. See http://www.caf.com/en/about-caf/what-we-do/access-to-
information/caf-gef-projects/ for more information. 
 199 
attention to the regional environment and to a certain extent, reflect the “discourse” on regional 
integration of the era. In the early 2000s, as Palestini and Agostinis (2014) suggest, Brazil 
politically constructed the “demand” for regionalism through its leadership’s persuasive ideas 
about cooperation in South America, which ultimately made state preferences converge towards 
cooperation initiatives like IIRSA in spite of low regional policy interdependencies and weak 
private sector demand for economic integration.  
Since the 2000s then, CAF has participated in regional fora beyond the Andean 
Community (which usually covered trade integration discussions). The involvement in 
infrastructure has also meant that CAF promptly joined initiatives like IIRSA, while attending a 
variety of regional meetings that ultimately contributed to the establishment of Unasur. 
Ideational motives—the idea of a South American identity or the perception that infrastructure 
was a practical channel to further integration—during the last decade have been crucial in 
supporting CAF’s activities, not only the ones related to the financing, but also those that have 
helped the institution to create and manage knowledge in infrastructure matters. CAF has also 
learnt more about its members and the different infrastructure needs that the institution can 
actually finance when taking into account governments’ priorities and demands—e.g. hydro-
electrical plants in Venezuela and municipalities’ loans in Brazil. As such, these activities are in 
line with the general idea behind the creation of regional and sub-regional institutions: they play 
specific and localized roles, which are not always covered adequately by global or even by larger 
regional institutions (Ocampo, 2006).  
 CAF’s survival can also be attributed to the institution’s commitment to country 
members, despite their different views on paths towards development and integration. Moreover, 
beyond the regional environment, CAF’s management has made sure that members feel 
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supported and that there is an ongoing flow of loans in South America, despite changing 
macroeconomic conditions in the last decade. CAF continued to lend through the global crisis 
and showed again its counter-cyclical role to the international lending community. Finally, 
compared to other RFIs, CAF still receives less scrutiny from its shareholders when it comes to 
infrastructure financing and, as such, it has less pressure to implement environmental safeguards. 
However, this is already changing as country members have experienced stricter supervision 
when it comes to environmental practices in the last few years. 
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Chapter 6. Infrastructure financing: The IIRSA experience  
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the IIRSA initiative and its members’ participation throughout the years. It 
dedicates particular attention to its first decade (2000-2010), an interesting era for integration 
with the rise of new regional commitments led by Brazil. Chapter 5 examined the ways CAF has 
engaged with the financing of infrastructure in the region and Garcia’s efforts to position this 
area at the core of its mission and actions in ensuring CAF’s growth. Conversely, this chapter 
focuses on the dynamics of CAF shareholders within a particular regional initiative, IIRSA. This 
initiative has served as a platform by which principals’ actions can be observed in more detail, as 
they relate to a changing regional environment in which Brazil led initial cooperation efforts, 
while other members consolidated their own views on infrastructure. During IIRSA’s initial 
years, the Southern Cone countries remained associate members of CAF. Yet, by mid-2000s, 
CAF updated its constitutive agreement so these countries could become full members, reflecting 
how IIRSA, a Brazilian-led project, was deemed an important element within CAF senior 
management’s agenda for infrastructure financing. 
Further, through the examination of IIRSA, this chapter demonstrates CAF’s ability to 
navigate and respond to its principals’ (both converging and diverging) interests in regard to their 
national and regional agendas for development. This has been vital for CAF’s growth and has 
been accompanied by periods in which CAF was very immersed in IIRSA’s dynamics (early 
years) and others in which the entity has taken some distance, reflecting regional preferences for 
integration (later years). As such, in recent years, CAF has referred to its involvement in IIRSA, 
more discretely; describing the initiative as one of the “networks of knowledge” the institution 
belongs to. At the same time, CAF has become a more detached advocate for the initiative, 
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especially since IIRSA became part of Unasur under the South American Council on 
Infrastructure and Planning (Cosiplan, in Spanish) in the late 2000s. But a decade ago, at the 
time IIRSA was created, CAF’s management was at the forefront of its establishment. CAF’s 
officials were energetic advocates who saw in IIRSA an opportunity to enhance CAF’s 
infrastructure agenda under a single forum that could bring South American countries together. 
IIRSA was created within the framework of open regionalism with the goal of providing 
its members a space to strengthen their economic relationships to foster intraregional trade, while 
increasing their capacity to compete in global markets. The IIRSA initiative was crafted at a time 
when multilateral debt and IMF outstanding loans were the norm in South America. By the time 
Unasur was created in 2008, however, IIRSA had formally adopted the new orientation to 
regionalism described by various academics as post-liberal (Riggirozzi & Tussie, 2012). This 
chapter analyzes then the main elements and developments of the IIRSA initiative as they relate 
to development governance in the region since 2000. This chapter first introduces a 
chronological analysis of IIRSA and its Agenda Based on Consensus (AIC, in Spanish), which 
focused on 31 strategic integration projects. Previous physical integration agendas in the region 
have been short-lived. As such, IIRSA’s first decade of work is notable, considering it has relied 
on a minimal institutional structure. However, this structure has resulted in a “non-ownership 
model” in which financing sources have become at times difficult to track and environmental 
standards, difficult to enforce. This is to a great extent due to the fact that RFIs continue to 
emphasize that the ultimate socioenvironmental responsibility of a project lies with the 
participating government(s), 
This chapter also provides an examination of what IIRSA has meant for its participants 
and critics. A detailed examination of IIRSA is needed for this work to better understand CAF’s 
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adaptability to the changing political dynamics of the region—especially in regards to Brazil’s 
role in promoting physical integration and also as it relates to the role of RFIs in providing 
financing mechanisms for its members. This chapter also shows how IIRSA got away from CAF 
in the later years, since the initiative encountered key challenges in mainly two areas. First, some 
countries wanted to limit RFI participation within the Unasur framework. Second, IIRSA 
encountered several criticisms due to the lack of clear environmental safeguards: CAF was not 
willing to take a strong stance in advocating for specific environmental guidelines, since, as seen 
in the previous chapter, the institution’s focus is limited to ensuring that a principal follows its 
own national environments legislation, without placing additional obligations on the borrower. 
IIRSA is currently supported by at least half a dozen governments that came to power 
openly holding an ideological critique of neoliberalism and multilateral institutions (See Table 7 
on Chapter 5). Many of these governments have distanced themselves by now from the IMF by 
paying off the majority of their outstanding debts while looking for new sources of financing 
such as treasury funds (ideally in national currencies) or foreign governments, in particular 
China.14As such, the changing political landscape has played a major role in shaping 
infrastructure agendas at the national and regional levels while presenting CAF with new 
opportunities and challenges for framing and demonstrating its relevance in the region.  
 
6.2 IIRSA 2000-2010: A decade reflecting South America’s changing political economy 
6.2.1 Origins 
                                                        
14 In December 2005, Argentina and Brazil announced that they would pay off $9.8 billion and $15.5 billion respectively. Uruguay, Panama, 
Ecuador and Venezuela followed suit. In 2007 President Rafael Correa in Ecuador ordered the expulsion of the World Bank's representative in 
the country. The rejection of external oversight was coupled with social mobilization, a new focus on empowerment of indigenous people, and 
the call to enact solidarity on a regional scale. See Tussie (2014) for more information. 
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As previously mentioned, IIRSA has its origins in the Cardoso government in Brazil, which 
brought forward the concept of territorial integration and development hubs for integration. With 
the intent to improve inter-regional interconnection within the Brazilian territory, the Cardoso 
government launched the idea of planning investment and certain public expenditure items in 
terms of territorial integration and development hubs. In the words of the main promoter and 
executor of the idea, José Silveira, who served as Strategic Planning and Investment Secretary of 
the Ministry of Planning during Cardoso’s administration: 
An integration and development hub is not a transport corridor, but rather a geo-
economic space sharing common features, where there are demands and opportunities 
that must be met via integrated actions. Such actions must be carried out in the fields of 
economic infrastructure (transport, energy, telecommunications, water resources), social 
development (education, health, sanitation, housing), information and knowledge 
(professional qualification, technological development, information access and 
dissemination) and environmental management (Silveira quoted in Iglesias 2008, p. 151).  
 
In 1997, in order to advance towards the definition of the idea, the Brazilian government 
commissioned several studies to identify integration and development hubs in Brazil. These 
studies surveyed the country’s economic infrastructure network in order to detect the areas where 
there were imbalances between demand for and supply of the different components of such 
infrastructure. The analysis of the mechanisms to meet those demands, from the conceptual 
perspective of the hubs, resulted in a portfolio of private and public investment opportunities. 
The national government included in its Pluriannual 2000-2003 Investment Plan some of the 
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projects and actions identified in the studies on hubs. That investment plan eventually became 
Avanc ̧a Brasil (Iglesias, 2008). 
Yet, the Brazilian government determined that it not only had an inter-regional 
connection problem within its territory; its transport infrastructure did not favour trade within the 
sub-region. This was certainly not just a Brazilian problem, but a general issue throughout South 
America. In the late 1990s, within the prevalent context of democratization, conflict resolution, 
intra-regional trade growth, and initial FTAA negotiations in the region, the Brazilian 
government launched IIRSA in an attempt to enhance the connectivity of its domestic hubs with 
its neighbours’ transport and infrastructure systems. In the view of the Brazilian designers of 
IIRSA’s proposal, the South American integration hubs pursued two objectives: first, 
overcoming border connection problems with neighbouring countries, and second, taking the 
Brazilian integration and development hubs as exemplary, building a shared prosperity space in 
the region from a sustainable development perspective (Iglesias, 2008). Brazil saw in IIRSA an 
opportunity to bring countries together to discuss a common but important problem: the 
advancement of infrastructure as a region. 
IIRSA was also the result of a more active Brazilian policy in the region, as a response to 
U.S. efforts to establish the FTAA. These efforts represented a challenge to Brazil’s geopolitical 
and economic preferences within and outside South America and vis-à-vis the U.S (Burges, 
2009). The American government’s goals to establish the FTAA gathered immediate interest 
within South American nations, which were led at the time (the 1990s) by governments aligned 
to strengthen trade liberalization and foreign investment attraction. According to Palestini and 
Agostinis (2014), in fact, already in 1994, the Argentinean government of President Carlos 
Menem expressed a strong interest in a trade agreement with the U.S. in spite of its commitment 
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to Mercosur (Palestini & Agostinis, 2014). Facing the risk of regional polarization, the Cardoso 
administration understood that in order to protect and advance the country’s economic interests 
in the FTAA negotiations it was necessary to gather support within the region, preventing the 
U.S. from carrying out bilateral negotiations with each country and promoting instead inter-bloc 
negotiations (Palestini & Agostinis, 2014). 
At the same time, within a complex and changing regional environment, IIRSA seemed 
like an attractive initiative for participating countries: its first novel concept was to conceive 
South America as a region with its own identity. Until then, the integration processes had been 
focused on one hand in Latin America, and on the other hand in very limited sub-regional 
schemes (Nerys Fernandez, 2010). In the 2000 Brasilia Communiqué, the concept of South 
America was launched as a way for CAN and Mercosur to converge (and to a certain extent for 
Guyana and Surinam to join a regional initiative of this magnitude for the first time). This type of 
convergence would allow for South America to be seen as a united subcontinent with its own 
identity. As such, the Community of South American Nations was born, and together with 
IIRSA, they would become fundamental for the creation of Unasur.  
The Community of South American Nations was Brazil’s first attempt to articulate a 
geopolitical response, based on the idea of a South American bloc, to the U.S. hemispheric 
hegemonic projection (Palestini & Agostinis, 2014). An additional strategic element was 
represented by the fact that IIRSA situated the physical territory as the focal action point for 
regionalism and as such, as a priority for regional cooperation. Brazil drove, then, the IIRSA 
initiative not only at the coordination level, but also at the ideational level surrounding the 
initiative with speeches on identity, physical integration and pragmatic development. It is here 
where Burges’ (2008) conceptualization of “consensual hegemony” is more clearly appreciated. 
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Brazilian officials played a key role in formulating ideas and policy proposals that attracted other 
South American nations’ attention and eventually made state preferences converge towards 
regional cooperation.  
Before IIRSA, even though countries held some internal plans to improve physical 
connectivity, this was mainly at the bilateral level or through Mercosur and CAN—but neither of 
these initiatives had promoted linking the entire continent. According to a former IADB 
consultant who has vast experience in trade logistics and transport facilitation issues in South 
America, governments were very used to the same discourses from Mercosur and CAN about 
physical integration without much novelty in the projects these initiative promoted: 
[Governments were used to listen to] the same border integration projects. But in IIRSA, 
the countries thought that since three multilateral institutions were involved there would 
be financing opportunities. When there are financing opportunities, the officials begin to 
listen…IIRSA began first as an initiative to solve a technical problem of how to carry out 
tangible physical integration with the tacit understanding that multilateral institutions 
were going to facilitate somehow the financing of identified projects (former IADB and 
IIRSA consultant, personal interview, September 12, 2012).  
 
IIRSA offered the opportunity then to set up a more ambitious plan that encompassed 
transportation, energy and telecommunications—all of them viewed as key elements of the 
territory for both governments and RFIs like CAF alike—and subsequently to further the 
development policy of the involved nations. IIRSA’s transportation projects would meet long-
standing regional hopes for better market access, reducing transportation costs and providing a 
financing mechanism for needed road building and future maintenance. 
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6.2.2 Institutional structure and initial dynamics: 2000-2004 
IIRSA’s founding document is the 2000-2010 Montevideo Action Plan (MAP), developed by the 
IADB, CAF and Fonplata at the request of the South American presidents. That blueprint set out 
the core components of the IIRSA intervention strategy and organizational arrangements to 
integrate multiple sectors of the region’s economy. The MAP set forth three guiding principles 
for the initiative’s action: (i) strengthening national investment planning and coordination among 
countries, (ii) standardizing and harmonizing regulatory and institutional aspects and (iii) 
developing a portfolio of projects that encourages private sector participation and innovative 
financing schemes. Despite a pragmatic approach that framed IIRSA within a ten-year Action 
Plan (2000-2010) and the extensive groundwork that had already been laid—especially for 
overland transport links, the MAP did not spell out a set of specific objectives or targets as 
quantitative benchmarks against which to assess IIRSA’s advances (OVE, 2008). 
IIRSA structured its work at three levels. First, its directorate level is based around the 
Executive Direction Committee (CDE, in Spanish), formed by the infrastructure or planning 
ministers of South American countries. Their role is that of deciding the strategic lines of work 
and approving action plans. Second, the executive level is structured around Executive Technical 
Groups (GTEs, in Spanish), which are integrated by senior officials and experts named by the 
countries. There is one GTE for each Integration and Development Axis (EID, in Spanish), with 
the purpose of analyzing specific topics among countries and carrying out concrete actions at the 
multinational level. A third level is integrated by representatives from the IADB, CAF and 
Fonplata, the Technical Coordination Committee (CCT, in Spanish).  
The mandate of the RFIs involved was to coordinate joint activities and provide technical 
support to countries. The decision originally was that the Technical Coordination Committee 
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would have a collegial secretariat (all the participating RFIs) permanently based at the IADB’s 
Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL) headquarters in 
Buenos Aires. The most operational level would contain the GTEs, IIRSA’s most technical level, 
responsible for ensuring that Technical Coordination Committee’s guidance (and ultimately, 
CDE’s) is heeded. A further subsequent decision made INTAL itself the Technical Coordination 
Committee’s secretariat, with a mandate to perform all the logistical tasks needed for the 
programming and delivery of activities within IIRSA’s work plan. The decision to officially 
bring in national coordinators came later in 2005 and coincided with a new phase of institutional 
innovation, characterized primarily by the training of governmental technical staff members and 
an agenda of meetings of the national coordinators and GTEs in order to move further toward 
IIRSA’s goals. According to IIRSA’s website,15
 
the national coordinator is: “...responsible for 
articulating the participation of the different ministries and government institutions involved in 
IIRSA and, eventually, that of other relevant sectors of society (private sector, sub-national 
governments, academia, NGOs, etc).”  
The challenge for IIRSA was (and continues to be) then to create an executive level 
equipped to manage this multi-sectoral, multidisciplinary enterprise which would assemble 
representatives of the three infrastructure sector ministries as well as senior finance and 
integration policy officials. The proposed organizational structure was envisaged as a way to 
address the complex range of issues on the IIRSA agenda. Accordingly, both representatives of 
the Executive Technical Groups and of the Executive Direction Committee were to be selected 
on the basis of the expertise needed for the issues in question. Conspicuously absent from the 
approved IIRSA organizational apparatus were participation avenues for agencies and 
                                                        
15 See the document “Anexo 10” of IIRSA’s 7th meeting of the CDE, held in Asunción, Paraguay on December 1st-2nd 2005, about the 
establishment of National Coordination in IIRSA. 
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institutions that had been very prominent in integration infrastructure consensus building, 
notably the Latin American Integration Association (Aladi, in Spanish), the Latin American 
Energy Organization (Olade, in Spanish), and ECLAC (OVE, 2008). Nor were any formal 
coordination mechanisms devised for IIRSA dealings with regional integration schemes such as 
CAN and Mercosur. And, lastly, when IIRSA was launched there was no provision in its 
structure for formal avenues for civil society organization or private sector input (OVE, 2008). 
 
Figure 4. IIRSA’s institutional structure 
 
Source: IIRSA 2011. “IIRSA Ten Years Later: Achievement and Challenges.” 
 
Furthermore, during the first years of the initiative, South America was divided into 
Integration and Development Axes, with each axis discussing and evaluating infrastructure 
integration projects. There are currently ten Integration and Development Axes being 
implemented within the scope of the IIRSA: the Amazon Axis; the Andean Axis; the Southern 
Andean Axis; the Capricorn Axis; the Guyanese Axis; the Paraguay-Paraná Waterway Axis; the 
Central Interoceanic Axis; the Mercosur-Chile Axis; the Peru-Brazil-Bolivia Axis, and; the 
Southern Axis. A GTE was appointed for each of the identified Integration and Development 
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Hubs, to deal with sector-specific issues such as regional energy markets, air, maritime, and 
multimodal transport, and border crossings, and for financing matters. The goal was that IIRSA 
would contribute towards greater regional approximation by discussing concrete aspects of 
physical integration, which could be used to support the anticipated increases in intraregional 
trade, particularly due to approximation efforts between Mercosur and the CAN. IIRSA would 
also address the issue of regional trade, taking into account all of the potential of promising 
Asian markets by allowing, for example, grains produced in Brazil to go through ports in the 
Pacific by building roads through the middle of the continent (Freitas Cuoto, 2007). 
During the first three years of IIRSA, there was an abundance of meetings and discourses 
trying to define the projects that would be under its umbrella. The fact that three RFIs were 
supporting the initiative generated high expectations about the ability to implement infrastructure 
projects that were already part of each South American country’s agenda. The use of an “IIRSA 
seal”, ensuring that differentiated treatment would be given to projects that were part of the 
initiative, was also discussed. In fact, during this period, country officials used to often remark 
that because a project was part of IIRSA, it was often prioritized in the local infrastructure 
agenda as it related to planning and possible expeditious financing (former IADB and IIRSA 
consultant, personal interview, September 17, 2012).  In this sense, states were enthusiastic to 
embrace IIRSA since it was presented as a “pragmatic alternative” to consolidate cooperation, 
while also materializing their national agendas. As examined by Yoshimatsu (2008, 2010) in the 
context of East Asia, states that adopt the pragmatic approach in diplomatic regional initiatives 
generally seek to avoid the political tension that derives from abstract values and principles. The 
idea that infrastructure was a technical and functional area for cooperation in which practical 
outcomes could be carried out was enticing and it was attractive to support the Brazilian 
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leadership’s desire to deepen physical integration. 
During the first years of IIRSA, CAF participated in helping the initiative compile an up-
to-date inventory of infrastructure projects. In terms of financing, CAF had some opportunities to 
finance some projects, while enhancing its links with countries like Bolivia and Brazil. CAF’s 
own financing within IIRSA (in terms of approvals), from June 2001 through December 2002, 
amounted to $517.8 million for nine projects in Bolivia (3), Brazil (1), Colombia (1), Ecuador 
(3) and Uruguay (1). These projects had an estimated total cost of US$ 1.22 billion; therefore, 
CAF was providing about 42% of the total financing (CAF AR, 2002). The two largest projects 
that were approved at the time were in Bolivia and aimed at improving Bolivia-Brazil 
connections and gas pipelines. CAF approved a US$ 100 million loan for the Regional 
Integration Highway Corridor Santa Cruz-Puerto Suarez. For Garcia, this project represented a 
key link in IIRSA’s interoceanic corridor to which CAF was committed (CAF News, 2002). 
CAF saw this project as strategic for the institution since its focus could be framed in terms of 
enhancing connectivity within the region. This was also a very visible project in terms of both 
national and regional impact and, through it, CAF was assisting an original shareholder 
(Bolivia), while helping improve transportation with the regional leader. According to CAF: 
With this loan, the CAF is making a decisive contribution to realizing the old dream of 
connecting eastern Bolivia with Brazil, while building the backbone of the Brazil-
Bolivia-Paraguay-Peru-Chile inter-oceanic corridor under the IIRSA initiative. In the 
recent past, CAF has contributed to the financing of another old dream of Bolivia: the 
Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline, which is now becoming a reality on a route near and parallel 
to the Santa Cruz- Puerto Suárez road corridor (CAF News, 2002). 
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Besides loan approvals, CAF began supporting countries that were interested in enhancing their 
participation in IIRSA.  For example, CAF launched an intensive effort to liaise with the 
Peruvian public sector agencies involved with the IIRSA initiative to push ahead with the cross-
sector integration projects in infrastructure (CAF AR, 2001; CAF AR, 2012). In addition, CAF 
approved $2.5 million in technical cooperation grants for South American integration, in support 
of planning, the preparation of studies, and institutional strengthening activities related to IIRSA. 
 
6.2.3 The Agenda Based on Consensus (AIC), reform and challenges: 2004—2008 
By 2004, after three years of activities heavily focused on the development of inventories, 
projects, studies, diagnostic and planning exercises, there was a clear perception among 
participants that IIRSA needed a change of agenda. It was imperative to move to a phase of 
stronger and faster implementation, especially of those projects with high integration 
components. The opportunity was deemed to be the right time to mark a watershed between 
planning and implementation, thus allowing IIRSA to move on to an execution stage with a full 
picture perspective, building upon the planning effort based on consensus that had been 
completed (IIRSA, 2010). According to IIRSA (2010), the fact that some countries were 
experiencing fiscal constraints, as well as limited private sector participation in infrastructure, 
meant that a clear focus on a limited set of strategic projects for integration was essential, since 
this enhanced the possibility of execution and prioritization by governments. This was the 
rationale behind the creation of the Agenda Based on Consensus (AIC, in Spanish) according to 
IIRSA’s participants. 
 However, the IADB’s Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE)’s analysis presents a 
different perspective on the creation of the AIC. According to the OVE (2008),  
 214 
The creation of Consensus Agenda was headed up by the IADB, backed by Fonplata, and 
strongly opposed by the CAF. 16  The Agenda’s ascribed strategic objective was to 
“enhance visibility of the project implementation phase” and thereby address negative 
perceptions among IIRSA authorities and key stakeholders regarding the Initiative’s slow 
implementation pace. This would suggest that the objectives behind the Consensus 
Agenda’s construction were fundamentally political-strategic, as reflected in the above-
cited [internal] communication…according to which the project selection criteria were 
those that would assure execution of the portfolio—mature projects, all-country 
participation, and project visibility (p.11, emphasis added). 
 
According to IIRSA’s official documents, the resulting agenda was the product of a 
combination of technical and political criteria. The 2005-2010 AIC was ultimately composed by 
a set of 31 integration projects. These projects required an estimated investment of US$ 14 
billion and the AIC was approved by IIRSA’s CDE in November 2004 and presented to the 
Presidents of South America Summit in Cusco on December 2004. In this regard, the AIC was 
perceived as instrumental in the “sealing” of national commitments to the strategic projects 
included in it and endorsed by a Presidential Summit (IIRSA, 2010). The first infrastructure 
project to be finalized was the bi-national bridge over the Acre River between Peru and Brazil, 
which was inaugurated in 2006. In order to support the implementation of the AIC, a decision 
was made to adopt intensive and specific management of results-oriented projects, the main 
element of which was the establishment of a special project monitoring system known as the 
Strategic Management Information System (SIGE). The SIGE was a tool designed for project 
                                                        
16 Although CAF officials interviewed for this dissertation did not confirm this fact, some interviewees mentioned that CAF has always 
preferred to present itself as a “technical” institution which does not dictate agendas and also which tries to distance itself from political 
motivations (and possible propaganda) in the pursue of national infrastructure agendas. 
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management generating information and monitoring mechanisms for the involved government 
agencies contributing to overcome the obstacles that may arise during projects’ execution 
(IIRSA, 2010). 
However, key factors required for the intensive management of strategic projects to work 
properly were absent from the initiative (IIRSA, 2010). Even though the starting point of the 
AIC was the support pledged by the Executive Direction Committee’s ministers and a summit 
attended by heads of state, the application of the results-oriented intensive management scheme 
at the multilateral level of the initiative failed to become consolidated and its support tool, SIGE, 
was progressively abandoned. A main reason why SIGE failed is because mechanisms of 
compliance were in place in each country on a sovereign basis, and therefore could not be 
enforced within the IIRSA initiative. As such, since financing was not tied to the following of 
SIGE, government authorities did not feel the need to use it (IIRSA, 2010).  Moreover, the 
management of the AIC projects (and of SIGE) remained at the intermediate governmental levels 
of each country, and failed to reach the political decision-making level of the process, 
represented by the Executive Direction Committee’s ministers. A visible shortcoming was then 
that the project monitoring and management capability of the AIC did not rely on a management 
team having the capacity to serve as a bridge between project execution and government 
decision-making levels. Although several national coordinators worked toward this aim, they did 
not always belong to the agencies in charge of executing the projects (IIRSA, 2010). 
 By 2010, 61% of the projects in the AIC were being executed, as compared to 32% in 
2005, and of those, 6.5% of them were completed (IIRSA, 2010). The breakdown by number of 
active projects was as follows, according to IIRSA (2010): 2 projects had been completed, 15 
had progressed properly (facing minor difficulties of various types, attributable to the very 
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characteristics of the works involved), 3 had encountered financial obstacles that have been 
overcome, another 3 had faced bureaucracy-related problems (which had been overcome thanks 
to the political willingness to solve them) and 5 had been forced to extend their design time 
frame due to a redefinition of the technical or environmental solutions adopted. From the AIC, it 
became clear that the countries’ integration agenda was progressing, though at different paces 
depending on each case (see Section 6.5.1). As such, the goal of having the AIC projects 
execution completed by late 2010 was not achieved and within countries there were different 
viewpoints in relation to the strategic importance of the AIC and as such not all government had 
dedicated agencies for project execution (IIRSA, 2010). In spite of the above-mentioned 
difficulties, the AIC leveraged somewhat the progress already made within the initiative’s larger 
portfolio and gave impetus to the agenda of IIRSA as a whole.  
In regard to the regional situation, the mid-2000s witnessed some interesting events in 
South America that affected physical integration, as described in previous chapters. These events 
included China’s increased consumption and ability to finance projects abroad, high oil prices 
and subsequent revenues for various nations, improved country financial ratings and the 
conception of the Bank of the South as an alternative and autonomous source of regional 
financing. These events had direct and indirect effects on the daily activities within IIRSA, 
including the AIC. Countries began to lose interest in broader issues within the initiative such as 
harmonization of regulatory issues or the focus on AIC projects. Instead, they were more 
preoccupied with concrete problems and potential solutions that might arise within the pre-
execution and execution levels of individual projects. 
Further, between 2004 and 2006, IIRSA went through a difficult phase due to growing 
resistance from non-state actors (see Section 6.3.4) and also because not all the recently elected 
 217 
center-left and left leaning governments were satisfied with the principles and actions of the 
initiative. These new governments were very distinct from those in power when IIRSA was 
created (when the institutional design and policy-making of IIRSA was delegated to participating 
RFIs). Although most countries in South America continued to perceive physical infrastructure 
as important to their national development agenda and were willing to dedicate resources from 
their treasuries to execute key projects, some governments—in particular, Venezuela—began to 
disagree more openly with the IIRSA initiative. Venezuela’s disagreement was also the result of 
its leadership trying to promote Alba as an alternative for alternative trade integration by 
pursuing reciprocity and redistribution in the economic relations between member countries, in 
the framework of a broader socialist political project for the region (Palestini & Agostinis, 2014).  
Starting from 2004 then, the Venezuelan government distanced itself from IIRSA by 
reducing its participation in its meeting (see Section 6.3.4). According to a state official who 
attended some IIRSA meetings later in the decade, Venezuela began associating IIRSA with 
neoliberalism and the idea that the biggest beneficiaries may be the multinationals that wanted to 
export products out of the region (Venezuelan public official, Central Bank, personal interview, 
November 6, 2012). In 2006, during the South American Community of Nations’ summit in 
Cochabamba, most governments explicitly expressed their support for IIRSA. Nevertheless, 
some national authorities expressed their concerns. Hugo Chavez openly criticized IIRSA and 
remarked that the initiative had exclusively taken into account economic factors and read to the 
other presidents a document in which civil society movements argued that IIRSA was an 
instrument of multinational companies to export South American natural resources to developed 
nations (Tautz, 2006).  
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Meanwhile, Rafael Correa—at the time elected president of Ecuador and therefore 
attending the summit as a guest—suggested that most of the 31 projects of IIRSA’s AIC should 
be reviewed. However, he supported some plans, such as building roads and ports for the export 
of Brazilian goods to the Pacific through Ecuador (Tautz, 2006). Further, Evo Morales from 
Bolivia showed some reluctance towards IIRSA by supporting an open letter from civil society 
movements. However, Morales’ deputy electricity minister at the time, Jerjes Mercado, told Inter 
Press Service that Bolivia wanted to participate in the first and so far most controversial project 
of the initiative: the construction of two power plants on the Madeira River in Brazil that would 
flood areas of Bolivia (Tautz, 2006).  
The dynamics exposed at the summit in Cochabamba are reflective of governmental 
policies prevailing in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. These governments have often attempted 
to paradoxically advance a dual discourse of social inclusion—emphasizing the need to go 
beyond economic rationales for peoples’ advancement and integration—and the need for rapid 
physical integration requiring large highway and dam projects. Therefore, while these countries 
in South America proclaim their support for alternative finance arrangements and they may 
criticize initiatives like IIRSA at times, they have not sidelined the initiative in their internal 
agendas and in fact have used it when possible to obtain financing for several large projects (see 
also Section 6.4 for projects financed). 
Therefore, although at the beginning of the decade, physical infrastructure was 
introduced to the regional agenda by the Brazilian leadership and the RFIs as the pragmatic and 
non-ideological alternative to pursue integration, by the mid-2000s, Venezuelan leadership’s 
statements regarding IIRSA suggested that it was deeply political. For an institution like CAF, it 
became even more relevant to keep itself informed of these regional developments. Although the 
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institution continued to express its commitment towards physical integration and IIRSA, senior 
officials at CAF were paying close attention to some members’ changing ideological 
perspectives regarding the initiative and integration more generally. Senior officials have 
suggested during these years that CAF was careful in how it framed publicly its support for 
physical integration: instead of expressing its institutional preferences for physical integration in 
statements that could be perceived as more political or favouring one way to integrate over 
another, CAF focused on communicating to countries its concrete actions. These included 
matters such as ongoing technical support and project approvals in this area at the regional and 
national levels (Antonio Juan Sosa, personal interview, October 18, 2012; senior CAF official, 
Infrastructure Division, personal interview, November 19, 2012). 
 Moreover, CAF dedicated extensive resources at the national level by for example 
strengthening the content of its Sectoral Reports. This was done by ensuring that CAF officials 
understood and included in the reports the projects and ideas that members defined at the time as 
short and medium-term priorities in regards to infrastructure (CAF senior official, VP of 
Development Strategies and Public Policies, personal interview, November 26, 2012). At the 
same time, in a parallel institutional agenda  (as seen in the previous chapter), it is during these 
years that CAF reformed its agreement while trying to establish closer ties with Brazilian 
officials, with the goal of ensuring Brazil’s interest and participation in CAF. Senior officials in 
the entity were busy trying to better understand the country’s evolving regional priorities, while 
ensuring that Brazil remained interested and active in CAF beyond IIRSA matters. 
In regard to IIRSA, CAF published the book “The Commitment of CAF to South 
American Integration” in 2005, which highlighted the activities of the institution in the area of 
physical infrastructure, particularly in the fields of road construction and energy, as well as the 
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scope of the projects developed within the framework of the initiative. The publication presented 
a selection of 31 infrastructure integration projects, from eight of the ten Integration and 
Development Hubs of IIRSA, which had been or were being funded by CAF and had a strategic 
impact on the broader regional integration process. In the book, Garcia remarked: 
The most important effort that CAF has been doing in the last fifteen years is aimed at 
building trans-South America infrastructure— which enhances the territory and regional 
integration. This is reflected in the significant and continued growth of [CAF’s] its 
portfolio of projects related to physical infrastructure throughout the region. These 
projects have been strategically selected in partnership with governments and the private 
sector, and its implementation has allowed to gradually reducing bottlenecks…(Garcia 
quoted in CAF, 2005b, p. 3). 
 
Despite different ideological views on integration by the Brazilian and Venezuelan 
governments, at the material level, CAF did not have any trouble finding projects to finance in 
regard to physical integration. IIRSA was giving CAF an opportunity to get involved in the 
financing and technical support of large-scale, strong-impact projects for specific countries and 
the region as a whole. The percentage of its portfolio earmarked for these projects continued to 
grow steadily on a yearly basis (CAF AR, 2005). That year, CAF led efforts to finance seven 
new investment projects in infrastructure prioritized by shareholder countries for a total amount 
of US$ 734,8 million for these newer projects. Some countries—in particular, Peru, Bolivia and 
Ecuador—kept active relationships between CAF and their ministries of infrastructure. These 
relationships were kept independently of the prevalent discourses about regional cooperation 
promoted by Brazil and Venezuela and of their own national positions in regional fora. For 
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example, according to a senior public official in Ecuador (a country that has often favoured 
Venezuelan leadership on regional cooperation) CAF was fundamental for successfully 
executing transportation projects in the Amazon and Highlands regions:  
We had a credit portfolio of US$ 254 million for a sectoral transportation program and 
more than 50% of the credit was related to IIRSA projects that were at least to be 
partially financed by CAF. We were so committed to IIRSA at the ministry in the mid-
2000s that the actual name of the credit proposals were  “IIRSA I” and “IIRSA II”…we 
had constant meetings with CAF officials during that time, especially when the country 
had mapped a project in its development agenda and it coincided with a project within 
IIRSA (Senior official, Ministry of Transportation and Public Works, personal interview, 
November 14, 2012. 
 
By 2006, according to its Annual Report, CAF had been involved in 41 out of 84 projects 
in IIRSA’s portfolio either through technical or financial support (CAF AR, 2006). In addition, 
responding to the needs of national authorities responsible for infrastructural development 
projects, in 2006 CAF placed at their disposal special funds designed to finance studies and pre-
investment work. By 2007, support was granted to finance pre–investment studies for more than 
30 projects with non–refundable contributions for close to US$ 10 million through the Fund for 
the Promotion of Sustainable Infrastructure Projects (Proinfra). By 2007, CAF had financed 46 
physical infrastructure projects that represented around US$ 4.5 billion of a total investment of 
approximately US$ 13 billion within IIRSA (CAF, 2007). 
During 2008, right before IIRSA was incorporated into the Unasur framework, CAF and 
ECLAC, as a complement to IIRSA’s institutional strengthening activities, designed and carried 
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out the first course on development and integration of the South American regional 
infrastructure. The objective of this course was to offer participating government officials a 
perspective on the political economy and challenges faced in the development of integration 
infrastructure (CAF, 2008). This was, however, the first year that CAF’s Annual Report did not 
mention IIRSA specifically when describing the physical integration projects financed by CAF. 
Although most of the projects mentioned in the report belonged to IIRSA, according to Antonio 
Juan Sosa: 
The word IIRSA stop appearing in the title of the physical integration section of Annual 
Reports, because what mattered after that time is that those projects are related to overall 
integration and not to a specific initiative. IIRSA began to move away from RFIs: it was 
more a passive than active initiative in regard to RFI participation and input. So we decided 
to stop using the word but we continued reporting physical integration projects with the 
same framework as before (Antonio Juan Sosa, CAF’s VP of Infrastructure, personal 
interview, October 18, 2012). 
 
6.2.4 Cosiplan, Unasur and IIRSA II: 2009 - present 
In 2009, under the leadership of Brazil, IIRSA became part of the recently created Unasur.  
The South American Council on Infrastructure and Planning (Cosiplan, in Spanish) was created 
at the Third Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of Unasur as a “forum for political and 
strategic discussion through consultation, evaluation, cooperation, planning and coordination of 
efforts, and articulation of programs and projects aimed at implementing the integration of 
regional infrastructure in the Unasur Member States” (Unasur, 2011). During this meeting, 
IIRSA’s member states, agreed that governments, not RFIs, should be the coordinators of 
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regional infrastructure projects, and Cosiplan would be the vehicle to coordinate physical 
integration. According to Palestini and Agostinis (2014), this change was possible because South 
American states still considered transport infrastructure as a strategic priority for the promotion 
of both national and regional agendas. Moreover, as previously highlighted, Unasur was an 
attractive option for countries due to its low demands and flexibility concerning trade matters. 
According to the 2012-2022 Action Plan, Cosiplan’s role is to obtain extensive political backing 
for activities and projects aimed at generating sustainable economic and social development in 
South America (Unasur, 2011). From 2012 on, IIRSA is defined on its website as “an 
institutional mechanism aimed at coordinating intergovernmental actions adopted by the twelve 
South American countries with a view to building a common agenda to foster projects for 
the integration of transport, energy, and communications infrastructure.” 
As such, South American governments did not renew the IADB’s mandate to serve as the 
center of coordination—the IADB also did not take the initiative to propose a renewal of its 
mandate, according to interviewees for this project—and instead, IIRSA became part of the 
Unasur’s framework for carrying out regional integration. IIRSA was designated as Cosiplan’s 
infrastructure technical forum. The 2012-2022 Action Plan also highlighted the new challenges 
that Cosiplan would have to confront, as the initiative was not within a specific regional 
initiative, independent of RFIs’ planning activities and direct support. These challenges included 
securing political support and viable funding for the project portfolio, particularly regarding the 
AIC projects; reviewing and applying territorial planning methodologies; extending and 
enhancing existing infrastructure networks among countries; ensuring greater publicity for 
infrastructure integration projects in South America, within the scope of Cosiplan; strengthening 
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the Council’s role in project execution, and progressing in sectoral processes and the 
implementation of priority projects.  
Once IIRSA fell under the Cosiplan/Unasur umbrella, the dynamics began to change 
between RFIs and participating governments. Many interviewees from RFIs define this new 
period informally as “IIRSA II.” For example, it was often mentioned how the IADB promptly 
reduced its technical support within IIRSA; the ad hoc unit dedicated to IIRSA was dismantled 
and IIRSA’s issues were dealt with now under the infrastructure unit with less priority (Christian 
Velasquez, personal interview, September 6, 2012). Meanwhile, the main IADB-IIRSA official 
and expert, Mauro Marcondes, returned to his native Brazil and was not replaced. At the time, 
the disappearance of IADB from IIRSA’s center stage was barely noticed by the countries, 
which were occupied with framing their commitment to Unasur and the policies that would 
direct IIRSA under Cosiplan (Christian Velasquez, personal interview, September 6, 2012).  
The integration of IIRSA to the Unasur framework can also be seen as an attempt by 
Brazilian leadership to reconcile divergent ideologies and bring Venezuela again on board in 
order to have a more unified view for cooperation on regional infrastructure matters. Ultimately, 
as Palestini and Agostinis (2014) have suggested, positive interactions between Brazil’s and 
Venezuela’s regional leaderships led to a renewed political consensus at the inter-presidential 
level that resulted in IIRSA’s transition to Unasur. In June 2011, all the 12 Ministries of 
Planning, with Venezuela again on board, signed the Cosiplan Regulation, which specified the 
institutional relationship and division of work between IIRSA and Cosiplan (Palestini & 
Agostinis, 2014). However, this would have not been possible withot a tremendous groundwork 
provided by the Brazilian government. In the year of the transition (2009), Brazil held IIRSA’s 
Executive Presidency. Although it was not its turn—it was Guyana’s— Brazil was the only 
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country member prepared to cooperate in integrating IIRSA to Unasur by offering its members 
once again a renewed impulse and enthusiasm towards regional integration. 
 Therefore, once IIRSA became a key component within Unasur’s framework, the RFIs’ 
engagement strategy changed. With regard to CAF, its institutional presence in IIRSA was 
pushed into the background (senior CAF official, Infrastructure Division, personal 
communication November 19, 2012). This change was partially an institutional decision, but it 
was also partially something that IIRSA’s national coordinators had requested. According to the 
same senior CAF official, during the transition period, the national coordinators asked the 
multilateral banks—which had attended all the previous meetings—not to partake in some 
internal IIRSA meetings. During the Asuncion meeting in September 2012, this official noted 
that: 
Most countries did not question that the development banks would have a central role in 
IIRSA but they question our full participation in Cosiplan; some countries, in particular 
Venezuela, do not want us to be present in all the meetings. Ultimately, countries are 
having some private meetings but most countries’ officials tell us later what is going on 
(CAF senior official, Infrastructure Division, personal communication November 19, 
2012).  
 
For instance, a Venezuelan public official who participated in IIRSA meetings in 2012, 
suggested that within IIRSA “[multilateral] institutions, to the extent possible should participate 
as technical support, make a presentation but they should not attend the discussions between 
countries, since those are sovereign matters” (Venezuelan public official, Central Bank, personal 
interview, November 6, 2012). In February 2013, during a conference in London, CAF’s VP of 
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Infrastructure, Antonio Sosa made some key remarks about IIRSA which were linked to CAF’s 
view on “IIRSA II”:  
The first phase of [IIRSA’s] network was very busy, very active. Now, once the continent 
created Unasur, which is a political institution for regional integration in South America, 
IIRSA has lost some of its impulse, because it is within a political body and it is trying to 
reorganize the agenda in the new institutional framework. But CAF and IADB are 
selecting new projects to finance (Antonio Juan Sosa, CAF’s presentation, February 11, 
2013).  
 
Consequently, from the dynamics within “IIRSA II,” we can observe that the nature of 
RFIs and governments’ cooperation in fostering physical integration within the initiative has 
shifted from RFIs’ explicit willingness to cooperate on financial and technical matters to the co-
existence of all participants within a regional political forum devoted to coordination— and 
without necessarily a direct RFI mandate to provide financing or active orientation. With the end 
of the Lula presidency in 2010 and Chavez’s death in 2013, the initiative has also lost priority 
within presidential circles and diplomatic activities within South America. For Garcia, although 
“IIRSA II” has less involvement of RFIs and less presidential and media attention, this has not 
affected CAF’s opportunities for financing since senior officials continue looking out for 
financing opportunities regarding regional integration within and outside IIRSA (Enrique Garcia, 
personal interview, November 19, 2012). The next section explores in detail the financing 
dilemmas within IIRSA and how different actors have actually contributed with capital for 
IIRSA’s projects. These issues are relevant when trying to understand how institutions like CAF 
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engage with their principals in an environment in which resources for infrastructure financing are 
limited; CAF’s priority has centered on those projects with a visible impact in the region. 
 
6.3 Financing mechanisms and sources within IIRSA and CAF’s contributions 
A closer look at the economic effort represented in the entire portfolio of IIRSA projects for each 
country involved gives an initial perspective of which countries might be more willing or able to 
materialize the infrastructure projects promoted by IIRSA in the last decade. Investments in 
IIRSA projects are high in demand in the case of Bolivia, Paraguay and Guyana. SELA (2011) 
measured the economic efforts of the national IIRSA portfolio for each country in 2010, by 
comparing the value of individual countries’ required investment to their GDP (measured for 
2009). SELA (2011) found that the amount of the proposed required investments are equivalent 
to 81% of its GDP for Paraguay, between 50% and 60% for Bolivia and Guyana, 25% in 
Surinam, 10% for Argentina, 5% for Chile, Ecuador and Peru and around 2%, 1% and close to 
0%, in that order for Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. 
The number of projects in the IIRSA portfolio increased over 50% between 2004 and 
2011, while the estimated investment increased by more than 200% in the same period (FIESP, 
2012). Meanwhile, public financing increased at a rate of 360%, partially prompted by the 
greater space created by the governments of the region in the past decade. In relation to the 
evolution of the type of financing arrangements, the public and public–private modes of 
financing overwhelmingly predominated, reaching values always set higher than 80% of the total 
investment. The total amounts of the private financing portfolio are well below those of the 
public or public- private financing and have had virtually no increase between 2009 and 2011 
(FIESP, 2012).  
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Therefore, for the most part, the financing of IIRSA projects that have been concluded or 
are in the implementation stage has relied heavily on state investments. Although the RFIs have 
financed several projects within the portfolio, they have contributed largely with facilitating pre-
investment and technical studies— the IADB created the Integration Fund (FIRII) in 2004 and 
CAF created the Proinfra Fund in 2006 to support the preparation of the projects that belong to 
the IIRSA portfolio. According to IIRSA’s CDE (2009), the RFIs involved—IADB, CAF and 
Fonplata—have contributed approximately 24% (US$10,6 billion) of the total investment of 
projects completed or under execution at the time. 
 According to IIRSA’s (2011) official documents, when taking into account the entire 
project portfolio for the total investment, the countries’ public sectors are the main financing 
source (46%), followed by public-private sources (37%), and, lastly, by the private sector (17%). 
The fact that countries’ treasuries have mainly financed most IIRSA projects that are in stages of 
implementation or completed has created some frustration amongst member countries. This is 
because despite the countries’ and RFIs’ efforts to jointly identify possible projects to be inserted 
in the IIRSA agenda, there have not been special considerations from the IADB or CAF to 
finance the projects once they become an official project of the initiative.  
 According to Christian Velazquez—Latin America’s Program Manager at the Bank 
Information— during the period that the BIC monitored IIRSA developments, he became aware 
that the IADB and CAF did not take into consideration (or indeed at times rejected) several 
IIRSA projects. They determined that the financial and/or socio-environmental risks of various 
projects were too high to bear for the RFIs; as such, a country’s treasury had at times to assume 
this risk if it really wanted to move forward carrying out a project within the IIRSA’s agenda 
(Christian Velasquez, personal interview, September 6, 2012). Similarly, a former IADB and 
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IIRSA consultant stated that once the AIC was implemented in 2004, several issues arose when 
moving from planning to financing projects. For example, each RFI had its own separate 
mechanism to evaluate projects and despite IIRSA meetings where countries and RFIs agreed to 
work on collaborative financing mechanisms, in practice the evaluation mechanisms did not 
change. As such, IIRSA projects had to go through the same cycle of evaluation as other country 
projects: 
Many IIRSA projects at the IADB were not financed because they did not meet the 
minimum environmental, social and other requirements. There were several projects that 
were on IIRSA’s portfolio due to more political reasons than anything else. Countries 
would come and tell us [the IADB] that they considered that A or B project was 
important for them. But many of those projects were not feasible when technical elements 
were considered. Then, of course, countries got frustrated because they argued that they 
had spent all this time working with the multilateral banks in defining projects and then 
the banks rejected the financing [of projects] (former IADB and IIRSA consultant, 
personal interview, September 12, 2012). 
 
According to the same consultant, another important reason why countries got frustrated 
at times was the lack of internal coordination within the RFIs: the technical groups that worked 
with the countries defining the IIRSA portfolio were often not the same as those groups and 
departments that worked in the project evaluation divisions at the multilateral banks (former 
IADB and IIRSA consultant, personal interview, September 12, 2012). Moreover, Velasquez 
also suggested that since the funds for IIRSA projects have largely come from national 
treasuries, it has become extremely hard to track down (and break down amounts for example 
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from bilateral cooperation, private-public agreements, amongst others) the money that is 
managed by a country’s treasury (Christian Velasquez, personal interview, September 6, 2012).  
RFIs’ officials believe, however, that the initiatives’ possible concrete “innovations” in 
the financing sphere can be linked to the guarantees designed by the RFIs, which promoted the 
participation of private actors. Mauro Marcondes, the IADB senior official who coordinated 
IIRSA matters between 2003 and 2010, argued that two concrete new mechanisms were devised 
for IIRSA project financing: the guarantee for the Northern Amazon project by the IADB and a 
similar mechanism for IIRSA Sur (for the Southern Interoceanic Road Corridor) designed by 
CAF. IIRSA Sur and Northern Amazon are projects located in Peru under the modes of public-
private participation. According to Marcondes (2012), the guarantee was an innovation to attract 
private sector infrastructure project integration and allowed that the dealer to place bonds in the 
international market worth more than US$ 200 million. 
The Southern Interoceanic Road Corridor joining Peru and Brazil is clearly one of the 
most important projects in South America, not only because of its required investment capacity, 
but also because of multiple economic and socioenvironmental considerations (discussed later in 
the chapter). This project is aimed at linking the Pacific and Atlantic coasts through a network of 
roads starting in the Peruvian coast down to the coasts of Brazil, crossing the Andes and the 
Amazonian rainforest in its path. This IIRSA project had two distinct new financial mechanisms: 
first, the co-financed concession and second, the creation of the Certificate of Recognition of 
Annual Payments Per Work (CRPAO, in Spanish), a financial instrument that allowed the 
Peruvian government to complete the financing of the IIRSA Norte and the sections 2 and 3 of 
the IIRSA Sur project, for amounts exceeding US$ 900 million:  
The structure of these concessions enables the concessionaire to, as it moves forward 
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with the construction stage, generate rights on the Annual Payments per Works (acronym 
in Spanish: PAO), which the State has undertaken to make in the future as part of the co-
financing of the project. These rights are reflected in the CRPAO, which constitutes a 
financial instrument incorporating an unconditional and irrevocable obligation 
undertaken by the Peruvian State to pay the holder of such instrument, on the established 
due date, a certain amount set forth therein. The CRPAOs have been structured so that 
they are governed by New York Law, subject to New York jurisdiction, rank pari passu 
with other similar obligations of the Government of Peru…(Ronceros & Fernandez-
Davila, 2007). 
 IIRSA promotes ultimately a “non-ownership” model where most direct and indirect 
financing are very difficult to track down. For example, although different sources (Burges, 
2009; Carvahlo, 2010; Gudynas, 2008) mention BNDES as one of the main sources of financing 
in IIRSA, the Brazilian bank can only provide funds to foreign governments for them to pay the 
costs for Brazilian goods and services used in a project. As Nyko (2009) remarked, the form 
assumed by the regional action of BNDES in the past few years is closer to an Eximbank. 
Brazilian private companies gain participation in IIRSA then through private-public contracts 
with South American governments and, although these transactions may be reported on the 
BNDES website, they are difficult to track down as projects specifically linked to IIRSA’s 
initiative. BNDES (2012) presented at one of the IIRSA’s meetings in Asuncion, remarking that 
it has been an important provider of finance for major infrastructure projects in Latin America. 
But officials noted that until now that support has been only in the form of export credit from 
Brazil (a statutory requirement for BNDES), which sometimes has resulted in the export of 
construction services. Therefore, in terms of mechanisms for financing, it seems that the 
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countries that have actually been able to benefit are those that have kept close relationships with 
regional and national development banks and have been able to consolidate public-private 
partnerships within and beyond IIRSA.  
Meanwhile, CAF officials have manifested satisfaction with the institution’s participation 
and financing within IIRSA during its initial and later stages. Table 9 lists the physical 
integration projects that CAF has supported during the period 2000-2010: CAF has approved 
operations in this area —within and outside IIRSA— for US$ 7.3 billion for the execution of 57 
projects that involve a total investment in excess of US$ 23 billion. Table 9 also shows that CAF 
has supported IIRSA’s projects for both newer and older full members. CAF’s financing within 
IIRSA also reflects great support in terms of numbers of projects for Bolivia and in dollar 
amounts for Peru. Both countries, as seen in the previous chapter, have the highest investment in 
infrastructure in Latin America as a percentage of their GDP. So it has been the national 
development agendas in these countries (and not necessarily the prevalence of its market and 
ideological preferences for regional integration), which has driven these nations to maintain and 
strengthen close relationships with CAF. The institution, as seen in Chapter 4, has tried to stay 
away from dogmatic or prescriptive agendas regarding members’ political preferences, including 
those related to infrastructure. It still supports the view that this area should be treated in a more 
pragmatic way (when compared to trade) to promote cooperation amongst members. Ultimately, 
Antonio Sosa, CAF’s VP of Infrastructure, suggested that CAF had a positive experience in 
IIRSA in terms of providing financing to member countries: 
We [CAF] did very well. We financed a lot of what we wanted, what happens is that you 
cannot be so academic. It is different to outline all possible projects that can be included 
in a portfolio and then to actually prioritize amongst them. But you cannot pretend that 
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the technical-academic appreciation would become the political appreciation that they 
[governments] would prioritize…There is an “internal rate of political return” that 
influences what type of projects governments prioritize and it is related to what political 
leaders deem viable when taking into account what their communities and regional 
leaderships expect from them (Antonio Juan Sosa, personal interview, October 18, 2012). 
 
Within IIRSA, CAF has supported 53 projects—a total of US$ 6.7 billion involving a 
total investment of US$ 17.3 billion. Considering that IIRSA’s portfolio involved at the time 
around US$ 116 billion, CAF has contributed approximately with 5.8% of the financing (see 
Table 9). Although this number may not seem impressive, CAF participated in some large 
projects such as the IIRSA Sur project mentioned above, which constitutes one of the first 
infrastructure projects executed under the scheme of an investment co-financed by the 
government of Peru and private companies. CAF provided 48% of the total investment in this 
project, about US$ 1 billion. This project also represented 15% of CAF’s total contribution to 
IIRSA’s projects.  
 
Table 9. Physical integration projects financed by CAF (IIRSA and non-IIRSA) 
  Andean Axis  
CAF’s 
Contribution 
(Million 
USDs)  
Total 
Investment 
(Million 
USDs)  
1 Colombia: Bogota-Buenaventura Road Corridor  447,0  1,116,6  
2 Ecuador: Amazon Connection with Colombia and Peru 93,8  152,7  
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(Eastern Amazonia Trunk Highway)  
3 Ecuador: Segmental Bridge Project over the Babahoyo River  123,0  133,9  
4 Peru: Rehabilitation of the Huancayo-Huancavelica Railroad  14,9  18,8  
5 
Venezuela: Railroad Connection between Caracas and the 
National Network  360,0  1,932,0  
6 
Venezuela: Support for Commercial Navigation in the 
Orinoco-Apure River Axis  10,0  14,3  
  Guyana Shield Axis      
7 Brazil: Venezuela-Brazil Road Interconnection  86,0  168,0  
8 Brazil: Venezuela-Brazil Electric Grid Interconnection  86,0  210,9  
9 
Venezuela: Studies for a Railroad Connecting Guayana City-
Maturin-Sucre State  2,6  2,6  
10 
Venezuela: Studies for a Highway Connecting Guayana City 
(Venezuela)-Georgetown (Guyana)  0,8  0,8  
  Amazonian Axis      
11 Ecuador: Central Trans-Andean Connection  33,7  54,5  
12 Ecuador: South Trans-Andean Corridor  70,0  110,2  
13 
Ecuador: International Cargo Transfer Terminal in Port of 
Manta, Ecuador  35,0  525,0  
14 Peru: Northern Amazon Road Corridor  110,0  328,0  
15 Peru: Pre-Investment in the Border Region with Ecuador  5,3  8,7  
16 
Peru: Central Amazon Corridor (Tingo Maria-Aguaytia-
Pucallpa section)  3,5  13,6  
  Peru-Brazil-Bolivia Axis      
17 Bolivia: Guayaramerin-Riberalta Highway  42,0 45,5 
18 Brazil: Highway Integration Program in Rondonia State  56,4  134,2  
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19 
Peru: Southern Inter-Oceanic Road Corridor (sections 2, 3 and 
4) and Guarantees for Private Structuring  1.004,5  2.091,0  
  Central Inter-Oceanic Axis      
20 Bolivia: Bolivia-Chile Integration Road Corridor  138,9  246,0  
21 Bolivia: La Paz-Oruro Two-Lane Highway  250,0 265,1  
22 
Bolivia: Road Corridor Integrating Santa Cruz-Puerto Suarez 
(sections 3, 4, and 5)  280,0  585,5  
23 Bolivia: Road Corridor Integrating Bolivia-Argentina  314,0  642,0  
24 Bolivia: Road Corridor Integrating Bolivia-Paraguay  135,0  285,6  
25 Bolivia: The “Y” Integration Road Program  97,3  141,3  
26 Bolivia: La Guardia-Comarapa Highway Rehabilitation  21,0  34,7  
27 Bolivia/Brazil: Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline  215,0  2.055,0  
28 Bolivia: Support Program for the PAST IV Transport Sector  22,4  32,3  
29 Bolivia: Transredes Gas Pipeline  88,0  262,8  
30 Bolivia: Complementary Road Works  70,0  73,0  
31 Bolivia: Sectoral Transport Program  150,0  221,2  
32 Peru: Bolivia-Peru Integration Road Corridor  48,9  176,6  
  Mercosur-Chile Axis      
33 Argentina/Brazil: Paso de los Libres Uruguaiana Border Center  10,0  10,0  
34 
Argentina: Buenos Aires-Santiago Corridor (Laguna La Picasa 
Alternative roadway)  10,0  10,0  
35 
Argentina: Buenos Aires-Santiago Corridor (Laguna La Picasa 
Alternative Railroad Route)  35,0  50,0  
36 
Argentina: Buenos Aires-Santiago Corridor (Access to Paso 
Pehuenche, RN 40 and RN 145)  106,7  188,1  
37 Argentina: Electric Grid Interconnection Rincon Santa Maria- 400,0  635,0  
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Rodriguez  
38 Argentina: Comahue-Cuyo Electric Grid Interconnection  200,0  414,0  
39 
Argentina: Road Works Program Integrating Argentina and 
Paraguay  110,0  182,0  
40 Argentina: Useful Life Extension of Embalse Nuclear Plant  240,0  1.026,7  
41 
Brazil: Integration Road Program- Phase One. State of Santa 
Catarina  32,6  65,5  
42 
Uruguay: Mega-Concession of the Main Road Connections to 
Argentina and Brazil  25,0  136,5  
43 Uruguay: Road Infrastructure Programs  240,0  757,1  
44 
Uruguay: Program to Strengthen the National Electricity 
System  150,0  621,0  
45 Uruguay: Punta del Tigre Thermal Power Station Project  28,0  165,4  
  Capricorn Axis      
46 Argentina: Paving of RN81  90,2  126,2  
47 Argentina: Access to the Jama Pass (Argentina-Chile)  54,0  54,0  
48 
Argentina: Studies for the Rehabilitation of the Jujuy- La 
Quiaca Railroad  1,0  1,0  
49 
Argentina: Recovery and Improvement of the General 
Belgrano Railroad  326,0  408,0  
50 Bolivia: Tarija-Bermejo Road Program  74,8  200,0  
51 
Paraguay: Rehabilitation and Paving of the Integration 
Corridors RN10 and RN11 and Complementary Works  19,5  41,9  
  Paraguay-Parana Waterway Axis      
52 
Studies to Improve Navigation, Institutional Management and 
the Financial Scheme for the Operation of the Waterway 0,9  1,1  
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(Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay)  
53 
Argentina: Railroad Works Program for the Integration of 
Argentina and Paraguay  100,0  166,0  
        
  Total projects within IIRSA 6.687,2 17.341,9 
        
  Integration Projects Outside IIRSA     
54 Costa Rica: Investment Program in the Atlantic Corridor  60,0  80,2  
55 Panama: Highway Rehabilitation and Improvement Program  80,0  125,6  
56 Panama: Binational Bridge Over the Sixaola River 5,5  13,4  
57 Panama: Panama Canal Authority, Expansion Program  300,0  5.250,0  
        
  Other integration projects outside IIRSA 210,0  812,0  
  Total 7.324,2  23.623,1  
 
Source: CAF IDeAL 2011 and IIRSA's database http://www.iirsa.org/proyectos/ 
Note: To validate that these projects were financed within the IIRSA framework, the projects and amounts 
were validated through CAF's official documents, IIRSA's database and/or external files from governments 
and NGOs. 
 
The next section explores in detail the different meanings that government officials, RFIs, 
and NGOs have attached to the IIRSA initiative. This is vital for better framing the nature of 
regional cooperation in regards to infrastructure financing, while understanding how CAF has 
been able to grow its portfolio and navigate successfully the dilemmas and opportunities 
presented within the regional environment. 
 238 
6.4 Internal and external perceptions of IIRSA 
6.4.1 What IIRSA has meant for its participants (countries’ public officials and RFIs) 
IIRSA has served as a signaling process for both countries and participating RFIs to convey their 
opinions and possible commitment towards certain infrastructure projects or towards regional 
integration more generally. IIRSA meetings convey both “cheap talk” messages (when 
information exchange among countries is costless) and key insights allowing countries to send 
costly signals (via their iterative cooperation process and repeated interaction) about their 
willingness (political objectives and priorities) and capacity (political and financial constraints) 
to coordinate public expenditure in portfolio’s infrastructure projects (Carcamo-Diaz & Goddard, 
2007). This signaling process is also reflected to a great extent in the active (or passive) 
participation of country officials in IIRSA’s meetings and in the implementation of projects. 
Despite different political views on integrations amongst IIRSA member countries, their 
public officials generally agree that because of IIRSA, the concept of integration based on 
infrastructure development has been put on national and regional development agendas in South 
America. For instance, in 2010, ECLAC interviewed 52 public officials and experts linked to 
IIRSA. When asked what were the main achievements of the initiative were during its first ten 
years, the interviewees mentioned: dedicated support to regional integration, the definition of a 
project portfolio and integral planning, development of standard methodologies, increased 
bilateral and multilateral relationships, trust and joint work amongst countries (ECLAC, 2010). 
Without IIRSA, countries would have probably kept working at a slower pace through CAN and 
Mercosur in their physical integration initiatives and transfer of knowledge in infrastructure 
profiling and financing would have been fairly limited. IIRSA provided a channel to increase 
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bilateral and multilateral relationships amongst interested parties (e.g. between CAF and a 
country like Peru, eager to enhance their infrastructure conditions).   
IIRSA has focused on hard infrastructure (physical) rather than in soft infrastructure 
(regulatory issues). IIRSA brought countries’ officials together on many occasions to discuss 
hard infrastructure matters.  Julian Villalba—former CAF senior official and current owner of a 
consulting company—emphasized IIRSA’s role in initiating dialogue around long-term 
infrastructure planning: “[before IIRSA] South American public officials had never come 
together to really explore long-term infrastructure planning. Perhaps in the diplomatic arena, but 
not in the technical arena.” (Julian Villalba, personal interview, October 15, 2012). For both 
RFIs and infrastructure officials (not political leaders) of most countries, IIRSA has represented, 
at least to a certain extent, a pragmatic forum to conceptualize a shared infrastructure agenda by 
the countries with the support of multilateral banks in the areas of territorial planning and also 
for constructing a regional vision of infrastructure.  
Furthermore, a former IADB and IIRSA consultant considers that the fact that IIRSA has 
enhanced dialogue amongst public officials represents a key achievement of the initiative. Due a 
great extent to IIRSA, South American officials began interacting with each other more often 
and to a certain extent developing networks when giving and receiving informal and formal 
advice for infrastructure projects within and beyond IIRSA:  
The dialogue was important since officials began to [somewhat] standardize concepts. At 
the beginning, [the dialogue] was quite superficial. As IIRSA began moving forward in 
time, the technical quality began improving, especially for certain projects. For example, 
Brazil had implemented “Exporta Facil” at home and then thanks to IIRSA that project 
could be replicated in Colombia and Peru. This program tried to facilitate the export 
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paperwork required for small exporters. It was an interesting transfer of knowledge 
(former IADB and IIRSA consultant, personal interview, September 12, 2012). 
 
Within member countries, there were some limited attempts to bring attention to the 
political aspects of IIRSA in its everyday activities and the need to have head of states’ 
endorsement and participation in the initiative. For example, between 2003 and 2005, IIRSA 
organized a series of workshops with the goal of establishing a “Strategic Vision for the Physical 
Integration of South America.” The final document gathers recommendations mainly from 
national coordinators (public officials) and demonstrates how IIRSA’s most involved 
participants were trying to at least frame the political sustainability of the initiative at the time. 
Santa Gadea (2005)— author of the document gathering the recommendations from the national 
workshop participants— defined physical integration as a political issue, going beyond technical 
aspects. Santa Gadea (2005) explained: “In emerging hubs, infrastructure works tend to be non-
profitable. To reverse this cycle, political decision is required. If the political framework is built, 
agreements with businessmen and understanding will follow. IIRSA is a politically validated 
technical process. Its approach is economic, while its exercise is political” (emphasis added).  
However, one of the shortcomings of the initiative relates to the infrequent convening of 
enough key stakeholders (senior political figures in the sub-region) and the absence of formal 
relations with political decision makers and with the integration schemes already operating in the 
region. Although the Brazilian and Venezuelan leaderships had their own vision for physical 
integration at the material and ideological levels, they did not give a clear direction and did not 
intervene directly in buttressing IIRSA’s agenda regarding broader political discussions on 
infrastructure matters. As such, representatives from various ministries did not have a clear 
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mandate or the resources to collaborate vis-à-vis larger issues surrounding infrastructure, such as 
those related to harmonization of regulations and policies in the continent, as well as the 
sustainability of infrastructure initiatives (see next section). For the Office of Evaluation and 
Oversight (OVE) at the IADB (2008), “this has adversely affected the political economy of 
IIRSA and has held up integration in the sectors in question” (p.ii). Similarly, Marcondes 
(2012)—the former IIRSA coordinator for the IADB— has suggested that the issues in IIRSA’s 
agenda that have shown minimal progress are those related to regulatory and policy issues in the 
areas of energy integration, air, maritime and transport, part of the Sectoral Integration Processes 
of IIRSA. Marcondes (2012) has attributed this lack of success to the absence of “greater 
political muscle” to coordinate within each country the different sectors involved in order to 
address the complexity of the IIRSA agenda.   
By 2006, member countries had limited the scope related to streamlining regulatory 
frameworks and instead focus was given to concrete problems that were the result of specific 
project treatments and the integration and development axes. Ultimately, surveyed country 
officials believed that the main obstacles that the initiative and the national coordinators faced 
were related to the lack of participation, interest, resources, promotion and political support 
(ECLAC, 2010). Attendance at IIRSA meetings had been declining before IIRSA became part of 
Unasur (see Table 10 below). Moreover, even after Unasur, the country hosting a particular 
meeting has been strongly overrepresented (see green boxes in Table 9). As for government 
representation, there is a marked bias toward the transport and public works sector in most 
countries and virtually no energy or telecommunications sector representatives or officials from 
other agencies like economic affairs ministries and regional trade or integration departments.  
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Table 10. Attendance: IIRSA’s national coordinators’ meetings 2005-2013 
 
Source: IIRSA’s website - Event Database 2005-2013 (compiled by author). 
Note: Green boxes show the host country of the meeting. Yellow boxes are displayed when a country did not attend 
the meeting. 
 
Countries’ participation and eagerness have fluctuated throughout the years and by 
examining national coordinators’ attendance between 2005-2012, the following observations are 
noted, which reflect countries’ ideologies and interests for advancing physical integration and 
shaping regional discussions. First, Brazil’s national coordinators have attended all the meetings 
and delegates from Ecuador and Venezuela interviewed for this thesis project were quick to 
mention Brazil’s leadership during these meetings and also the fact that Brazil’s attendees not 
only included transportation experts but also people from the foreign affairs divisions. Second, 
Venezuela and Guyana were largely absent from IIRSA’s meeting between 2006-2011. 
Venezuela has recently come back to the initiative due to the country’s ties to Unasur and the 
role of Unasur in “IIRSA II.” Third, countries like Peru, Bolivia and Argentina (and to a lesser 
extent Ecuador) have had smaller but constant delegations. In fact, CAF interviewees were able 
to mention various names of these countries’ representatives who have attended meetings 
regularly since the earlier days.  
Participants	
by	Country
2005 2005 2006 2006 2006 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009 2010 2010 2011 2011 2012 2013
Argentina 4 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 6 3 2 2 2 2 12 3
Colombia 1 1 2 4 3 7 3 3 2 1 2 1 1
Bolivia 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
Brazil 3 6 7 3 6 8 6 5 3 6 3 3 12 12 3 6
Chile	 3 4 2 2 5 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 2 2
Ecuador 5 4 2 13 4 1 1 1 4 2 2 4 1
Guyana 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Paraguay 1 15 1 1 5 5 3 2 1 1 1 2 12 8
Peru 4 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 8 1 2 1 13
Surinam 3 1 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
Uruguay	 2 2 2 9 8 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2
Venezuela 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 7
TOTAL 27 39 26 27 29 39 27 23 21 19 23 23 28 45 34 38
Hosting	
Country
ARG PAR ARG ECU URU URU ARG COL ARG ARG ARG PERU BRASIL BRASIL ARG PERU
Source:	IIRSA's	event	database.	Compiled	by	author.
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Peru, in particular, has truly incorporated IIRSA as a platform to advance (in terms of 
projects and transfer of knowledge) its infrastructure agenda at the national and regional levels. 
For Peru, it is the Ministry of Foreign Relations (and not the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communication as in most nations), that oversees the management of IIRSA affairs. This has 
been key according to Arzubiaga, a senior Peruvian official who has worked in various 
ministries throughout the years, since it provided an external and more visible component to 
carry out IIRSA projects: 
Peru is the country that has taken more advantage of IIRSA and, therefore, this model has 
been successful. We have not tried to deal with everything within a single ministry, 
because there are many topics covering many aspects that are part of other public entities 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates with all sectors equally. If the topics were 
to be handled in isolation, each sector would claim that its scope is the most important, 
even sometimes at the expense of another sector. By contrast, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs does not directly manage any of the projects and achieves inter-sectoral 
coordination (Arzubiaga quoted in Santa Gadea, 2012, p.124). 
 
Further, in regard to the RFIs, they have greatly benefited themselves by participating in 
the IIRSA initiative. For CAF, the IADB and Fonplata, joining IIRSA has given them an 
opportunity to enhance their relationships with South American nations, while getting a closer 
and deeper look at which projects were key for elected national governments and their 
infrastructure authorities. IIRSA gave RFIs then an inside look at internal infrastructure 
dynamics, credit considerations and politics within South American nations. The IADB (2006) 
perceived IIRSA as “agile, relying on the coordination of existing institutions, rather than 
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creating a new bureaucracy” (p.13). The IADB also saw in IIRSA an opportunity to “influence 
its credit terms, while reactivating and improving its relationship with South American 
countries” (Pablo Heidrich, personal interview, September 17, 2012).  
For CAF, in particular, riding the wave of regional enthusiasm for physical integration 
without criticizing states’ ideologies has been key in growing its infrastructure portfolio. 
Ultimately, CAF officials knew that different nations would attach diverse levels of attention and 
resources to their infrastructure agendas. But within IIRSA there was, at least in principle, a big 
push for principals to start conversations with CAF about what could be financed in this area. At 
the end, CAF, as explained in the previous sections, was able to get involved in various large 
IIRSA projects in countries like Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. Further, Antonio Juan Sosa, CAF’s 
VP of Infrastructure explains CAF’s initial enthusiasm when it was invited to join IIRSA: 
CAF had already established that it was fundamental to focus on physical infrastructure 
and regional connectivity [by the late 1990s]. CAF had appointed staff that would go 
around countries examining possible projects that would connect neighbouring countries 
in the future, especially as it relates to highways, electric transmission lines and gas 
projects…When Cardoso invited CAF to join IIRSA, that was music to our ears. That 
meant that IIRSA, at a larger scale, would seek the political support needed for 
infrastructure projects together with the IADB. We [CAF] thought it was wonderful and 
enthusiastically joined the initiative because it meant giving a bigger push to things we 
were already doing. We had also already published some books about highways and 
rivers. (Antonio Juan Sosa, personal interview, October 18, 2012). 
Moreover, according to the IADB’s OVE (2008), IIRSA’s premier achievement has been 
to structure by consensus a portfolio of integration infrastructure projects organized around eight 
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Integration and Development Hubs. The portfolio makeup is reflective of consensuses forged in 
the region over the past fifty years: it is more robust in overland transport infrastructure, an area 
with a lengthy track record of consensus building (OVE, 2008).  From 2003 until 2010, the 
IADB operated a dedicated unit to handle IIRSA matters within the institution in Washington, 
D.C., which enabled more detailed tracking of IIRSA-related operations and issues. However, 
this arrangement distanced the IADB operational units from IIRSA decision-making processes in 
South America, limiting the operational departments’ ownership of the initiative and the 
presence of IIRSA projects in their pipeline (OVE, 2008).  
In 2008, Mauro Marcondes (IIRSA coordinator for the IADB at the time) defined 
IADB’s views on IIRSA during an infrastructure event at the Wilson Center. He established that 
IIRSA was neither a mechanism to finance “mega-infrastructure” projects, nor a process for the 
privatization of public assets, nor an agency that defines any of its member countries’ political 
agendas. Rather, IIRSA was a forum for regional dialogue of twelve South American countries 
that is built on consensus, with each government responsible for the activities and projects 
undertaken through the initiative (Marcondes, 2008, emphasis added). Marcondes (2008) also 
emphasized that each country decided if it wanted to prioritize the implementation of the projects 
in IIRSA’s portfolio (and which projects); how to finance each particular project; and if it 
wanted to apply IIRSA tools and methodologies.  
Ultimately, RFIs involved in IIRSA have emphasized then the initiative’s coordinating 
role as one of its main achievements, clarifying that the successful implementation of projects 
and related regulations are up to the member countries. By locating the emphasis on “dialogue” 
and “governments’ responsibility,” RFIs like the IADB and CAF have often attempted to 
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distance themselves from IIRSA and from a possible perceived role that participating institutions 
were bound to finance and share socioeconomic responsibilities for the projects.  
 
6.3.4 What IIRSA has meant for critics 
Academics and organized civil society groups have raised legitimate concerns about major 
infrastructure works within IIRSA, emphasizing the environmental impact of the initiative, as 
well as how the initiative embodies the continuation of neoliberal practices. This section engages 
with the main criticisms and evidence by scholars, environmental and social groups. Various 
scholars have emphasized that even though South America experienced the rise of progressive 
governments in the mid-2000s in various countries, IIRSA does not represent a change towards 
more sustainable infrastructure initiatives. Fuser (2008) for example has argued that since the 
rise of these governments, the partisans of IIRSA have substituted the rhetoric of  “open 
regionalism”—the password for the neoliberal opening up of the region’s economies—with a 
discourse about development. Progressive governments have brought, then, an enduring 
developmentalist mentality of strong state presence and financing into the service of free-market 
expansion (Pieck, 2013b). As such, the need to improve physical integration in South America 
has turned into a common argument for IIRSA’s participants, without any meaningful change in 
the content of the projects or in the methods adopted for implementation. The exchange of 
neoliberal authorities for other authorities that identify themselves with the forces of the left has 
contributed only to diluting resistance (Fuser, 2008). 
Various social movements, political groups, and NGOs have denounced the strategy that 
permeates IIRSA as it relates to the social, economic, and environmental impact of several of its 
projects. One of the main arguments is that IIRSA projects— instead of contributing to the 
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interconnecting of the regional market—add to the process of “re-primarization” being fueled by 
growing Asian demand for commodities as well as the windfall brought by higher commodity 
prices (Nerys Fernandez, 2010). One of the earliest studies by Tim Killen, director of the 
National Center for Atmospheric Research, evaluated the impact of the transportation, energy, 
and telecommunications projects and concluded that they may destroy a large part of the tropical 
forest in the Amazon in the next few decades. Killeen (2007) related the projects planned in 
IIRSA to the growth in pressures on the ecosystem in Amazonia and its traditional communities. 
Among these pressures are lumber industry exploitation and deforestation issues associated with 
the uncontrolled expansion of agriculture, with cattle raising and mineral exploration, as well as 
with the rapid growth in planting for biofuels. Killeen (2007) suggested that the lack of 
perception of the full impact of IIRSA investments, especially in the context of climate change 
and global markets, is capable of producing a perfect storm of environmental destruction.  
According to Killeen (2007), the challenge within IIRSA is to mediate the legitimate 
expectations of development with the need to conserve the ecosystem in Amazonia. But this 
concern, which should be at the center of IIRSA’s decision-making process, appears only in a 
superficial way. Environmental and social sustainability within IIRSA has been perceived on 
many occasions as a conflict management issue of how to turn around the eventual resistance of 
civil society or as a precondition for countries to access multilateral financing. At IIRSA, 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) has been mandated to ensure that the social and 
environmental issues are adequately addressed in the project planning process—and it is a 
precondition for CAF and/or IADB support—but so far only a few strategic ex ante assessment 
studies have been made related to corridors in the IIRSA agenda. And very little systemic 
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knowledge and know-how has been developed related to the appropriate methodology and 
organization of such large scale ex ante assessments (Van Djick, 2010).  
By analyzing four case studies,17 Kis Madrid, Hickey & Bouchard (2011) identified the 
conditions under which the SEAs of the IIRSA projects have been undertaken and whether the 
Action Plans (established under IIRSA) have been (or will be) implemented. Their findings show 
that SEAs have not been sufficient conditions to prevent and/or mitigate environmental impacts 
of IIRSA projects and they also have not been effective in including civil society groups in 
project discussions. According to the NGOs in the region that closely followed the SEA 
processes conducted for the IIRSA’s projects, the SEAs of three of the selected case studies did 
not include an appropriate public consultation process.  
In regard to national capacities, in each case studied the SEAs mention that the countries 
need to develop their institutional, operative, coordination, and/or monitoring capacities to be 
able to implement the SEA’s Action Plans. The problem is that there is no guarantee that the 
countries will be able to develop the required capacities to implement the Action Plans in an 
adequate way and within the required timeframes. Therefore, the environmental and social risks 
identified within the SEAs may not be able to be addressed (Kis Madrid et al., 2011). In addition, 
in three out of the four case studies there was no indication of government’s political will and 
commitment to implement SEA recommendations. This can be related to the fact that in most 
cases (except the North Amazon Transport Corridor) important ministries were not involved in 
the planning process and therefore, they did not appropriate the programs of the Action Plan as 
their own. For example, in the case of the Northern Corridor of Bolivia, the Bolivian Highway 
                                                        
17 The case studies were selected based on six criteria, as follows: (i) they had to be anchor projects of the IIRSA’s transportation sector; (ii) 
they had to be located in the Amazon Basin; (iii) they had to include new paving or extensions of highways; (iv) they must be at the 
implementation stage; (v) they must have undertaken an SEA; and (vi) they had to be financed by the IDB, among other multilateral financial 
institutions. See Kis Madrid et al (2011) for details. 
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Administrator (responsible for the management and maintenance of the road network) was 
designated as the responsible authority to execute the Action Plan, while the Ministry of Public 
Works (responsible for the sectoral planning in the country) and the Ministries of the 
Environment and Rural Development were left aside in the planning process (BIC, 2009). 
Furthermore, Redwood (2012)—an external consultant hired by the IADB— documented 
the experience of the IADB in managing the environmental and social impacts of road 
improvement and road-related projects along two major transport corridors in Peru: IIRSA Sur 
and IIRSA Norte. Both projects also involved CAF as a financial intermediary. According to 
Redwood (2012), CAF has been directly involved in financing the major road improvements in 
the more sensitive Amazonian portions of the road in the case of the Interoceanica highway. 
CAF appears to be co-financing with the IADB (although the Bank’s respective Donors 
Memorandum does not specifically mention this) some of the activities being implemented by 
the Odebrecht Corporation and its partners under the Conservancy and Sustainable Development 
Project (that is partially and jointly co-financed by IADB’s Multilateral Investment Fund and an 
Italian Trust Fund under IADB’s management) (Redwood, 2012).  
In the case of IIRSA Norte, CAF is financing the road as a whole (for which the IADB 
has provided a parallel Guarantee and eventual loan, if needed to the Peruvian Government). As 
Redwood (2012) remarks, in none of these three cases is the de facto division of labour between 
the IADB and the other financing entities involved well-defined. There is not a clear division of 
responsibilities regarding monitoring and supervision, both with respect to environmental and 
social safeguard compliance and more generally between the IADB and the other financing 
entities involved clearly in the respective IADB project and/or guarantee documents. 
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CAF, as part of its involvement in the financing of portions of the Interoceanica highway, 
funded a mitigation program hosted by the then only existing government environmental office 
in Peru, the National Institute of Natural Resources (Inrena, in Spanish). The original US$ 17 
million mitigation loan represented a small amount relative to the highway cost. The loan was 
designed to address the myriad environmental challenges posed by the complexity of this project. 
A recent study by the NGO Derecho, Ambiente and Recurso Natural (DAR) concludes that this 
mitigation program, referred to as CAF/Inrena for simplicity, suffered from weak 
institutionalization, underfunding, and poor communication that reduced transparency and any 
possibility for meaningful civil society input (Enrique & Cueto, 2010). The program was highly 
centralized from the start and its coordinating committee was composed entirely of government 
agencies, and very little civil society (or regional government) input was allowed. In the late 
2010, as the first impact mitigation program CAF/Inrena (CAF I) neared its end, the Peruvian 
government hired a consulting firm to draft a new mitigation program, building into it a more 
participatory process (Pieck, 2013b). This new program, called CAF/Minam (CAF II), is based 
on a series of workshops conducted in Cusco, Puno and Madre de Dios, that boasted the 
participation of regional governments, local mayors of communities affected by the highway, 
and grassroots organizations.  
 From 2006 to 2011, there was a major non-governmental platform for monitoring and 
conveying IIRSA projects’ socio-environmental implications. The Bank Information Center 
(BIC) sponsored this platform (with funding from the Moore Foundation) and developed a major 
civil society initiative called Building Informed Civic Engagement for Conservation in the 
Andes-Amazon (BICECA, in Spanish). The goals of BICECA were to help ‘‘civil society 
organizations to analyze and influence economic integration projects and policies in the Andes-
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Amazon in order to help protect the biological and cultural diversity of the region’’ and to 
‘‘promote informed engagement and effective conservation advocacy through linking civil 
society initiatives in the local, regional, and international arenas’’(BIC quoted in Pieck, 2011). 
Five South American NGOs in Peru (including DAR mentioned previously in this chapter) 
Colombia, Brazil, Bolivia and Ecuador also formally joined BICECA.  
 BICECA published several newsletters and analytical articles on the impacts of 
infrastructure projects in the Andean Amazon region, but its main impact was perhaps the 
generation of a transnational activist network. BIC hosted a meeting of Northern and Southern 
civil society organizations in Lima, Peru in July 2005, which culminated in the “Articulacion 
Frente a IIRSA” (Platform against IIRSA). This platform produced the Lima Declaration, in 
which it defines its goals as: 
 Unmasking and halting the IIRSA initiative in the way it is currently being implemented, 
thus contributing to the political and social construction of a critical consciousness 
concerning IIRSA, and building society’s capacity for intervention, and to generate 
alternative sustainable processes in order to achieve another possible form of integration. 
(Lima Declaration available at BIC, 2009). 
The Lima Declaration was signed by sixteen NGOs, including BIC. With time, over forty groups 
joined the platform and three clusters of organizations ultimately comprised this network: (1) 
US-based internationally active environmental and social justice NGOs (e.g., the Center for 
International Environmental Law and BIC, both in Washington, D.C.); (2) South American 
environmental and social justice NGOs located in the capital cities; and (3) indigenous 
federations in the Amazonian lowlands (Pieck, 2011). 
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 The BIC wanted to ultimately influence how IIRSA operated, while promoting a more 
participatory process. Velasquez suggested that even before IIRSA launched its online database 
for tracking the projects’ development, BICECA had already compiled the information on about 
300 projects. In 2005, IIRSA began compiling a database of the projects and their status at 
INTAL. According to Velasquez, this period was very interesting from BICECA’s point of view, 
because IADB officials working in the IIRSA unit used to phone BICECA to get information 
about the projects in order to support its own official database. (Christian Velasquez, personal 
interview, September 6, 2012). BICECA tried to engage directly with IIRSA Directors and in 
2008, its NGO partners and a total of twenty civil society organizations of eight countries 
submitted a proposal to IIRSA for creating joint mechanisms that would assure the participation 
of civil society within the IIRSA framework.  
 The civil society group also asked to be more involved in environmental operational 
matters such as the SEAs. Yet, the official response from Carolina Renteria—President of 
IIRSA’s Executive Direction Committee at the time and Colombia’s National Planning Director 
—was not positive and IIRSA rejected the proposal, while suggesting that instead IIRSA would 
create a “Strategic Thinking Forum” where a lot of concerns like those in the proposal would be 
discussed through IIRSA’s technical committees (Censat – Agua Viva, 2008). The forum took 
part in 2009 in Buenos Aires but it was only a two-day event that did not result in a continuous 
engagement between IIRSA and civil society groups. The first day of the forum was devoted to 
examining South American integration from different angles, and comparing it with other 
experiences as well and it encouraged the participation of a large number of government officials 
and representatives of academia and civil society. The second day, however, was reserved for the 
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work of IIRSA National Coordinators to reflect on the issues dealt with on the previous day and 
identifying strategic orientations.  
 The BIC stopped directly monitoring IIRSA’s activities in 2010 because the organization 
changed its institutional focus once a new director was appointed and restructured BIC’s main 
program areas (Christian Velasquez, personal interview, September 6, 2012). The new BIC 
Director restructured the focus of the organization with more attention to the World Bank’s 
activity in Latin America. Traditionally, BIC’s focus had been monitoring the activities of the 
World Bank but during the period 2006-2010—in part due to the loss of the World Bank’s 
influence in the region—BIC allocated resources to closely monitor regional initiatives like 
IIRSA and related actions by participating RFIs. At present, the national NGOs are trying to 
directly monitor IIRSA. Yet, according to Velasquez, they have very limited capacity and 
resources to do so and the “regional networking” component of civil society was weakened 
because the medium and long- term planning of all these NGOs activities requires a lot of time 
and the resources that the BIC previously provided (Christian Velasquez, personal interview, 
September 6, 2012).  
Nevertheless, the combination of local NGOs working with the BIC was fundamental in 
raising awareness of IIRSA’s environmental effects. The potential environmental costs of these 
projects have been highlighted by various protests around the region in which local NGOs have 
participated. For example, in 2011, one of the largest protests to date took part in Bolivia against 
the construction of the highway Cochabamba-Beni through the Isidoro Secure national park and 
indigenous territories. Ultimately, president Evo Morales announced a possible postponement or 
cancellation of the proposed Amazon highway. Morales passed a law through Congress that 
would prohibit construction of a highway through the national park (Quinones, 2011).  
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6.4 Conclusion: Knowledge and coordination but lack of ownership 
 
The discontent with the prevailing neoliberal model of development of the 1990s left some room 
for countries like Brazil to promote initiatives like IIRSA, which was positioned as a more 
comprehensive strategy of regional insertion. Brazil’s own national development goals and 
strategies were crucial in the consolidation of this initiative. Presented as a response to revive the 
regional movement in South America, IIRSA represented in a way a practical alternative to 
expand the Avança Brasil program to the sub-region. However, Brazil stepped cautiously in 
promoting IIRSA, without openly adopting a hegemonic position that would grate in a region 
that associates foreign policy leadership with coercion and domination (Burges, 2009). Within 
initiatives like IIRSA (including the transition to Unasur), it is possible to appreciate how 
Brazil’s regional foreign policy preferences have managed to appear more pragmatic and 
moderate to many of its South American neighbours much of the time, assisted by the implicit 
comparison with the more ideologically polarized alternative regional organization schemes 
promoted by countries like Venezuela.  
CAF jumped enthusiastically at the opportunity to join an initiative that could serve as a 
platform to broadcast its infrastructure work throughout the region. IIRSA allowed CAF to 
engage in relevant projects with its newest full members—the Southern Cone countries—and to 
continue deepening its relationship with nations like Peru, whose administration (including 
several ministries and foreign affairs offices) had a mandate to carry out concrete large 
infrastructure projects. Members’ preferences—manifested through political will in countries 
like Brazil and Peru— have worked then to promote national projects and initiatives through the 
discourse of regional cooperation, the coordination of various ministries, and the idea that South 
America is coming together through physical integration.  
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Meanwhile, CAF has proven to be a flexible organization, continuing to explore and 
provide financing opportunities throughout a period in which several countries in the region were 
redefining their ideologies and distancing themselves from the ideals that the Cardoso 
administration envisioned for the working of IIRSA. Ultimately, CAF has benefited greatly from 
participating in IIRSA and has been able to expand its portfolio, knowledge and impact in the 
region. Through IIRSA, the institution has strengthened its relationship with older and newer 
members and has enhanced its understanding of members’ national priorities in regard to 
infrastructure, despite receiving criticisms due to the lack of monitoring and enforcement of 
environmental standards. Further, IIRSA has kept the institution informed of ongoing 
geopolitical discussions in the region, while giving it a forum to broadcast its programs and 
lending opportunities accordingly. 
This institutional involvement of the RFIs has been a considerable component of the 
factors that have pushed discussions on infrastructure forward during the first ten years of 
IIRSA. During this period, the IADB and CAF used their convening power for organizing 
several meetings among South American authorities, as well as providing technical cooperation, 
in an attempt to overcome the coordination failure of previous eras while looking for their own 
financing opportunities. More recently, with the establishment of Cosiplan, CAF and the IADB 
have left the center public stage and distanced themselves from the dynamics of countries 
coordinating amongst themselves which projects to pursue. For these institutions, being the 
technical arm—as opposed to instating specific guidelines for obtaining financing for example—
is also a way to dissociate themselves from issues of responsibility on the terms of cooperation 
and on the degree of influence in what may be perceived as “sovereign” issues. An interesting 
point to highlight within IIRSA’s dynamics is that the de facto division of labour between the 
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RFIs involved has never been well-defined; there is not a clear division of responsibilities in 
regard to the respective monitoring and supervision of the projects that these entities have 
supported.  
With IIRSA, and now with Cosiplan, the concept of cooperation based on infrastructure 
development has been repositioned in the regional agenda. IIRSA and the RFIs’ participation 
have helped frame in the last decade the understanding of new consensus, agendas and 
cooperation processes in the provision of infrastructure that ultimately shape a region. IIRSA has 
brought together South American leaders at least on several occasions to discuss infrastructure 
matters within and beyond the initiative in spite of low regulatory convergence and weak 
demand for trade and economic integration. A notable achievement of IIRSA relates to the 
identification and systematization of relevant infrastructure projects for the region. Cooperation 
on infrastructure, both as rhetoric and as a practical matter, has served as a common denominator 
amongst countries to contribute—even though sometimes at a slower pace than others—to the 
development of a portfolio and to various large concluded infrastructure projects. However, as 
previously acknowledged, the lack of financing, absence of monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms, and the absent or zero binding effect of the consensus achieved, have conspired in 
general to lead to low levels of execution. This result is a signal that South American 
governments continue to move away from binding or sovereignty sharing agreements, as 
national projects take precedence within various governments currently in power. 
Although multimodal, the centerpiece of IIRSA’s agenda still is the improvement of road 
infrastructure, and little progress has been made in the other segments of its agenda. As such, 
alternative transport modes such as railways, as well as energy and telecommunications 
networks, are less well represented in the portfolio, project groups, and the amount of investment 
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so far (van Djick, 2010). Also, not all infrastructure works included in the agenda have a clear 
focus or potential impact on deepening regional integration and improving connectivity. Finally, 
it needs to be acknowledged that, in many respects, insights into the socioeconomic and 
environmental implications of the projects are limited, which makes it difficult to assess the 
long-term impacts of the initiative and its contribution to sustainable development (van Djick, 
2010). 
Therefore, large IIRSA-sponsored projects continue to suffer from a serious 
accountability gap. In many ways, this problem points to the limits to the transformative capacity 
of new forms of regionalism embraced by projects such as Unasur. As such, the dynamics within 
IIRSA and “IIRSA II” reflect the broader dynamics of regional cooperation amongst 
governments and RFIs. At times, we could say that some of the advancements—in terms of 
agenda setting and concrete projects— can be attributed governments’ political support to carry 
out certain visible infrastructure projects (such as the construction of IIRSA Norte and IIRSA 
Sur in Peru) supported by a network of institutional experts (composed in great part by IADB 
and CAF officials, and more recently reinforced by ECLAC studies). Therefore, to a great extent, 
institutional knowledge and the availability of financing mechanisms like the CRPAO are 
employed as a way to back up political alliances and projects that otherwise would have not 
perhaps had a space to be discussed and disseminated at the multilateral level.  
Finally, through the analysis of country members and RFIs’ participation in the initiative, 
this chapter has shown how the promotion of infrastructure through IIRSA has resulted in the 
adoption of a “non-ownership” model, where, despite agreed consensus and constant exchange 
of ideas between twelve South American countries and RFIs, there is a lack of effort to go 
beyond coordination exercises. Since no one “owns” IIRSA, financing sources have become at 
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times hard to track and environmental standards are left to the will of the participating countries’ 
authorities whose main concerns are often speeding up the financing or reaffirming in the 
international arena the existing links and willingness to cooperate at the regional level. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion: Leadership, institutional design, principals’ 
preferences and momentum in regional cooperation schemes  
 
7.1 Introduction 
This dissertation has addressed the question: What explains CAF’s continuity and expansion 
since the 1990s? The previous chapters have examined how, in a world of powerful donor states 
and multilateral agencies, it was possible for an originally Andean (and now increasingly Latin) 
development bank to survive regional integration crises and to actually incorporate the successes 
and failures of regional governance into its mandate and governance model. CAF’s story 
highlights the importance of successful agency—and building up know-how while taking into 
account institutional and regional factors—in the survival and growth of RFIs. CAF has been 
instrumental in removing financial barriers for long-term development for its members 
throughout the years. Sometimes CAF has lent directly for projects considered priorities for 
national development and regional integration; at others, it has performed a catalytic role by 
attracting funds from different sources in the international capital markets at the kind of 
competitive rates it can command by being a recognized issuer in the region. 
The study of CAF contributes not only to ongoing academic interest in further 
understanding the roles of RFIs in the global political economy after the 2008 crisis, but also in 
outlining relevant factors for the survival and growth of a RFI that can be studied and 
benchmarked by older and newer regional institutions. Explaining these factors provides an 
opportunity for scholars and public officials working within regional initiatives to reexamine the 
ways a RFI like CAF needs to balance the demands of both its principals (country members) and 
the global financial markets. The first section of this chapter reviews the answers to this work’s 
central research question. Next, this chapter identifies how the arguments and discussions 
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advanced in this work contribute to existing global governance literature—in particular to the 
fields of IPE, IR and regional governance. The chapter concludes by presenting possible research 
agendas for future contributions to the study of international institutions and regional 
cooperation.  
 
7.2 Key findings: Explaining CAF’s growth 
To understand CAF’s survival and growth, this work put forward a framework suggesting that  
CAF’s expansion has been possible due to the combination of four factors: 1) leadership, 2) 
institutional design, 3) member governments’ preferences and 4) Brazil’s push for regional 
cooperation beyond trade (see Figure 1). This dissertation focused on expanding traditional 
examinations of principal-agent dynamics by showing how sometimes individuals in leadership 
positions are crucial in framing an agent’s mandate and scope of action. The leadership of 
Enrique Garcia, CAF’s Executive President since 1991, has been vital in outlining a clear agenda 
for the bank’s staff. He also successfully cultivated an internal culture and bureaucracy that 
supported his vision, while building coalitions and alliances to ensure adequate support from 
both CRAs and member governments. CAF’s institutional design has also provided the 
necessary foundations for carrying out Garcia’s vision for the institution. 
 Further, member countries have not been passive observers in CAF’s story. They have 
supported the institution throughout the years with their capital contributions and by not 
interfering with its management. In addition, a changed ideological context in various countries, 
combined with an improved fiscal situation since the early 2000s, have favoured a renewed 
emphasis on infrastructure and consequently, greater attention to the role that CAF can play in 
members’ long-term financing agendas. Underlying regional forces have also played a role in 
 261 
CAF’s growth. In particular, Brazilian foreign policy created a renewed enthusiasm for regional 
cooperation in the early 2000s in regard to physical integration. CAF has been able to capture 
Brazilian priorities, while ensuring its participation in regional infrastructure discussions and 
schemes such as IIRSA. 
This dissertation began by analyzing the regional context that underlined CAF’s creation 
and its policies before the arrival of Enrique Garcia because several institutional features that 
would sustain CAF’s growth in later decades were instituted at this time. Chapter 3 showed how 
CAF was established in an era in which heads of state showed great enthusiasm towards regional 
integration and shared sovereignty. Within this environment, and guided by lawyers instead of 
heads of state, CAF’s constitutive agreement was drafted and approved in the Andean Group. 
The agreement set up some key foundations that differentiated the institution from other MDBs 
such as the fact that shareholders are also borrowers, as well as the decision to have a non-
resident board—which has ultimately increased CAF’s autonomy and consequently, Garcia’s 
discretion. CAF’s institutional design has provided then the necessary foundations for carrying 
out Garcia’s vision for the institution. Its constitutive agreement, framed in the late 1960s as an 
international treaty, also includes various privileges and immunities (such as the preferred 
creditor status) that have been respected by CAF’s members throughout the years. These features 
embedded in CAF’s agreements set the foundations for later introducing CAF to the international 
markets as a solid entity in which members paid on time, despite ongoing regional and global 
economic crises. 
 The first two decades of existence were difficult for CAF, however. Despite initial 
vitality, the Andean integration goals quickly began to encounter serious difficulties and got 
completely deadlocked in the 1970s. Meanwhile, CAF’s lending scope and goals were limited 
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and the institution was still very dependent on national contributions for much of its working 
capital. The combination of the dissatisfaction of Andean countries with the integration scheme 
they had outlined and both the oil and the debt crises undermined CAF’s strategies. CAF 
survived the 1980s, but it was not until the arrival of Enrique Garcia that the entity redefined its 
goals and isolated itself to a great extent from the dilemmas and disagreements that country 
members experienced with the prevailing Andean integration goals and schemes. CAF needed to 
build an operational model that focused more on serving the sectors that its senior management 
thought most contributed to countries’ economic development, rather than a model based on 
overall regional ambitions framed within trade goals as a priority. 
With the arrival of Garcia, a new strategy was put in place, with the goal of establishing 
CAF as a solid source of long-term financing in the region. When Garcia assumed CAF’s 
presidency, he drafted an agenda of three interrelated goals: gaining access to capital markets, 
developing a niche in financing physical infrastructure and expanding CAF’s membership while 
strengthening the relationships with all country members. Chapter 3 showed how Garcia’s early 
leadership was a catalyst for reinventing the institution both internally and externally. Garcia’s 
familiarity with the region from a RFI perspective helped him in setting up an unprecedented 
strategy when he arrived at CAF, while taking advantage of the entity’s institutional design. The 
flexibility the constitutive agreement embodies allowed CAF’s president, for example, to gain 
the Board’s approval among the founding members in the early 1990s to further the inclusion of 
other Latin American countries as associate members. Garcia focused during his first decade on 
ensuring that larger countries like Brazil eventually became interested in CAF’s agenda. 
During the first years of his mandate, Garcia also focused on building a successful 
bureaucracy that supported his core goals. Garcia also used his knowledge of capital markets to 
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train CAF staff in regard to the promotion of the institution outside the region and within 
member countries. Senior officials learnt how to tell “CAF’s story,” while demonstrating that the 
institution was determined to survive and keep the support of its shareholders within prevailing 
regional dynamics. Garcia has been fundamental in giving CAF an identity beyond “the sum of 
all of its members” and demonstrating to the CRAs that the bank was financially more solid than 
its members’ own economies and that it followed its own standards and goals. 
Chapter 4 discussed in depth the ways Garcia and his team focused extensively on 
cultivating coalitions and alliances within member states and credit rating agencies; they had to 
ensure support from both groups to successfully deliver on CAF’s portfolio and financial 
performance. Examining how the institution has managed relationships with both CRAs and 
member countries illustrates how a development bank like CAF has had to often walk a fine line 
between the requirements and goals of two different sets of stakeholders. CAF’s commitment to 
maintain a Latin American identity is a fundamental part of the institution’s identity that has 
given CAF both advantages and disadvantages within the rating system used by the Big Three 
CRAs. For instance, CAF has had to forgo strengthening indicators such as callable capital, 
which would require increased participation of developed countries. Meanwhile, CAF presents 
itself as an entity without outside interference that is owned by its members and works for them 
by trying to respond in an agile manner to their financing needs. Members’ trust in the institution 
has contributed to its survival and commitment to launch bonds and notes in the global markets. 
Principals have been active in supporting CAF’s institutional credibility through their actions, 
including progressive capital contributions, supporting the inclusion of new Latin American 
members and paying their loans on time despite numerous crises. 
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Garcia was central then in promoting an approach that aimed at progressively increasing 
the amount of money raised in the global markets, while keeping shareholders identified with the 
institution. CRAs have also noticed the leadership component within the institution, which has 
given CAF a stability component that has allowed the entity to accumulate expertise on long-
term financing, especially around infrastructure lending. In addition, to improve its credit ratings 
and attractiveness of issued bonds, CAF has employed a mix of strategies, building upon its 
institutional features. In terms of indicators that show financial soundness, CAF has benefited 
from strong capitalization levels from principals, continued growth and diversification of lending 
operations and consistent profitability. Nevertheless, CAF has also gone beyond financial 
indicators and senior management has developed an effective narrative to account for how CAF 
has been designed—and how it is currently managed—to withstand volatility in the region. For 
example, during roadshows and conference presentations, CAF’s management has highlighted its 
good relationships with governments from both the left and the right in Latin America, while 
emphasizing CAF’s immunities and privileges. Talking face to face to investors has been key in 
enhancing CAF’s funding strategy. 
Moreover, CAF has broadened its shareholders’ base since the mid-2000s. This step has 
been, however, a careful move that has prompted the reduction of individual countries’ 
concentration in its loan portfolio. CAF has tried to balance the relationship between the CRAs 
and its members by growing its membership, but only inviting Latin American countries to 
become full members (Series A shareholders). Increasing the membership base at CAF opened 
the possibility to further capitalize the institution, while attracting more investors and 
consequently diversifying financing sources. But what are CAF’s comparative advantages vis-à-
vis other MDBs that keep members interested in the institution? Chapter 4 showed that factors 
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such as the speed of loan approval (related to the lack of a permanent resident board), perceived 
lack of a dogmatic agenda, and an ability to understand local governments’ current needs have 
been all important for governments in the region. Other MDBs may be more in the forefront in 
their prescriptive recipes for economic growth, but at CAF, the country’s model for growth is not 
what prevails in lending decisions. Therefore, governments with very different ideologies have 
kept a close relationship with CAF. CAF’s success is also related to its management’s efforts to 
build knowledge and develop financing options for sectors that are relevant for all of its 
shareholders.  
Explaining CAF’s success also requires an understanding of how Garcia and his team 
pursued the strategy of making infrastructure financing a priority area that would entice South 
American governments and investors, while fitting nicely within ongoing regional initiatives.  
Making infrastructure a priority in its mission has also meant, as Chapter 5 examined, that the 
institution has had to pay closer attention to the regional environment and to be able to respond 
and engage Brazilian leadership, which has to a great extent framed the political demand for 
regionalism and physical integration. In addition, CAF’s principals have been interested for 
decades in financing large infrastructure projects, but until the mid-2005, most nations did not 
have the fiscal room needed for large infrastructure projects. Development models within some 
of CAF’s members now have the state at the center of infrastructure planning and execution. 
Moreover, before IIRSA, there was not a centralized regional venue for governments to discuss 
the challenges and benefits of physical integration. IIRSA made it possible to broadcast Brazilian 
goals for advancing physical integration throughout South America with the support of nations 
that wanted to explore themselves other areas to promote integration beyond trade.  
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CAF’s work in infrastructure financing since Garcia’s arrival provided the basis to 
respond to principals’ concerns and goals which also means that the entity has had to 
increasingly take into account regional discussions, expanded national agendas and emerging 
regional cooperation and financial alternatives. Garcia’s leadership during the last decade vis-à-
vis infrastructure financing focused on two main elements: highlighting the role of the institution 
in promoting regional cooperation to increase its portfolio and ensuring that CAF remains 
relevant within the emergence of initiatives such as IIRSA and the Bank of the South. 
Meanwhile, in its official documents, CAF began to often emphasize infrastructure and not trade 
as areas of opportunities for integration. The continuous presence of Enrique Garcia in regional 
presidential summits, as well as the ongoing technical support within the region’s multilateral 
agenda has allowed CAF to be an active participant with member countries, under an “umbrella” 
of regional integration. At the same time, governments continue to recognize CAF’s relevance at 
the regional level. For example, during the 2008 global crisis, the financial committee of Unasur 
agreed to strengthen CAF due to its anti-cyclical role.  
Ideational motives—the idea of a South American identity or the perception that 
infrastructure was a practical channel to further integration—during the last decade benefited 
Garcia’s strategy for expanding CAF’s impact not only in regards to its financing capabilities, 
but also in terms of knowledge on infrastructure matters and countries’ specific needs and wants 
in this area. Through infrastructure involvement, CAF has been able to play a localized function 
in member countries, even for those that obtained full-membership in the last decade; for 
instance, despite having its own resources and agencies, Brazil has been able to obtain 
guarantees and financing from CAF for projects within municipalities. CAF’s management has 
also worked with the premise that lending had to be available for members, despite countries’ 
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changing macroeconomic conditions. CAF continued to lend through the global and European 
crises, since its own investment portfolio (which is mainly short-term) was not adversely affected 
and thus CAF demonstrated again its counter-cyclical role to the global lending community. 
In Chapter 6, CAF’s shareholder dynamics were analyzed within a particular regional 
initiative, IIRSA. The IIRSA initiative showcases the complexities, dilemmas and advances of 
regional cooperation, national interests, and multilateral financing during an interesting period 
led by Brazilian foreign policy towards the region. By exploring CAF’s participation in IIRSA, it 
is possible to grasp the adaptability of the institution to the changing political dynamics of the 
region, especially since the mid-2000s. CAF went from being an active advocate of the initiative 
(due to its potential to enhance CAF’s infrastructure agenda under a single forum) to a more 
discrete supporter (due to a combination of factors including the limitations and criticisms IIRSA 
faced after the mid-2000s and the change of direction it experienced under Unasur).  
Ultimately, cooperation on infrastructure both as rhetoric and as a practical project has 
served as a common denominator amongst countries to contribute—even though sometimes at a 
slower pace than others—to the development of a portfolio of key projects and to the execution 
of some large projects. However, limited financial sources beyond treasuries, the absence of 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, Venezuela’s disengagement with the initiative and the 
absent or zero binding effect of the consensus achieved, have conspired in general toward limited 
levels of execution. This signals the fact that governments in the region keep moving away from 
sovereignty sharing agreements, as distinct national infrastructure agendas are drafted and 
carried out by elected governments. Meanwhile, RFIs have emphasized coordination and 
dialogue within IIRSA as key milestones of initiative. This emphasis was put in place by the 
RFIs in order to create some distance between responsibilities regarding technical pre-investment 
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studies and financing of projects on one hand, and responsibilities regarding socioeconomic and 
environmental for successful implementation of a project on the other.  
Within this environment, CAF has, however, achieved great benefits from its 
participation in IIRSA, which have contributed not only to its portfolio growth, but also to the 
ongoing development and maintenance of relationships with its member countries. IIRSA 
allowed CAF to engage in relevant projects with its newest full members and to continue 
deepening its relationship with Andean nations who wanted to materialize concrete large 
infrastructure projects. Members’ preferences—manifested through political will in countries 
like Brazil and Peru— have worked then to create momentum for national projects through the 
discourse of regional cooperation. Meanwhile, CAF has proven to be a flexible organization, 
continuing to explore and provide financing opportunities throughout a period in which several 
countries in the region were redefining their ideologies and distancing themselves from 
neoliberal practices. Through IIRSA, CAF’s management has had an important avenue to keep 
senior officials informed of ongoing geopolitical discussions in the region, while giving the 
entity a place to broadcast its programs, lending opportunities and other ways how the institution 
can support its members.  
7.3 Contributions to the advancement of knowledge 
 
The framework advanced in this study for explaining CAF’s survival and growth, as well as the 
empirical evidence introduced throughout the chapters, not only shed light on the functioning of 
small regional institutions, but also have broader implications for the IPE literature. IPE is a 
discipline that has featured a diversity of approaches, through which scholars have studied a 
wide variety of issues surrounding the dynamics of power and transformation in international 
organizations. By drawing upon several schools of thought, this study reveals new and important 
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factors that have been vital in the survival and growth of a RFI. These findings may have larger 
implications within IO, IR and regionalist literatures.    
 At the empirical level, this dissertation is the first detailed analysis of the history of CAF. 
It goes beyond existing literature on CAF by outlining several factors that have contributed to the 
institution’s growth and how these factors have reinforced each other. Previous work on CAF 
has to a large extent focused on institutional features, and has had less to say about CAF’s 
adaptability to the regional environment, the pivotal role of Garcia or the fine balance that the 
institution maintains and cultivates amongst members and the international capital markets.  
Perhaps the most significant contribution of this thesis is that on the role of leadership in 
international financial institutions. This is not the first study to investigate this factor in RFIs.18 
However, existing literature has for the most presented a limited account of this influence in 
RFIs’ management and mandate. This thesis has showcased how the role of the “agent” can be 
distilled to demonstrate the crucial role that individuals might perform within an institution. 
What is more, available literature on CAF19 has explored how its institutional design has 
contributed to the institution’s survival and growth but these works have not necessarily 
accounted for the fact that Garcia’s leadership was actually a vital force in carving a niche for the 
institution by taking advantage of those available institutional features. This dissertation invites 
scholars to reengage with the study of leadership in IOs, especially within those research agendas 
that consider that P-A theory and constructivism can be complementary explanations. This study 
adds to literature on IOs by focusing on how the personal characteristics of a RFI’s executive 
president, as well as his professional background and connections, influenced the entity’s 
behaviour, thus providing insight into an undertheorized variable in constructivist accounts. 
                                                        
18 See for example Weaver (2008) and Park & Weaver (2012). 
19 See for example Ocampo (2006) and Humphrey (2012, 2014). 
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Action and reconfiguration of mandates in IOs are not necessarily bound by traditional 
bureaucratic considerations or rational motives. The actions of IOs can be normatively guided by 
their internal design through an executive’s president normative leanings and subsequent vision 
for the institution.  
The importance of leadership for the functioning of a MDB can also be explored when 
taking into account the geographic location of an entity and the countries it serves. CAF’s scope 
of lending is restricted to Latin America. Here, presidentialism has prevailed in regional 
arrangements: Latin American presidents have in the last two decades played a prominent role in 
crafting and implementing foreign policy (Malamud, 2014). A solid leader within an IO working 
in this region is vital not only for creating an internal culture of cohesiveness, but also to keep 
political interference at bay (while cultivating relationships with presidents with diverse political 
leanings). In Latin America, institutional leadership has the potential not only to buttress or to 
destroy an institution, but also to make it relevant for its members. As previously noted, only 
recently, Fonplata (another RFIs in the Southern Cone) inaugurated an executive president 
position in its efforts to promote institutional growth and solidify long-term goals and 
institutional accountability. As such, this dissertation contributes to a better understanding of 
how individual actors may be just as important, if not more important, than IO bureaucratic 
structure or external influence in shaping the ways that an IO can respond to (and balance) the 
financial and non-material demands of distinct stakeholders within a specific region. 
In addition, this study contributes to regional governance literature. The prominence of 
regionalism is a core feature of South America’s international relations. The proliferation of 
cooperation efforts beginning in the early 2000s alongside competing economic and political 
rivalries represents an opportunity for academics to engage with topics beyond trade matters, 
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which have been widely discussed in the literature. This study has focused on the distinctiveness 
of cooperation on infrastructure matters in a multilateral environment. This study traced the 
motivations and main events that triggered cooperation in this area, despite the absence of 
economic interdependence and strong demand for economic integration, factors which scholars 
like Mattli (1999) have outlined as vital factors for intergovernmental cooperation and policy 
coordination. Although scholars have studied topics such as Unasur as a venue for cooperation 
and/or Brazil’s role in promoting integration and launching IIRSA,20 this dissertation brings a 
different perspective since it has focused on understanding cooperation on infrastructure from a 
RFI’s viewpoint, while engaging with how South American governments are constructing 
cooperation in their region and framing what it means at an ideological and material levels.  
By analyzing IIRSA and the different groups involved in the initiative, this thesis traced 
how the concept of cooperation based on infrastructure development has been repositioned in the 
regional agenda. Through supporting (or at times criticizing) IIRSA, various states in the region 
have seized the opportunities to pursue an assertive regionalist and/or sub-regionalist agenda 
with the goal of promoting their own views on development. Moreover, this study has shown 
that cooperation on infrastructure is not necessarily a tale of regional hegemony; Brazilian 
leadership has impacted the structural environment, but the actions of this government are 
overall more reflective of a nation acting as a facilitator rather than as a financier. CAF has paid 
attention then to its member governments’ priorities and demands and has been able to diversify 
and grow its infrastructure portfolio. CAF has done very well in engaging with the regional 
leader: the institution has banked on Brazilian ideals of a South American identity and on the fact 
                                                        
20 See for example Sanahuja (2012) on Unasur, Burgues (2009) on Brazil’s leadership and Carvahlo (2010) on Brazil’s role in IIRSA. 
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that infrastructure (due to the complex geography of the region and the large scope of several 
projects) is an area which countries are willing to receive technical advice. 
Although some scholars suggest that recent changes in regionalism are having 
transformative impacts on sovereignty, other scholars acknowledge that changes in regionalism 
have taken place, but that they have been accompanied by persistent and traditional meanings 
and practices of sovereignty.21 Through qualitative empirical research, this dissertation has 
engaged within the regional experience and has pointed to the limits and possibilities of 
cooperation on infrastructure, and more generally to cooperation in the region. This contributes 
to our current understanding of South America’s ongoing regional, institutional, and sovereignty 
patterns, as well as the scope for regional governance.  
Through the analysis of CAF’s participation in IIRSA, this study demonstrated how the 
promotion of infrastructure through IIRSA has resulted in what could be described as a “non-
ownership” model, where despite agreed consensus and constant exchange of ideas between 
twelve South American countries and RFIs, there is a lack of efforts to go beyond coordination 
exercises. Ultimately, this study sides with the view that sovereignty is at present a distinctive 
feature of regional initiatives, in particular of those engaging with physical integration. While 
changing member governments’ preferences in South America since the mid-2005 have created a 
space to move beyond trade and “open regionalism” discussions, governments are using this 
space to materialize national projects, while drawing upon diverse sources of multilateral and 
bilateral financing. For CAF, this has meant that the entity still has a localized role to play in 
financing countries’ priorities, as long as its staff continues to engage with members to 
understand which kind of projects CAF can finance or co-finance according to its principals’ 
                                                        
21 See Legler (2013) for a discussion on academics’ viewpoints on sovereignty and regionalism in Latin America. 
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national agendas, the situation of the global financial markets, and increasing pressure to tighten 
projects’ environmental standards.  
 
7.4 Future research agendas 
The analysis in this dissertation also suggests a number of future research agendas. First, this 
thesis has limited its empirical analysis to a single RFI. However, while discussing the survival 
and growth of CAF, several factors have been outlined that could be taken into account when 
studying the conditions that need to be in place for an IO to survive within a region. The 
opportunities and dilemmas that CAF faces when dealing with its two main stakeholders—
members and CRAs—may be relevant for other institutions that are not operational yet, or that 
are trying to expand their operations. As such scholars, IO staff and policymakers involved in 
regional discussions could evaluate how the combination of one of more of the following 
factors—leadership, institution design, changing national government’s preferences and the 
impact of a country’s foreign policy in regionalism—may impact the functioning on an IO. 
Scholars and policymakers interested in emerging institutions, such as the BRICS’ New 
Development Bank could pull some valuable lessons from studying, for instance, how CAF 
obtained its current credit rating or how its lean management structure has speeded operational 
decisions, including loan approvals. Other aspects of study include financing mechanisms and 
hiring practices. For more alternative projects like the Bank of the South, the findings of this 
study invite scholars, for instance to explore a development bank’s need for a clear financial 
mandate. This mandate needs to be fulfilled by building trust within and beyond members. In 
CAF’s case, the entity looked at the international markets’ as the way to increase funds for 
lending. CAF has shown that its success has depended on Garcia’s ability to bring financial 
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soundness to the institution, while combining a clear geopolitical and growth vision with an 
approach that limited political interference from member governments. 
Moreover, the regionalism-sovereignty dynamic has opened a broad research agenda and 
this study of CAF represents only a small fraction of all the potential studies that need to be 
carried out in order to understand new regional consensus and dilemmas, such as the ones that 
have taken place in IIRSA. Both continuity and change seem to be present in the institutional and 
sociopolitical trends of ongoing regional initiatives. As Leger (2013) suggests, 
Given the seemingly limited or problematic applicability of theoretical and conceptual 
tools fashioned by intellectuals in other empirical contexts [e.g. Europe], Latin American 
scholars therefore need to move beyond describing trends and patterns in regional politics 
and sovereignty to theorizing much more why and how they occur, persist, or are 
transformed (p.344). 
 
 This study has engaged broadly with one aspect of physical integration: transport 
infrastructure, which has been by far the most important focus of IIRSA’s agenda. However, 
RFIs have increasingly paid attention to energy integration, an area which fell outside the scope 
of this thesis (and in which CAF has been more active recently). Recent scholarship has begun to 
undertake comparative studies. For example, Palestini and Agostinis (2014) have engaged with 
the study and comparison of transport and energy integration by focusing on state preferences 
and regional leadership as crucial factors in explaining why regional cooperation emerged in 
South America at the beginning of the past decade, and why it has progressed further in some 
areas than in others. Future studies of CAF and of regional agendas would need to engage with 
energy cooperation. For instance, the growing weight of the energy sector prodded CAF’s 
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corporate decision to create a new Vice-presidency for Energy Projects in late 2012. According 
to its 2012 Annual Report, among this new vice-presidency’s goals is fostering the development 
of sustainable energy systems for the region’s countries, through project financing and 
specialized technical assistance (CAF AR, 2012). The energy sector has also already opened 
some doors for CAF to engage with its newest members in the Southern Cone. For example, in 
2013, at the request of the governments of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia, CAF supported 
studies to analyze the feasibility of a gas interconnection between these countries (CAF AR, 
2013).  
 I would like to end this dissertation by quoting a recent phrase by Enrique Garcia, 
reflecting upon his views (which have been discussed throughout this study) on the relevance of 
RFIs in the region,  
It is important to reaffirm the fundamental role played by multilateral development banks 
in Latin America, particularly regional banks. The question that frequently arises about 
the need for new regional banks, and even the question about the relevance of those that 
currently exist, can be answered simply: consider the investment and financing needs of 
the region, if it hopes to achieve high and sustained growth rates that enable it to attain 
similar levels of per capita income as industrialized countries within 20 years, while at 
the same time achieving genuine inclusion and social equity (Garcia, 2014, p.21). 
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Appendix A 
 
 
WB IADB CAF
1971-1980 1,462 1,294 56
1981-1989 4,332 2,849 281
                 
1990
5,965 3,881 812
                 
1991
5,237 5,419 1,300
                 
1992
5,662 6,023 1,773
                 
1993
6,169 5,963 2,096
                 
1994
4,747 5,255 2,160
                 
1995
6,061 7,248 2,258
                 
1996
4,438 6,766 2,314
                 
1997
4,563 6,048 2,900
                 
1998
 6,040 10,063 2,672
                 
1999
7,737 9,486 2,182
                 
2000
4,064 5,266 2,323
                 
2001
5,300 7,854 3,196
                 
2002
 4,366 4,549 3,291
                 
2003
5,821 6,810 3,304
                 
2004
                 
 5,320
6,020 3,504
                 
2005
5,166 6,858 4,746
                 
2006
 5,911 6,239 5,521
                 
2007
 4,553 8,735 6,607
                 
2008
4,660 11,226 7,947
                 
2009
14,031 15,507 9,170
                 
2010
13,907 12,464 10,533
                 
2011
 9,629 10,911 10,066
2007-2011 32,598 58,843 44,323
 Multilateral Development Banks 
Loans to Latin America (Approvals, 
current USD million dollars) 
Source:	Ocampo	and	Titelman	(2012)	and	
institutional	annual	reports
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
Institutions and arrangements for financing long-term development projects in 
South America 
 
Institution Members/ 
Beneficiaries 
(Regional) 
Objectives/ 
Specific Programs 
Partnerships Financial 
Highlights 
Other Highlights 
Banco del 
Alba – The 
Bolivarian 
Alliance for 
the Peoples of 
our America 
(ALBA)  
 
2008 
Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, 
Cuba, Saint 
Vincent and 
the Grenadines, 
and Venezuela  
The Bank aims to 
boost industrial and 
agricultural production 
and to support social 
projects and 
multilateral 
cooperation 
agreements among its 
members. 
  N/A                                                 
At present, the 
bank is mainly 
acting as an 
agent for 
SUCRE 
transactions. 
Part of the ALBA strategy, 
jointly with the SUCRE 
regional currency. Although 
there are no specific 
transactions available on its 
website, the Bank advertises 
its  “Intra-Alba” exchange 
commercial program 
financing directed at 
Venezuelan importers who 
want to acquire Bolivian 
goods. 
Bank of the 
South  
 
2009 
Argentina, 
Brazil, 
Paraguay, 
Uruguay, 
Ecuador, 
Bolivia, and 
Venezuela  
The goal is to support 
social programs and 
infrastructure in the 
Latin American 
region.  
  N/A                                                 
At present, the 
bank is not 
operational. 
Brazil and Paraguay have 
not ratified its constitutive 
agreements at the congress 
level. 
BNDES - The 
Brazilian 
National 
Development 
Bank 
 
1952 
Brazil, with an 
internalization 
strategy 
The international 
dimension of BNDES 
includes continuous 
efforts to strengthen 
traditional operations 
such as export 
financing of Brazilian 
goods and services, to 
projects implemented 
overseas and 
institutional 
fundraising through 
multilateral entities, 
and enhancing 
promotional activities.  
Cooperation 
agreements signed 
with the 
development 
banks of China, 
India, Russia and 
South Africa as 
part of its 
continuing 
engagement with 
the BRICS 
countries . 
The BNDES 
financed 27 
infrastructure 
projects in 
South America 
from 1997 to 
2013. BNDES’ 
total support for 
exports of 
Brazilian goods 
and services to 
the region was 
US$3.67 billion 
from 2001 to 
2010. 
In August 2009, it opened its 
first branch office in South 
America, in Montevideo, 
Uruguay.  
BRICS Bank 
- New 
Development 
Bank 
 
2014 
Brazil, Russia, 
India, China 
and South 
Africa 
The bank is initially 
expected to focus on 
financing 
infrastructure.  
BNDES N/A                                          
Bank is not 
operational yet. 
Initial 
subscribed 
capital base of 
USD $50 
billion, with 
each of the five 
countries 
contributing 
USD $10 billion 
and receiving 
equal voting 
rights. 
Driven by a politically 
expedient concept. 
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CAF - 
Development 
Bank of Latin 
America 
 
1968 
Series A 
shareholders 
(full members): 
Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, 
Ecuador, 
Panama, 
Paraguay, 
Peru, Trinidad 
& Tobago 
Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
Series C 
shareholders: 
Costa Rica, 
Mexico, Chile, 
Dominican 
Republic, 
Jamaica, Spain 
and Portugal  
CAF aims to reinforce 
and expand its role as 
an institution that 
promotes Latin 
American integration, 
and to strengthen the 
sustainability of its 
operations.  
G-NEXID, IDFC, 
part of the IIRSA 
technical 
committee, 
several MoUs 
with other 
development 
banks. 
In 2013, the 
institution 
approved US 
$12.1 billion in 
financing, a 
31% increase 
over 2012.  
Products & services:  short-, 
medium-, and long-term 
loans; structured finance; 
A/B loans with int. 
institutions and banks; 
financial advisory services; 
bonds and guarantees; 
partial guarantees; equity; 
treasury services; technical 
cooperation; credit lines. 
CBD - China 
Development 
Bank 
 
1994 
Chinese public 
and private 
institutions, 
with an 
internationaliza
tion strategy 
CDB has been China’s 
leading financier for 
the development of 
national infrastructure 
and basic and key 
industries, which are 
its primary business.  
IDFC According to 
data gathered by 
the Inter-
American 
Dialogue, China 
provided loan 
commitments 
upwards of 
USD$98 billion 
between 2005 
and 2013). The 
bulk comes 
from the CB 
and the Exim 
Bank. Yet, 
Chinese lending 
in the region is 
highly 
concentrated by 
country. Over 
half of these 
loans went to 
Venezuela, 
followed by 
Argentina and 
Brazil, with the 
rest of Latin 
America 
accounting for 
slightly over 
20%.  
Responsible for raising 
funding for large 
infrastructure projects. 
China's Exim 
Bank - 
Export-Import 
Bank of China 
 
1994 
The Export-Import 
Bank of China aims to 
facilitate exports and 
imports of Chinese 
mechanical and 
technical products and 
complete sets of 
equipment; to assist 
Chinese companies; 
and to promote Sino-
foreign global 
economic and trade 
cooperation. It is a key 
on-lending bank of 
foreign government 
loans and the only 
operating bank for 
government 
concessional loans. 
G-NEXID, MoU 
with other RFIs 
including CAF 
and the IADB 
Products and services: 
export credit and import 
credit; loans to overseas 
construction contracts and 
loans to overseas investment 
projects; Chinese 
government concessional 
loans; international 
guarantees; on lending loans 
from foreign governments 
and international financial 
institutions; international 
and domestic settlement and 
corporate deposits under the 
loan facilities provided by 
the Bank; raising funds in 
domestic and international 
capital markets and money 
markets; international inter-
bank loans, organizing or 
participating in international 
and domestic syndication 
loans; inter-bank 
borrowing/lending and bond 
repurchasing; foreign 
exchange transaction and 
approved risk-protection 
foreign exchange (FX) 
business for clients. 
Fonplata - 
Plata Basin 
Financial 
Development 
Fund 
 
1976 
Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, 
Paraguay and 
Uruguay 
To carry out studies, 
projects, programs and 
works aimed at 
promoting the 
harmonic development 
and physical 
integration of the La 
Plata Basin, allocating 
to that end its own 
resources and those 
obtained from other 
financial sources.  
Part of IIRSA's 
technical 
committee (with 
IADB and CAF) 
On December 
31, 2013 
FONPLATA 
loan portfolio 
reached US$ 
664.3 million. 
Authorized 
capital reaches 
US$ 1,639.2 
millions 
(subscribed 
capital is US$ 
489.2 millions). 
If the capital and operative 
amounts are compared with 
the objectives of 
FONPLATA and the 
volumes managed by other 
RFIs in the region, it 
becomes evident that 
FONPLATA has a small 
amount of resources, which 
has undoubtedly limited its 
performance and compliance 
with the functions that were 
assigned to it since its 
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creation.  In 2013, a new 
strategic vision was 
approved, which included 
the creation of the position 
of Executive President. 
IADB - Inter-
American 
Development 
Bank 
 
1959 
 48 member 
countries, 
including 26 
Latin 
American and 
Caribbean 
borrowing 
members. 
China has 
joined as a 
member. 
The IADB’s priorities 
and actions have 
shifted over the years 
to adapt to the various 
prevalent integration 
schemes in Latin 
America. The IDB 
provides financial and 
non-financial 
resources to 
governments, 
businesses, and civil 
society organizations 
in its 26 borrowing 
member countries. 
Financial instruments 
include loans for 
public and private 
sector investment 
projects, policy 
reforms, and help in 
managing financial 
crisis. It also provides 
partial credit 
guarantees as well as 
grants for technical 
cooperation and 
recovery from natural 
disasters. 
Several MoUs 
with other 
development 
banks  
Approved 
lending and 
grants in 2013: 
USD $14 billion 
The capital subscribed for 
and voting rights in the 
IADB were divided as 
follows: Latin American 
developing countries 
represented approximately 
50% (with Brazil and 
Argentina around 10% 
each), a significant portion 
(30%) was held by the U.S. 
and the rest was divided 
between Canada and 
advanced economies outside 
the region.                                                                                          
WB - World 
Bank 
 
1944 
The 
International 
Bank for 
Reconstruction 
and 
Development 
(IBRD) has 
188 member 
countries, 
while the 
International 
Development 
Association  
(IDA) has 172 
members. Each 
member state 
of IBRD 
should be also 
a member of 
the IMF. 
According to 
its voting 
power, Brazil 
ranks #14 in 
the IBRD, and 
the IDA. No 
other Latin 
American 
country is the 
top 20 list. 
Its official goal is 
the reduction of 
poverty. According to 
its Articles of 
Agreement, all its 
decisions must be 
guided by a 
commitment to the 
promotion of foreign 
investment and 
international trade and 
to the facilitation of 
capital investment. 
The IBRD provides 
financial services as 
well as strategic 
coordination and 
information services to 
its borrowing member 
countries The Bank 
only finances 
sovereign 
governments directly, 
or projects backed by 
sovereign government. 
Several MoUs 
with other 
development 
banks  
In 2013 the WB 
approved USD 
$5.2 billion for 
41 projects in 
Latin America. 
Support came 
from two 
groups: $435 
million from the 
IDA and $4.8 
billion from the 
IBRD 
commitments.  
Although members 
contribute capital to the 
IBRD, the Bank acquires 
funds primarily by 
borrowing on international 
capital markets by 
issuing bonds. The Bank 
raised $29 billion USD 
worth of capital in 2011 
from bonds issued in 26 
different currencies. The 
IBRD has enjoyed a triple-
A credit rating since 1959.                                                 
 
Sources: Institutions' websites, Alvarez (2013), Gallagher et al. (2012), Garcia-Guerrero 
et al. (2014), SELA (2010), Hochstetler (2014), Withol (2014). 
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Appendix C 
 
List of all capital contributions made by shareholder countries during 2007-2012 
 
Argentina:  
 In 2007, Argentina entered into an agreement to subscribe to an additional $543.0 million in 
Series ‘‘C’’ shares, of which it paid $315.0 million in 2009, $105.0 million in 2010 and $123.0 
million in 2011.In 2009, Argentina subscribed to an additional $190.0 million in Series ‘‘C’’ 
shares, to be paid in seven installments, of which it paid $10.0 million in 2011 and $150.0 million 
in 2012. 
 In 2010, Argentina subscribed to $126.0 million in callable capital. 
 In February 2011, upon completion of all requirements to become a full member shareholder 
country, Argentina acquired a $1.2 million Series ‘‘A’’ share and exchanged all of its Series ‘‘C’’ 
ordinary and callable capital shares for Series ‘‘B’’ share equivalents. 
 In March 2012, Argentina subscribed to an additional $228.6 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares, to be 
paid in four installments beginning in 2013. 
 
Bolivia 
 In 2009, Bolivia subscribed to an additional $105.0 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares, to be paid in 
eight installments, of which it paid $5.0 million in 2010, $5.0 million in 2011 and $10.0 million 
in 2012.  
 In January 2012, Bolivia subscribed to an additional $91.5 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares, to be 
paid in four installments beginning in 2013. 
 
Brazil 
 In 2007, Brazil entered into an agreement to subscribe to an additional $467.0 million in Series 
‘‘C’’ shares, which was paid in full in 2013. 
 In 2009, Brazil subscribed to an additional $190.0 million in Series ‘‘C’’ shares to be paid in 
seven installments, of which it paid $25.1 million in 2013. 
 In 2009, Brazil subscribed to $126.0 million in callable capital. 
 In 2010, upon completion of all requirements to become a full member shareholder country, 
Brazil acquired a $1.2 million Series ‘‘A’’ share and exchanged all of its Series ‘‘C’’ ordinary 
and callable capital shares for Series ‘‘B’’ share equivalents. In September 2012, Brazil 
subscribed to an additional $228.6 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares, to be paid in four installments 
beginning in 2013. 
 
Chile 
 
 In 2007, the Republic of Chile subscribed to an additional $50.0 million in Series ‘‘C’’ shares, 
which was paid in full in the same year. 
 
Colombia 
 In 2009, Colombia subscribed to an additional $20.0 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares, which was 
paid in full in 2010. 
 In 2010, Colombia subscribed to an additional $150 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares to be paid in 
five installments of which it paid $2.0 million in 2010, $18.0 million in 2011, $30 million in 2012 
and $50 million in May 2013. 
 In June 2012, Colombia subscribed to an additional $210.0 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares to be 
paid in three installments beginning in 2015. 
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 In August 2012, Colombia subscribed to an additional $228.6 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares, to be 
paid in four installments beginning in 2013. 
 
Ecuador 
 In 2009, Ecuador subscribed to an additional $105.0 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares to be paid in 
eight installments, of which it paid $5.0 million in 2010, $5.0 million in 2011 and $10.0 million 
in 2012. 
 In March 2012, Ecuador subscribed to an additional $91.5 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares, to be 
paid in four installments beginning in 2013. 
 
Mexico 
 In June 2012, Mexico entered into an agreement to subscribe to an additional $100.0 million in 
Series ‘‘C’’ shares of CAF, which was paid in full that same month. 
 
Panama 
 In 2008, Panama entered into an agreement to subscribe to an additional $170.0 million in Series 
‘‘C’’ shares to be paid in five annual installments beginning in 2009. As of the date of this 
Offering Circular, Panama has paid $140.0 million, with the remaining balance to be paid in one 
instalment in 2013. 
 In 2009, Panama subscribed to an additional $55.0 million in Series ‘‘C’’ shares to be paid in 
seven installments, of which it paid $3.0 million in 2011 and $5.0 million in 2012. 
 In 2010, Panama subscribed to $36.0 million in callable capital. 
 In 2010, upon completion of all requirements to become a full member shareholder country, 
Panama acquired a $1.2 million Series ‘‘A’’ share and exchanged all of its Series ‘‘C’’ ordinary 
and callable capital shares for Series ‘‘B’’ share equivalents. 
 In February 2012, Panama subscribed to an additional $91.5 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares, to be 
paid in five installments beginning in 2013. 
 
Paraguay 
 In 2008, Paraguay entered into an agreement to subscribe to an additional $189.0 million in 
Series ‘‘C’’ shares. As of the date of this Offering Circular, Paraguay has paid $100.0 million, 
with the balance to be paid in two annual installments ending in 2014.  
 In 2009, Paraguay subscribed to an additional $55.0 million in Series ‘‘C’’ shares to be paid in 
seven installments, of which it paid $3.0 million in 2011 and $5.0 million in 2012. 
 In December 2011, upon completion of all requirements to become a full member shareholder 
country, Paraguay acquired a $1.2 million Series ‘‘A’’ share and exchanged all of its Series ‘‘C’’ 
ordinary and callable capital shares for Series ‘‘B’’ share equivalents. 
 In May 2012, Paraguay subscribed to an additional $91.5 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares, to be paid 
in five installments beginning in 2013. 
 
Peru 
 In 2009, Peru subscribed to an additional $380.0 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares to be paid in eight 
installments, but later this schedule was modified to seven installments. As of 31 December 2011, 
Peru has paid $40 million, with the balance to be paid in six annual installments ending in 2016. 
 In March 2012, Peru subscribed to an additional $228.6 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares, to be paid 
in four installments beginning in 2013. 
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Portugal 
 In 2009, Portugal subscribed to EUR 15.0 million in Series ‘‘C’’ shares to be paid in four equal 
installments and EUR 60.0 million in callable capital. As of the date of this Offering Circular, 
Portugal has paid EUR 11.3 million with the balance to be paid in 2013. 
 
Spain 
 In 2010, Spain subscribed to an additional $327.0 million of paid-in capital to be paid in five 
installments ending in 2014. The first three payments were received for a total aggregate amount 
of $196.2 million. 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 
 In 2009, Trinidad and Tobago entered into an agreement to subscribe to Series ‘‘C’’ shares for a 
total capital contribution of $6.0 million. As of the date of this Offering Circular, Trinidad and 
Tobago has paid $5.0 million, with the balance to be paid in 2013. 
 In April 2012, Trinidad and Tobago entered into an agreement to subscribe to an additional 
$323.4 million in Series ‘‘C’’ shares of CAF, to be paid in three annual installments, of which it 
paid $107.8 million in 2012. 
 
Uruguay 
 In 2007, Uruguay entered into an agreement to subscribe to an additional $137.0 million in Series 
‘‘C’’ shares, of which it paid $81.0 million in 2009, $27.0 million in 2010 and the balance of 
$29.0 million in 2011. 
 In 2009, Uruguay subscribed to an additional $55.0 million in Series ‘‘C’’ shares to be paid in 
seven annual installments ending in 2017, of which it paid $3.0 million in 2011 and $5.0 million 
in 2012. 
 In 2009, Uruguay subscribed to $36.0 million in callable capital. 
 In 2010, upon completion of all requirements to become a full member shareholder country, 
Uruguay acquired a $1.2 million Series ‘‘A’’ share and exchanged all of its Series ‘‘C’’ ordinary 
and callable capital shares for Series ‘‘B’’ share equivalents. 
 In February 2012, Uruguay subscribed to an additional $91.5 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares, to be 
paid in four installments beginning in 2013. 
 
Venezuela 
 In 2009, Venezuela subscribed to an additional $380.0 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares to be paid in 
eight installments, of which it has paid $70.0 million as of the date of this Offering Circular. In 
August 2012, Venezuela subscribed to an additional $228.6 million in Series ‘‘B’’ shares, to be 
paid in four installments beginning in 2013. 
 
 
Source: CAF (2013a). U.S.$7,000,000,000 Medium Term Note Programme.  
